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ABSTRACT
This research proposes several methods designed to improve solutions for
security classification problems. The security classification problem involves unbal-
anced, high-dimensional, binary classification problems that are prevalent today.
The imbalance within this data involves a significant majority of the negative class
and a minority positive class. Any system that needs protection from malicious
activity, intruders, theft, or other types of breaches in security must address this
problem. These breaches in security are considered instances of the positive class.
Given numerical data that represent observations or instances which require classi-
fication, state of the art machine learning algorithms can be applied. However, the
unbalanced and high-dimensional structure of the data must be considered prior to
applying these learning methods. High-dimensional data poses a “curse of dimen-
sionality” which can be overcome through the analysis of subspaces. Exploration of
intelligent subspace modeling and the fusion of subspace models is proposed. De-
tailed analysis of the one-class support vector machine, as well as its weaknesses and
proposals to overcome these shortcomings are included. A fundamental method for
evaluation of the binary classification model is the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve and the area under the curve (AUC). This work details the underlying
statistics involved with ROC curves, contributing a comprehensive review of ROC
curve construction and analysis techniques to include a novel graphic for illustrating
the connection between ROC curves and classifier decision values. The major inno-
vations of this work include synergistic classifier fusion through the analysis of ROC
curves and rankings, insight into the statistical behavior of the gaussian kernel, and
novel methods for applying machine learning techniques to defend against computer
intrusion detection. The primary empirical vehicle for this research is computer in-
trusion detection data, and both host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) and
network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are addressed. Empirical studies




During the air defense battles of World War II, the value of radar and signal de-
tection grew at an explosive rate. Radar techniques were relatively primitive and
required significant human interaction and interpretation. The essence of the prob-
lem was simple. Radar detected incoming aircraft. A radar operator needed to
be able to distinguish between friendly and enemy aircraft. Identifying a friendly
aircraft as enemy (a false positive), created an expensive sequence of drills and de-
fensive responses. This could potentially subject the inbound friendly aircraft to
friendly fire. There was also the danger of not alerting when actual enemy aircraft
were inbound, a false negative. Radar represents one of the earliest signal detec-
tion problems which required humans to interact and interpret a technical measure,
the radar signal, with the overall goal of classifying the observation as one of two
classes. This is a binary classification problem. In order to measure the effectiveness
of radar operators, the military recorded the performance of these radar operators.
This performance measure became known as the radar receiver operating charac-
teristic illustrated on the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve [53]. Radar
became one of the earliest applications of signal detection theory. After World War
II, atomic weapons boosted the importance of air defense. In the 1950s tremen-
dous research efforts, such as the MIT led Project Charles, communicated the vast
problems and gaps that existed in national air defense. The final report of Project
Charles, originally a classified document, emphasized that in order to improve air
defense the program would need significant manpower and a deliberate layered de-
tection strategy in order to overcome costly false positives [103].
Much of the enemy aircraft threat existed in remote areas where vast expanses,
such as oceans or harsh northern territories further constrained the nation’s ability
to man an adequate air defense system. This marked the beginning of a long quest
to automate signal detection. Naka and Ward explain the history of air defense
coverage across Alaska and Canada and the critical need for an automated system
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that could defend this enormous territory [115].
Although ROC curves and automated signal detection has matured immensely
since its inception over half a century ago, there is a continued effort to improve
automation and vast use of ROC curves to support various types of binary decisions.
This dissertation contributes several novel methods that involve the automation and
accuracy of binary prediction models. Although the applications presented in this
thesis do not involve radar and air defense, many similar threads exist between early
research of automated binary decision making and the novelties included in this
dissertation. Today’s binary classification problems have increased complexity and
dimensionality, however today’s binary prediction models and computing resources
provide tools and leverage necessary to tackle the problems. There is still a continued
quest to automate these systems, reduce false positives, and simply improve overall
accuracy. In many ways, this quest is no different from the quest that Naka and
Ward discuss when they explain one of the original quests for automated signal
detection that occurred over half a century ago [115].
1.1 Statement of the Problem
A novel framework for solving the high-dimensional unbalanced binary classi-
fication problem in both the supervised and unsupervised domain is proposed. This
type of classification problem will be referred to as the security classification
problem.
A typical security domain abounds with healthy instances or observations.
The healthy instances in a security problem will always comprise the majority, and
hence are called the majority class. The unhealthy, or positive instances are the
minority class.
1.2 Notation and Formulation of the Security Classification
Problem
The formulation of the security problem assumes there is a given data set
X ∈ RN×m. X contains N instances or observations, x1,x2, ...,xN , where xi ∈ R1×m.
There are m variables to represent every instance. For every instance there is a label
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or class, yi ∈ {−1, +1}. The unbalanced nature of this problem indicates a prevailing
negative or healthy class and minimal instances of the positive or unhealthy class.
A fundamental problem within the security classification problem is that in-
creased dimensionality, especially if it contains noisy data, can degrade learning.
For classification problems that assume the data is balanced and plentiful, there are
feature extraction techniques designed to effectively reduce dimensionality without
degrading performance [67, 76], however this is not the case with the security clas-
sification problem. Managing high-dimensional data is not as simple if the classes
are unbalanced. It is even more difficult when there are no instances of the positive
class or unknown instances of the positive class in the training data.
The underlying premise of this research is that given a security classification
problem, improved performance can be achieved through a divide and conquer ap-
proach that involves analyzing the subspaces within X.
1.3 Objectives of the Research
This research includes three objectives:
1. Create a general framework for improving the accuracy of solutions for secu-
rity classification problems. This framework will include specific models that
are particularly applicable for security classification problems, however more
importantly the framework will provide procedural knowledge for solving se-
curity classification problems. This framework will also expose a taxonomy for
security classification problems to enhance a practitioner’s ability to quickly
identify the type and nature of problem he is facing.
2. Examine computer intrusion detection data as the primary empirical vehicle
for this research. Intrusion detection is an excellent example of a security clas-
sification problem. Intrusion detection datasets which stress state-of-the-art
learning models are available, and additionally this is an active and constantly
changing field of research.
3. Utilize and enhance state-of-the-art learning methods for solving security clas-
sification problems. Unsupervised learning is a major component of this re-
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search, with a particular emphasis on one-class support vector machines (SVM)
which are suited exceptionally well for solving security classification problems.
Learning models will focus on kernel methods. These advanced learning meth-
ods will be combined with multivariate statistical analysis and dimension re-
duction techniques to address problems within the learning models that have
not been solved and tailor these models for security classification problems.
1.4 Hypotheses
Several hypotheses that seek to characterize the security classification problem
have been created. The purpose of itemizing the hypotheses is to clearly indicate
unsolved problems and the chapters within this dissertation that address these un-
solved problems.
1. Kernel-based pattern recognition suffers from a curse of dimensionality. The
underlying theory and fundamentals that prove this hypothesis as true are
shown in this chapter. This is also shown experimentally in section 2.2.3.3.
2. Subspace modeling and fusion of models with fuzzy logic aggregators can im-
prove accuracy. This is perhaps the most important finding of this disserta-
tion. Chapter 6 provides theoretical and empirical proof that class imbalance
is a critical additional parameter that must be included when fusing models.
T-norms (minimum, algebraic product, etc.) have consistently demonstrated
superior performance as a subspace aggregator when there is a minority posi-
tive class. Modeling in randomly selected subspaces consistently outperforms
models constructed from the entire set of dimensions. Chapters 5 and 6 detail
the efforts that prove this hypothesis as true.
3. The general problem of the curse of dimensionality can be systematically solved
with intelligent subspace modeling and model fusion. This is an explored but
unproven hypothesis. Selecting the right subspaces is a difficult problem which
has been approached with several alternatives. Chapter 5 includes several
exploratory efforts that aim to create intelligent subspace models.
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4. Statistical analysis of the gaussian kernel provides an opportunity for auto-
mated kernel tuning for the one class SVM. The nonlinear patterns recognized
by the gaussian kernel make this kernel a favorite amongst practitioners. How-
ever, this kernel contains an additional free parameter that requires additional
tuning and validation. Chapter 7 provides novel insight into the statistical be-
havior of the gaussian kernel. Optimization of certain statistical measures of
the gaussian kernel present opportunities for automated tuning. The chapter
proposes a heuristic that illustrates the use of these statistics to automate the
tuning of the gaussian kernel. Promising empirical results support use of the
heuristic as an automated tuning method.
1.5 Innovative Progress to Date
This section highlights some of the novel contributions of this research. Each of
the following subsections summarizes an innovative approach that has been applied
during the course of this research.
1.5.1 Pursuit of the Synergistic ROC Curve
Given that the security problem involves binary classification, Receiver oper-
ating characteristic (ROC) curves will provide the primary measure of effectiveness
of the models. The ROC curve plots the false positive rate on the x-axis and the
true positive rate on the y-axis. Given that both of these rates have minimal values
of zero and maximal values of unity, the area under the ROC curve also ranges be-
tween zero and one. This area is an excellent scalar measure of binary classification,
and it also involves a probabilistic interpretation. This area is the probability that
the classifier will correctly rank a negative instance lower than a positive instance.
The pursuit throughout this research is to develop techniques that improve the area
under the ROC curve for security classification problems, both in the supervised and
unsupervised domain. Consistent with the divide and conquer approach, subspaces
of X play a critical role throughout this research. Every subspace could provide an
independent model, and each independent model would create an ROC curve. An
ongoing pursuit involves combining these independent models such that synergistic
6
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of synergistic ROC curve vs. ROCCH
1.5.2 The Relationship between ROC Curves and Decision Values
Chapter 3 provides a summary on how to construct ROC curves from ranks.
The chapter includes several algorithms used for construction, with an additional
discussion regarding the analysis of the partial area under the ROC curve. Most
of the chapter is not novel information, however the chapter does provide a useful
survey regarding ROC curve construction. The one novel aspect of the chapter
involves a graphical method to illustrate the relationship between ROC curves and
decision values. Although ROC curves can be built entirely from ranks, it is possible
to plot the decision values versus the false positive rate which creates much more
insight into the nature of the classification problem and the performance of the
classifier that the ROC curve represents.
1.5.3 Intelligent Selection of Subspaces
One of the hypotheses states that synergistic combination will not occur unless
there is intelligent subspace selection. Building models for the intelligent selection
of subspaces is an exploratory effort. Three different methods to intelligently select
subspaces have been explored. The first method involves selection of orthogonal
subspaces through the analysis of subspace principal components. Given a selection
of subspaces, it is possible to calculate the principal components of each subspace.
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If the principal components of subspaces do not demonstrate correlation, these sub-
spaces are viewed as orthogonal. Uncorrelated principal components indicates that
the subspaces are measuring different behavior. The method utilized to find these
orthogonal subspaces is evolutionary optimization.
Another technique that is closely related involves the analysis of nonparametric
statistics. Once again given a selection of subspaces, the orthogonality of these
subspaces can be measured with the use of Kendall’s W , a nonparametric statistic
that measures concordance (agreement) of rankings. Given a centroid for each
subspace, the distance of an instance can be measured to the centroid. For each
subspace, given instances 1...n, each instance can be ranked based on the distance
to the subspace centroid. The correlation of the ranked distances is calculated with
Kendall’s W . We seek a low value for Kendall’s W , indicating discordance; this is
again pursued with evolutionary optimization.
A third subspace modeling effort exploits the covariance structure of the data.
Experiments have been performed with subspaces constructed from hierarchical clus-
tering of the variables based upon their covariance as a similarity measure. Exper-
iments have also been performed with subspaces constructed with maximally co-
variant variables in subspace one, minimally covariant variables in subspace 3, and
the remaining variables in subspace 2 (as an example for a model with number of
subspaces = 3). Each of these alternatives for intelligent subspace modeling is an
innovative approach, however rigorous testing of the effectiveness of these subspace
modeling techniques is ongoing.
1.5.4 The Fuzzy ROC Curve and Synergistic Classifier Fusion
Given several subspace models, it is necessary to fuse the decision results to
determine the ultimate prediction. This fusion occurs with the application of a
technique inspired by fuzzy logic. The prediction models considered in this research
create a soft-valued decision value for each instance. Let us refer to this decision
value as d ∈ R1. For the ith observation predicted by the jth subspace model, the
soft label will be dij. dij is not a probability or a known distribution; it simply
indicates the relative confidence of a model that the instance belongs to one class
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or the other. The fusion of dij across several subspace models requires some type
of scaling enabling comparative analysis. Scaling this value as a simple rank has
shown exceptional promise for fusion; ranks provide a comparable and meaningful
measure for fusion. The rules used to fuse the decision values invoke fuzzy logic.
These ranks are then mapped to range in (0,1) without the loss of any information,
and T-norm and T-conorm aggregation operators provide a method for fusion [83].
The fusion method of choice will reflect the risk aversion of the decision maker,
indicating the decision makers aversion to either false positives or false negatives.
Furthermore, rather than blindly fusing all decisions with the same aggregator, the
model also addresses methods for fusing contentious, or disagreeing decisions. It is
often appropriate to fuse contentious decisions with a different aggregation rule.
Intersections(T-Norms) Unions(T-Conorms)Averages









Figure 1.2: Fuzzy aggregation operators
The measure of effectiveness for subspace modeling and fusion involves com-
paring performance of these intelligent subspace modeling techniques against both
the base model and fusion of randomly selected subspaces. The performance of the
novelty detection method can be benchmarked by running the method with every
variable in one subspace. This will be referred to as the base model. This base
model is often a poor performer due to degradation created by a high-dimensional,
noisy input space.
It is not uncommon for randomly selected subspaces that are modeled and
fused to consistently perform better than this base model. The effectiveness of alter-
nate aggregation operators can be explored with these randomly selected subspaces.
The effectiveness of the subspace modeling is measured by comparing performance
of randomly selected subspaces and a fixed fusion method versus the intelligently
selected subspaces. Results of intelligent subspace modeling and fuzzy ROC curve
fusion has been reported in [48, 49].
Promising results from the fusion of ranks produced by prediction models led
to the analysis of rank distributions and pseudo ROC curves. This analysis spawned
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some of the most important results in this research. Class balance, a parameter of
every prediction model that is rarely considered and almost never included as part
of the model, provides crucial insight into the behavior of prediction models. If it is
possible to assume the balance of the classes in a binary classification problem, it is
possible to use fuzzy logic aggregators to create synergistic and improved prediction.
Chapter 6 details these results.
1.5.5 Contributions to Computer Intrusion Detection
The primary empirical vehicle and an immediate application for this research
is the computer intrusion detection problem. Computer intrusion detection is a
broad field in itself, and in general terms it can be considered an unbalanced classi-
fication problem. There are two types of intrusion detection: Host-Based Intrusion
Detection Systems (HIDS) and Network-Based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS).
Host-based systems monitor the behavior of workstations and user profiles. HIDS
typically detect anomalies. Results published in [50] illustrate datamining and clas-
sification techniques for a host-based intrusion detection problem that involved iden-
tifying authentic users versus intruders based upon command usage history of users.
This same type of model could be applied to user logs that exist on every computer.
NIDS monitor network behavior and typically detect attacks with signature-based
models (identify signatures of known attacks) and / or anomalies. In order to model
both host based data and network based data with the machine learning techniques
utilized in this research, numeric data must be extracted. The variables created to
represent the data span the full spectrum of creativity; some variables are simple
rates and averages, other variables are products of interesting data mining routines.
The data collection model and representation of the host and network data is a
byproduct of this research, however it is a contribution to the computer intrusion
detection community that should not be overlooked.
1.5.6 The Curse of Dimensionality, Kernels, and Class Imbalance
The curse of dimensionality is a commonly known problem in datamining and
machine learning. Machine learning and data mining typically seek to show a de-
gree of similarity between observations. This degree of similarity can be measured
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by numerous metrics. Most of these metrics consider some type of distance. A
problem with distance metrics in high-dimensional spaces is that distance is typ-
ically measured across volume. Volume increases exponentially as dimensionality
increases, and points tend to become equidistant. The curse of dimensionality is
explained with several artificial data problems in [93]. A simple example of this
involves a cube with sides of unit length in hyperspace. If two points within this
hypersphere are randomly selected, the variance of the distance between these two
points approaches zero as dimensionality increases. If a cube has a side of length
that is less than one, the volume of this cube approaches zero with increased dimen-
sionality; if the side is of length greater than one, the volume approaches infinity as
dimensionality increases.
Kernel-based pattern recognition, especially in the unsupervised domain, is not
entirely robust in high- dimensional input spaces. A kernel is nothing more than
a similarity measure between two observations. Given two observations, x1,x2,
the kernel between these two points is represented as κ(x1,x2). A large value for
κ(x1,x2) indicates similar points, where smaller values indicate dissimilar points.
Typical kernels include the linear kernel, κ(x1,x2) = 〈x1,x2〉, the polynomial
kernel, κ(x1,x2) = (〈x1,x2〉 + 1)p, and the popular gaussian kernel, κ(x1,x2) =
e(−‖x1−x2‖/2σ
2).1 As shown, these kernels are all functions of inner products. If the
variables within x1 and x2 are considered random variables, these kernels can be
modeled as functions of random variables. The fundamental premise of pattern
recognition is that (κ(x1,x2)|y1 = y2) > (κ(x1,x2)|y1 = y2). If this premise is
consistently true, good performance occurs. By modeling these kernels as functions
of random variables, it can be shown that the addition of noisy, meaningless input
variables degrades performance. This noise increases the variance of the kernels,
and increased variance degrades the likelihood of the fundamental premise shown
above.
For balanced supervised classification problems, feature selection methods ex-
ist for eliminating meaningless noisy variables. This is not the case in the security
problem. Certain properties may indicate a noisy variable, but it is not possible to
1Throughout this text the inner product, or dot product betwee two vectors will be represented
as 〈·, ·〉.
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determine whether or not the variable is meaningless. The notion of modeling in
subspaces is to dilute the impact of the noise while retaining every variable.
In a classification problem, the curse of dimensionality is a function of the
degree of imbalance. If there are a small number of positive examples to learn from,
feature selection is possible but difficult and the evidence required to illustrate that
a feature is not meaningful is burdensome. If the problem is balanced, the burden
is not as great. Features are much more easily filtered and selected.
A simple explanation of this is to consider a two-sample Kolmogorov test [123].
This is a classical statistical test to determine whether or not two samples come from
the same distribution, and this test is general regardless of the distribution. This
indicates that the test can be performed without knowing the underlying distribution
of the data. In classification models, a meaningful variable should behave differently
depending on the class, implying distributions that are not equal. Stated in terms of
distributions, if x is any variable taken from the space of all variables in the dataset,
(Fx(x)|y = 1) should not be equivalent to (Gx(x)|y = −1). Fx(x) and Gx(x)
simply represent the cumulative distribution functions of (x|y = 1) and (x|y =
−1), respectively. In order to apply the two-sample Kolmogorov test, the empirical
distribution functions of Fx(x) and Gx(x) must be calculated from a given sample,




equate to the number of samples in the minority class, and N2 equates to the number
of samples in the majority class. These empirical distribution functions are easily
derived from the order statistics of the given sample, which is shown in [123]. The
Kolmogorov two-sample test states that if the supremum of the difference of these
functions exceeds a tabled critical value depending on the modeler’s choice of α(sum
of probabilities in two tails), then these two distributions are significantly different.
Stated formally, our hypothesis is that Fx(x) = Gx(x). We reject this hypothesis
with a confidence of (1 − α) if equation 1.1 is true.
DN1,N2 = sup−∞<x<∞
|F ∗N1(x) − G∗N2(x)| > DN1,N2,α (1.1)
For larger values of N1 and N2 (both N1 and N2 greater than 20) and α = .05,
we can consider equation 1.2 to illustrate an example. This equation is found in the
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If N2 is fixed at 100, and N1 is considered the minority class, it is possible
























Figure 1.3: Plot of critical value for two-sample Kolmogorov test with
fixed N2, α = .05
Figure 1.3 illustrates the effect of class imbalance on feature selection. If the
classes are not balanced, as is the case when N1 = 20 and N2 = 100, there is a large
value required for DN1,N2 . It is also evident that if the classes were more severely
imbalanced, DN1,N2 would continue to grow exponentially. As the classes balance,
DN1,N2 and the critical value begins to approach a limit. The point of this exercise
was to show that the curse of dimensionality is a function of the level of imbalance
between the classes, and the two sample Kolmogorov test provides a compact and
statistically grounded explanation for this.
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1.6 Kernel Behavior in High-Dimensional Input Space
The previous subsections list the innovative claims of this research. Most of
these innovative claims rely on the assumption that noisy high-dimensional input
space can degrade the performance of kernel methods, especially given a security
classification problems. In order to further support this assumption, an example is
given in this section which illustrates the impact of dimensionality on linear kernels
and gaussian kernels.
Consider two random vectors that will serve as artificial data for this example.
x1 = (z1, z2, ..., zm), zi ∼ N(0, 1) i.i.d
x2 = (z1′ , z2′ , ..., zm′), zi′ ∼ N(0, 1) i.i.d
m′ = m, and let vi = zizi′
The expected value of vi is zero. vi is the product of two standard normal
random variables, which follows an interesting distribution discussed in [65]. The
plot of this distribution is shown in figure 1.4.
To find the expectation of a linear kernel, it is straightforward to see that
E(〈x,y〉) = ∑i vi = E(z1z1′ + z2z2′ + ... + zmzm′) = 0. The variance of the linear
kernel can be found as follows:



















(verified by numerical integration)
Again considering the linear kernel as a function of random variables, κ(x1,x2) =
〈x1,x2〉 =
∑m
i=1 vi is distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of
∑m
i=1 1 = m.
In classification problems, however, it is assumed that the distributions of the
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Figure 1.4: Plot of of the product of two standard normal random vari-
ables, vi = zizi′
variables for one class are not the same as the distributions of the variables for
the other class. Let us now consider v− as a product of dissimilar distributions,
and v+ as a product of similar distributions. Let v− = (zi − 1)(zi′ + 1). v− will
be distributed with a mean of µ− = E(zizi′ − zi′ + zi − 1) = −1, and a variance
of 3 (verified through numerical integration). The linear kernel of the dissimilar
distributions can be expressed as:




This linear kernel is distributed with the following parameters:
mean− = mµ− = −m, variance = mσ2 = 3m
For the similar observations, let v+ = (zi + 1)(zi′ + 1) = (zi − 1)(z′i − 1).
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The parameters of the kernel for the similar observations can be found in the same
manner. v+ is distributed with a mean of µ+ = E(zizi′ + zi′ + zi + 1) = 1 and a
variance of σ2 = 3. The linear kernel of the similar distributions can be expressed
as:




This kernel is distributed with the following paramaters:
mean+ = mµ+ = m, variance = mσ
2 = 3m
The means and variances of the distributions of the linear kernels are easily
tractable, and this is all the information that we need to analyze the effect of di-
mensionality on these kernels. In the above example, the mean of every variable for
dissimilar observations differs by 2. This is consistent for every variable. Obviously,
no dataset is this clean, however there are still interesting observations that can be
made. Consider that rather than each variable differing by 2, they differ by some
value εi. If εi is a small value, or even zero for some instances (which would be the
case for pure noise), this variable will contribute minimally in distinguishing similar
from dissimilar observations, and furthermore the variance of this variable will be
entirely contributed. Also notice that at the rate of 3m, variance grows large fast.
Based on this observation, an assertion is that for the binary classification
problem, bimodal variables are desirable. Each mode will correspond to either the
positive or negative class. Large deviations in these modes, with minimal variation
within a class, are also desired. An effective model must be able to distinguish v−
from v+. In order for this to occur, the model needs good separation between mean−
and mean+ and variance that is under control.
It is also interesting to explore the gaussian kernel under the same example.
For the gaussian kernel, κ(x1,y2) = e
−‖x1−x2‖2/2σ2 . This kernel is entirely dependent
upon the behavior of ‖ x1 − x2 ‖2 and the modeler’s choice of the parameter σ
(which has no relation to variance).
Restricting our attention to ‖ x1 − x2 ‖2, an initial observation is that this
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expression is nothing more than the euclidean distance squared. Also, if x1 and x2
contain variables that are distributed ∼ N(0, 1), then (x1 − x2) contains variables
distributed normally with a mean of 0 and a variance of 2.
Let w = (zi − zi′)2, implying that w/2 is a chi-squared distribution with a
mean of one (which will be annotated as χ2(1)). This also indicates that w =
2χ2(1), indicating that w has a mean of 2 and a variance of 8 (verified by numerical
integration).
Therefore, ‖ x1 − x2 ‖2=
∑m
i=1 wi will have a distribution with a mean of
2m and a variance of 8m. Notice that the variance grows much faster under this
formulation, indicating even more sensitivity to noisy variables.
The purpose of the above example is to show how every variable added will
contribute to the overall behavior of the kernel. If the variable is meaningful, the
pattern contributed to the -1 class is not equivalent to the pattern contributed to
+1 class. The meaningfulness of the variable can also be considered in terms of
cost and benefit. The benefit of including a variable in a classification model is the
contribution of the variable towards pushing mean− away from mean+. The cost of
including a variable involves the variance. This variance will be included regardless
of the significance of the benefit.
The goal is to include variables where this benefit outweighs the cost. Feature
selection manages this behavior for supervised classification models. For security
classification models, an alternative method to achieve this goal is to model in
subspaces. Subspaces reduce variance and mitigate cost of noisy variables, however
subspace modeling is complicated with the task of intelligent selection of subspaces
and proper fusion of the subspace models.
1.7 Organization of this Document
Chapter 2 provides a summary of related mathematical models and some of
the previous work that relates to the research included in this dissertation. Chapter
3 is an overview on ROC curves, focusing on the construction of ROC curves and
including a novel representation of the relationship between ROC curves and deci-
sion variables, the Decision ROC Chart. Chapter 4 discusses the methods utilized
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to model computer intrusion detection problems. This includes techniques to cre-
ate variables from both host based intrusion detection and network based intrusion
detection. Chapter 5 details exploratory methods undertaken to find synergistic
classifier ensembles. Much of this chapter discusses efforts for the creation of in-
telligent subspaces. The chapter details several subspace analysis methods which
represent possible avenues for intelligent subspace selection. Chapter 6 includes the
most important findings in this dissertation. The chapter introduces pseudo-ROC
curves, rank distributions, and the synergistic fusion of ranks to improve classifier
performance. Chapter 7 discusses the gaussian kernel matrix and insights regarding
the statistical properties of this matrix. These statistical properties provide poten-
tial avenues for the automated tuning of the gaussian kernel. Chapter 8 presents
three applied cases. Each of these cases represent security classification problems
that have been investigated using principles discussed in this research. The appen-
dices include comments on the computing methods and tools utilized as well as a
discussion of some text mining techniques utilized to analyze a host based computer
intrusion detection problem.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND RELATED
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
2.1 Introduction
The literature and mathematical models that apply to this research involve
many domains. In the interest of the organization of this chapter, each section will
discuss the material reviewed from a particular domain. These domains include
the related mathematical models, ROC curves (output analysis), and recent work
in computer intrusion detection which will cover both host based (masquerading)
intrusion detection and network based intrusion detection. Throughout this chapter
the Schonlau et. al. dataset is abbreviated as the SEA dataset. This is a host-based
intrusion detection dataset that provided initial results for the work with the models
discussed. A detailed description of this dataset is included in Chapter 4.
2.2 Selected Mathematical Models for Unbalanced Binary
Classification
There are numerous mathematical models used in binary classification prob-
lems, and this section introduces several of the techniques explored and applied
for this research. Included is a brief introduction to each model or technique and
typically a short discussion of known applications or initial experimental results.
Many of the models have alternate formulations or perhaps even several algorithms
which achieve the same result. Only the algorithms which have been studied and
implemented have been included.
Dimension reduction is an important concept that includes several techniques,
and there is a brief discussion on this concept and the application to the security
problem. Scaling of data will be described as “Mahalanobis” scaling of the data.
This simply means that we scale each variable by subtracting from it the variable’s
mean and dividing by the variable’s standard deviation. For the actual prediction
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modeling there are two models specifically discussed. The first model is a supervised
classification technique. This model is Kernel Partial Least Squares (KPLS) [124].
The model selected for unsupervised classification is the One-Class Support Vector
Machine (SVM), which is a variant of the traditional (SVM) [127].
2.2.1 Statistical Dimension Reduction Techniques
Dimension reduction techniques are important statistical tools that are often
necessary to create manageable data sets (meaning that rapid computing is possi-
ble with the data), explain interaction between variables, indicate root causes, and
capture the most important information with many fewer dimensions. Computer in-
trusion detection, and security problems in general, can involve mountains of data.
Introduce any type of multimedia data and file sizes explode. If this multimedia
needs to be represented as some quantifiable variable, it is often necessary to em-
ploy dimension reduction. Dimension reduction techniques can increase computing
speed and reduce storage. Furthermore, these techniques are not destructive to
the data, meaning that datasets can be reconstructed from the dimensionally re-
duced space back to its original space and form. There are a number of dimension
reduction techniques to include principal component analysis (PCA), partial least
squares (PLS), independent component analysis (ICA), and canonical correlation
analysis(CCA). Each of these techniques solves a particular problem, and we will
briefly discuss each of these. PLS serves as a regression model, and therefore it will
be discussed under the prediction modeling section.
2.2.1.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a very old multivariate statistical anal-
ysis technique. If X is our N × m data matrix, PCA seeks to solve the equation
S = XL where we can consider S as our scores matrix and L as our matrix of
loading vectors. L is equivalent to E for the formulation presented here. Harold
Hotelling [78] was the pioneer of principal components, and today almost every text-
book that serves as an introduction to multivariate statistics will contain a chapter
on principal component analysis [85]. PCA is a dimension reduction technique that
seeks to find linear combinations of the variables in order to maximize variance along
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a single axis. This single axis that contains the maximum variance can be consid-
ered the direction of the first principle component. The second principal component
captures maximal variance in an orthogonal direction(all principle components are
orthogonal to each other and the scores uncorrelated). There can only be as many
principal components as there are variables in a data set. Typically, the first few
principal components capture most of the variance.
Mathematical preliminaries for PCA include understanding the correlation
matrix of the data. There are a few interesting points regarding the correlation ma-
trix. Much confusion exists regarding the difference between the covariance matrix
and the correlation matrix. They are not the same. Covariance matrices contain
the variance of each variable on the diagonal and the covariance between variables
for the off-diagonal elements. The correlation matrix contains a 1 in each diagonal
entry and the pairwise correlation between variables in the off diagonal elements.
If data are normalized and it is assumed that every variable within the scaled data
possesses a mean of 0 and a variance of unity, then the correlation matrix will equal
the covariance matrix for this data. Given a N × m normalized data matrix, X,
where every row represents a multivariate observation, the correlation matrix is ex-
actly equal to (1/(N − 1))XTX. The proof for this is quite simple. Consider ρij as
the correlation between variable i and variable j, σ2ij as the unbiased estimator of
the covariance between the ith and jth variables, xij as the i
th observation of the jth
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A projection of the data on the eigenvectors of the correlation matrix creates
the principal components. Consider a matrix of the eigenvectors as E, where every
column in the matrix is an eigenvector. We will refer to a diagonal matrix D that
contains the eigenvalues, λi, in decreasing order. Every eigenvalue corresponds to
a specific eigenvector. The largest eigenvalue corresponds to the eigenvector that
represents the first principal component, which captures the most variance. The
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... ... ... ... ...
0 0 0 ... λm
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (2.2)
The eigenvectors can be considered as loading vectors, or the coefficients for the
linear combinations for each principle component. If we have variables x1, x2, ..., xm,
we can represent a principal component score as e11x1 + e12x2 + ... + e1mxm. These
scores can be represented in a plot, and it is often useful to plot the scores of two
different principal components on a two dimensional plot for visualization.
Figure 2.1 illustrates both a score plot and a scree plot. The scree plot shows
the values for each eigenvalue. A scree plot with a sharp elbow, meaning that the
first one or two eigenvalues is large with small successive eigenvalues, indicates that
that most of the variance is captured in the first couple of principal components. A
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Figure 2.1: Principal component score plot and scree plot
which often indicates a more interesting data set.
In 1966 Herman Wold published a paper that included the Non Iterative Par-
tial Least Squares Algorithm (NIPALS) [146], a technique for calculating the prin-
cipal components without the cost incurred by directly calculating eigenvectors and
eigenvalues (which requires solving a system of linear equations). This algorithm
is remarkably elegant and compact, and the style of this algorithm extends to the
technique used to extract partial least squares components and independent compo-
nents. It is worth illustrating this algorithm here so the reader can draw comparisons
to the algorithms shown for PLS and ICA component extraction. It is assumed that
all data are scaled to a mean of 0 and variance of unity (Mahalanobis scaling).
Algorithm 1 Wold’s Non Iterative Partial Least Squares Algorithm
1: for i = 1 to m do
2: Randomly estimate a normalized (length of unity) loading vector, tT
3: while t ← l‖l‖ has not converged do
4: Compute the score vector, s=Xt
5: Compute new loadings, lT =sTX, t ← l‖l‖
6: end while
7: X=X-stT
8: t = ith principal component loading vector
9: end for
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2.2.1.2 Canonical Correlation Analysis
Canonical correlation analysis is multivariate statistical technique designed for
comparing two sets of variables. Conceptualized by Hotelling in 1936 [78], canonical
correlation analysis actually measures the correlation that exists between two sets
of variables. Consider two sets of variables, x = x1, ..., xa and y = y1, ..., yb that
measure a certain phenomena. There are a + b variables. For each observation, one
can observe x and y. Canonical correlation analysis provides a measure of corre-
lation between x and y by creating linear combination of each. Consider a linear
combination of x, Ui(x), and a similar linear combination of y, Vj(y), such that
the correlation between Ui(x) and Vi(y) is maximized when i = j, subject to the
constraint that the correlation between Ui(x) and Vj(y) is 0 when i = j. It is addi-
tionally stipulated that the variance of Ui(x)is equal to the variance of Vj(y) which
equals 1. Let us call the correlation that exists between U1(x) and V1(y) the first
canonical correlation. When i = j = a, this is the ath canonical correlation. Several
experiments involving the SEA data indicate that canonical correlation between sets
of variables is often related to the amount of synergy that exists when these variable
sets combine in a multiple classification system. For a more detailed explanation of
canonical correlation analysis, see [85, 130].
2.2.1.3 Independent Component Analysis
Independent Component Analysis(ICA) is the newest of all of the dimension
reduction techniques. ICA was considered as a potential dimension reduction tech-
nique to apply to the security classification problem, however the properties of this
technique rendered ICA infeasible for SCPs. Although dimension reduction is pos-
sible with ICA, unlike PCA there is no importance or value associated with the
components. Any given component could contain noise or critical information for
the problem. Worse yet, every time the ICA algorithm solves for the components,
ordering of the components can differ. Regardless, ICA is a fascinating new dimen-
sion reduction and signal detection technique. The following ICA survey has been
included to illustrate the basic nature of this method, its relation to solving SCPs,
and perhaps provide enough insight to spur future research towards the application
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of ICA to solve SCPs.
ICA appeared in the 1980s and 1990s, however the first comprehensive text
written on this subject is written by Aapo Hyvarinen, Juha Karhunen, and Erkki Oja
[81]. Hyvarinen also wrote a comprehensive survey paper on ICA [80]. Independent
component analysis seeks to find linear combinations of the data which separates the
data into independent variables. Again consider our data matrix X which will be
referred to as the mixed signal. We are interested in extracting S, the independent
signals. The problem formulation is X=AS such that A can be considered a mixing
matrix. In [69], the authors illustrate the use of ICA to separate randomly mixed
images. ICA is a very useful technique anytime the problem involves a noisy signal
such as visual, audio, radar, sonar, and it is necessary to decipher the true signal.
A common explanation of independent component analysis is the cocktail party
problem. Imagine three conversations that take place at a cocktail party. Three
microphones are positioned in the room to record these conversations, all of which
can be recorded but each conversation creates conflicting sound and the end result
is what sounds like a noisy room. In [81], this problem is formulated in the following
manner:
The audio collected on each microphone is x1, x2, and x3, and our three signals
are s1, s2, and s3. In order to separate theses signals, a matrix W should be found
such that S=WX. There are several key points about ICA that must be understood
before showing the algorithm.
The first step in ICA involves “whitening” the observed data. Whitening con-
sists of transforming the scaled variables into uncorrelated variables with a variance
of unity [81]. Whitening can be explained as follows: Given Mahalanobis scaled data
in X, determine the matrix V such that Z = VX is the whitened data associated
with X. Given the aforementioned definition of whitening, the theory of PCA comes
into practice where V = D−1/2ET where E and D are the eigenvector and eigenvalue
matrices as discussed in the section on principal components. From this definition,
a whitened Z is computed. However, caution is advised when calculating D−1/2. If
there are small eigenvalues, which is common, a ridge matrix must be added to D
such that D′ = R + D, where R contains a small ridge offset value in the diagonal
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and zeros elsewhere.
Whitening is only the first part of ICA. This whitening, or sphering of the data,
creates uncorrelated but highly gaussian variables in Z [81]. In order to eliminate
this gaussian property, Hyvarinen discusses the idea of entropy and negentropy.
Entropy is used in the context of information theory and statistics, where the more
random a variable, the higher the entropy. Entropy is different from variance given
that variance measures the dispersion of a probability distribution. Entropy is an
overall index that illustrates the degree of equivalence of the cumulative distribution
function across the entire distribution, or the randomness of the variable. Entropy,
measured by the function H(y), can be estimated for the observed data using a
technique that estimates y as a gaussian function compensated by the nongaussian
properties of y through a Taylor series expansion of the Kurtosis functions of y [81].
There are several numerical computing techniques that can be used to estimate
negentropy. Now the idea is to extract independent components by maximizing
negentropy.
Hyvarinen created the following algorithm, known as FastICA. This is another
iterative algorithm that uses deflation to extract orthogonal vectors. The similarities
that exist between NIPALS for PCA, NIPALS for PLS, and FastICA are remarkable.
Here is the algorithm from [81]:
Algorithm 2 Hyvarinen’s FastICA Algorithm
1: Choose m, the number of ICs to estimate
2: for p = 1 to m do
3: Randomly estimate a normalized (length of unity) vector t
4: while t ← wp‖wp‖ has not converged do
5: wp = t
6: wp = E{zg(wTp z)} - E{g′(wTp z)}w
7: t ← wp‖wp‖
8: end while
9: end for
Initial results with this algorithm applied to IDS data are promising. Natural
clusters occur often with independent components, and this is particularly useful
for unsupervised learning problems. Similar to the pursuit of using principal com-
ponents as features, independent components can create features as well. There is
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innovative opportunity involving the use of independent components as features, to
include a thorough analysis of how to create these features and their impact in pre-
dictive modeling. Independent components have a natural tendency to filter noise
and present underlying independent patterns. Noise is exactly what we are trying to
eliminate in the security classification problem. The following example with images
provides a good example of how independent components filter this noise.
Using an implementation of the FastICA algorithm implemented in MATLAB,
two personal photos are randomly mixed with noise to create a source separation
problem. This example uses four images as the initial source vectors (the vectors
are the pixel values for the grey-scale image, an integer between 0 and 256), creating
S. These four images are mixed with a mixing matrix, A ∈ R4×4. The first image is
two children in an office, the second image is a soldier wearing a ski cap, the third
image is random noise, and the fourth image is a meaningless pattern.
The mixing matrix, A, is considered unknown and not utilized at all in the
algorithm to separate the pictures. An important subtlety of this source separation
included proper scaling. Independent components are completely oblivious to scale.
The solution is to Mahalanobis scale the results, and then project this back into the
desired scale.
Independent components are unlike principal components with regard to order
and relation to eigenvalues. Given the same ICA problem, two different iterations
will uncover the source signals but they often will not occur in the same order.
Therefore, every independent component is just as significant as the other, unlike
PCA. Additionally, the sign of independent components are ambiguous. The picture
of the children is inverted in the results, resulting in an image that looks like a photo
negative.
2.2.2 Taxonomy of the Security Classification Problem
In an effort to improve understanding of the types of problems and models
available within the domain of security classification, a brief taxonomy is presented.
This taxonomy is important because it clarifies terms used throughout machine
learning which are often wrongly exchanged and misunderstood, and secondly it
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Figure 2.2: Initial images or S Figure 2.3: Mixed images or X = AS
Figure 2.4: Results of ICA attempt-
ing to uncover S
provides examples of the types of models that could be used depending upon the
problem.
Recall the definition of the security classification problem: a high-dimensional
unbalanced binary classification problem which could exist in either the supervised
and unsupervised domain. The security classification problem is often unsupervised.
If the classes of the data are either unknown or all negative, this is an unsupervised
problem. There are three types of unsupervised problems identified in this taxon-
omy.
1. Novelty Detection. The one-class SVM is a good example of a novelty detection
algorithm. This type of algorithm trains on negative data, and based upon
the behavior of negative data, attempts to predict the instances of positive





















Figure 2.5: Taxonomy of problems in the security classification domain.
2. Unsupervised Classification (Clustering). In clustering, the classes are com-
pletely unknown and there typically is no training. Clustering utilizes similar-
ity metrics to cluster similar instances. Clustering algorithms exist for both
an unknown number of classes and a predefined number of classes. K near-
est neighbor, K means, Hierarchical, and Density Based are several types of
clustering algorithms.
3. Outlier Detection. In classical statistics, outliers are a common term. Given
a sample of data, instances which deviate a specified measure from the mean
are labeled as outliers. An outlier detection approach could exist without any
training of the data, or if training occurs with only healthy data, this would
be identical to novelty detection.
Supervised learning is also a critical component of the security classification
problem. The critical component needed to apply supervised learning is instances
of the positive class. Typically these instances are few, therefore making feature
selection somewhat difficult. One of the best suited supervised algorithm for this
problem is Kernel Partial Least Squares, because it performs a natural feature se-
lection method and responds well to a minority class by scaling of the response.
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2.2.3 Prediction Models
There are two prediction models that have been applied to the host-based
computer intrusion detection data and the network intrusion detection data. For
supervised modeling, Kernel Partial Least Squares (K-PLS) is a powerful technique
that will be discussed. If unsupervised modeling is necessary, the model of choice is
the one-class support vector machine (SVM).
2.2.3.1 Kernel Partial Least Squares (K-PLS)
Partial Least Squares Regression (PLS) was conceived by the Swedish statis-
tician Herman Wold for econometrics modeling of multi-variate time series [146].
The first PLS publication was a sociology application in 1975 [147]. His son, Svante
Wold, applied PLS to chemometrics in the early eighties [148,149] and currently PLS
has become one of the most popular and powerful tools in chemometrics, mainly
because of the quality of building models with many variables. PLS is not easy to
explain and the mathematics involved are far from transparent. Partially for that
reason PLS has a low emphasis in mainstream statistics and machine learning.
K-PLS is a technique that has grown from partial least squares analysis. The
study of partial least squares(PLS) regression is similar to principal components re-
gression (PCR). Foundations for principal components analysis have been presented
in section 2.2.1.1.
PLS analysis considers the response vector (or matrix for multiple responses),
typically denoted as Y. PLS regression is a technique that maximizes latent variable
correlation with a response vector. Therefore, the first latent variable (which is again
a linear combination of the input variables), possesses maximum correlation with
the response variable while remaining orthogonal to the remaining latent variables.
Since the first few partial least squares components or latent variables capture the
majority of correlation with the response variable, powerful prediction models result
with desirable dimension reduction properties.
Rosipal explains in [124] how to extract these PLS components. Utilizing the
NIPALS approach, algorithm 3 illustrates Rosipal’s method.
At each full iteration (completion of step 10), we will store the t,u,w and c
30
Algorithm 3 PLS extraction with NIPALS
1: for i = 1 to m do
2: randomly initialize u
3: while u and t have not converged do
4: w = XTu
5: t = Xw, t ← t‖t‖
6: c = YTt





10: Assign t as the ith PLS component
11: end for
vectors. These vectors will create matrices T,U,W and C which will be used to
complete the PLS regression model. If we write the typical regression model as
Y = XB +F
where B is our regression matrix and F is the residual matrix, Rosipal shows
in [124] the following:
B = XTU(TTXXTU)−1TTY
The key to Kernel PLS (KPLS) is realizing the kernel matrix formed in the
algorithm shown above between steps 2 and 3. The algorithm for KPLS is no
different than what is shown for the PLS algorithm, except steps 2 and 3 combine
to create:
t = φφTu, t ← t‖t‖
φ represents the nonlinear function, or kernel function, that transforms the
input variables into feature space. φφT is the well known kernel matrix. KPLS
provides the attractive aspect of feature reduction while also combining the powerful
similarity technique that exists within nonlinear kernels. KPLS has been extensively
benchmarked with other models such as support vector machines and often yields
nearly identical results [9].
KPLS was the original model applied to the SEA dataset for this research.
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2.2.3.2 The One-Class Support Vector Machine (SVM)
The one-class SVM is an unsupervised learning technique, sometimes referred
to as outlier detection or anomaly detection, originally proposed in [137]. The
purpose of a one-class SVM is to learn the attributes of known, “healthy” cases
without ever learning from an “unhealthy” or positive case. When introduced to a
test set that contains both healthy and unhealthy, or intruders and non-intruders,
the one-class SVM utilizes what it learned from the healthy cases to segregate the
classes.
The software package utilized to implement the one-class SVM is called LIB-
SVM (library of support vector machines) [24]. This software employs both the
one-class SVM and the more popular supervised learning version of the SVM. The
programs are well written in C++ and C, and there is thorough documentation
for both understanding the software and understanding the underlying theory. The
source code is available, and this software is widely cited and utilized in machine
learning applications.
The one-class SVM is a less popular but natural extension from the supervised
SVM which is has become a very popular learning technique. Cristianini and Shawe-
Taylor provide a detailed explanation of one-class SVMs in [130]. Stolfo and Wang
[132] successfully apply the one-class SVM to the SEA dataset and compare it with
several of the techniques mentioned above. Chen uses the one-class SVM for image
retrieval [27]. The simplest way to express the one-class SVM is to envision a
sphere or ball, and the object is to squeeze all of the training data into the tightest
ball feasible. This is analogous to the idea of variance reduction for distribution
estimation; given a set of data, we want to estimate a distribution that tightly
defines this data, and any other data that does not look the same will not fit this
distribution. In other words, once the distribution is estimated, data that does not
fit the distribution will be considered an outlier or not a member of the negative
class. Consider the following formulation of the one-class SVM originally from [127]
and also clearly explained in [27]:
Due to the applicability of the one-class SVM to the security classification
problem and the innovative research opportunities involving potential enhancement
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of this learning model, a detailed derivation of this technique follows. Consider
x1,x2, ...,xl ∈ X instances of training observations, and Φ is a mapping into the
feature space, F , from X .
The following minimization function attempts to squeeze R, which can be
thought of as the radius of a hypersphere, as small as possible in order to fit all of
the training samples. If a training sample will not fit, ζi is a slack variable to allow










subject to ‖ Φ(xi) − c ‖2≤ R2 + ζi, ζi ≥ 0 for i ∈ [l]
Figure 2.6: A three dimensional visualization of an enclosing sphere. Sev-
eral novelties are shown as squares.
In order to solve this optimization problem, the following steps occur:
1. Place constraints in standard form:
subject to ‖ Φ(xi) − c ‖2 −R2 − ζi ≤ 0, −ζi ≤ 0 for i ∈ [l]
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2. Find max of Lagrangian:
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i αi ‖ Φ(xi) − c ‖2
3. The following algebraic expansion leads to equation 7.3:
‖ Φ(xi) − c ‖2= 〈Φ(xi), Φ(xi)〉 − 2〈Φ(xi), c〉 + 〈c, c〉










⇒∑i αi ‖ Φ(xi) − c ‖2=∑



















All training examples with αi > 0 are support vectors, and the examples which
also have a strict inequality for αi <
1
vl
are considered non-bounded support vectors.
In order to classify a new test instance, v, we would evaluate the following
decision function:







Before evaluating for a new point, R2 must be found. This is done by finding
a non-bounded support vector training example and setting the decision function
equal to 0 [8]. If the decision function is negative for a new test instance, this
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indicates a negative or healthy prediction. A positive evaluation is an unhealthy or
positive prediction, and the magnitude of the decision function in either direction is
an indication of the model’s confidence.
2.2.3.3 An Experiment to Illustrate the Impact of Dimensionality on
the One-Class SVM
In order to illustrate the impact of dimensionality on kernels and the one-
class SVM specifically, an experiment with artificial data was constructed. Experi-
ments with artificial data fill a critical gap by enabling modelers to entirely control
datasets. Real-world data are required to validate techniques and demonstrate ap-
plicability. However, real world data often contains erroneously labeled instances,
noise that may create spurious patterns, and human error. It is impossible to clean
this data entirely. Testing performed with real data will always assumes these po-
tential problems. Artificial data prevents these types of problems. If constructed
properly, artificial data can truly test the limits of pattern recognition algorithms
in a carefully controlled experimental environment.
In order to create data for the one-class SVM experiment, it was necessary
to build a model of the pattern. This model is quite simple, involving standard
normal distributions where the positive class and negative class have a difference of
2 between their means. This model can be presented as follows:
x+1 = (z1 + 1, z2 + 1, z3, ..., zm), zi ∼ N(0, 1) i.i.d
x−1 = (z1′ − 1, z2′ − 1, z3′..., zm′), zi′ ∼ N(0, 1) i.i.d
The true pattern only lied in the first two variables. All remaining variables
were noise. Three types of kernels were examined. The linear kernel, polynomial
kernel, and gaussian kernel.
Gaussian Kernel : κ(x+1,x−1) = e−‖x+1−x−1‖
2/2σ2
Linear Kernel : κ(x+1,x−1) = 〈x+1,x−1〉
Polynomial Kernel : κ(x+1,x−1) = (〈x+1,x−1〉 + 1)p
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Table 2.1: One Class SVM experiment for various dimensions on artificial
data
Kernel Parameter dimensions AUC R2
polynomial p=1 2 0.874 12.8000
polynomial p=1 5 0.8664 16.3600
polynomial p=1 10 0.829 24.0600
polynomial p=1 50 0.6642 73.2300
polynomial p=1 100 0.618 127.9000
polynomial p=1 250 0.5854 290.7000
polynomial p=1 500 0.5683 551.1000
polynomial p=1 1000 0.5549 1,064.0000
polynomial p=2 2 0.7312 149.3000
polynomial p=2 5 0.5946 359.8000
polynomial p=2 10 0.5476 791.2000
polynomial p=2 50 0.5014 5,918.0000
polynomial p=2 100 0.4912 18,050.0000
polynomial p=2 250 0.4952 88,640.0000
polynomial p=2 500 0.5269 314,300.0000
polynomial p=2 1000 0.5036 1,167,000.0000
polynomial p=3 2 0.741 3,710.0000
polynomial p=3 5 0.6065 10,490.0000
polynomial p=3 10 0.5538 22,900.0000
polynomial p=3 50 0.492 517,300.0000
polynomial p=3 100 0.5172 2,634,000.0000
polynomial p=3 250 0.5076 26,930,000.0000
polynomial p=3 500 0.5111 179,700,000.0000
polynomial p=3 1000 0.5117 1,291,000,000.0000
gaussian 2 0.9201 0.5149
gaussian 5 0.8978 0.4665
gaussian 10 0.8234 0.4356
gaussian 50 0.7154 0.3306
gaussian 100 0.6409 0.5234
gaussian 250 0.6189 0.4159
gaussian 500 0.5523 0.6466
gaussian 1000 0.5209 0.4059
The gaussian kernels in this experiment were tuned using an auto-tuning
method. Typically for gaussian kernels, a validation set of positive and negative
labeled data is available for tuning σ. In unsupervised learning, these examples of
positive labeled data do not exist. Therefore, the best tuning possible is to achieve
some variation in the values of the kernel without values concentrated on either ex-
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treme. If σ is too large, all of the values will tend towards 1. If too small, they tend
to 0. The auto tuning function ensures that the off-diagonal values for κ(x+1,x−1)
average between 0.4 and 0.6, with a min value greater than 0.2 (notice that diagonal
elements of a gaussian kernel matrix will always be one).
2.2.3.4 Multiple Classification Systems(MCS)
An interesting problem that exists with the one-class SVM involves the curse
of dimensionality. This so called curse refers to the tendency for multivariate data to
become equidistant as dimensions increase, preventing discrimination, classification,
and clustering.
Given a classification problem of high dimension (greater than 10 variables),
initial experimental results indicate that the creation of subspaces and aggregation
of the subspace classification decision values results in improved classification over
a model that utilizes all variables at once as shown in chapter 5 (the unsupervised
classification model that will be utilized is the linear kernel one-class SVM from [24]).
Creating subspaces for outlier detection, which is essentially what we are describing,
is not a new concept [1]. However, considering this problem as a function of one-
class SVM outputs and utilizing fuzzy logic for aggregation of output is a novel idea
that this thesis explores.
A valid question would be to ask why not try a dimension reduction technique,
such as principal components. Principal components work well with balanced clas-
sification problems, however caution is advised to use principal components as an
overall dimension reduction technique for unsupervised problems. Often the differ-
ence between an intruder and non-intruder is subtle, and principle components along
with other dimension reduction techniques often dilute the information content of
the variables, especially in an unsupervised setting. Therefore, other techniques
should be considered.
Bonissone et. al. explored the concept of applying fuzzy logic to the Multiple
Classifier Systems (MCS) problem [15]. Their technique involved exploring the
different aggregation techniques used in fuzzy logic, such as T-norms, to fuse decision
variables. Chapter 5 details much of the recent work with multiple classification
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systems. Multiple classification techniques presents an alternative to overcome this
curse of dimensionality.
2.3 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curves
A Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve is a simple and elegant way to
display the performance of a binary classification system. ROC curves date back to
World War II during the advent of radar. It was necessary to detect friendly planes
from enemy planes, and the military needed reliable systems to perform this task.
Continuing with our concept of referring to a true positive as the correct detection
of something dangerous or malicious, it was desirable for the military to possess a
system which performed at a high true positive (correctly identify an enemy plane)
and low false positive (identify a friendly plane as enemy). The reasons for this is
obvious. The medical community uses ROC curves extensively for measuring the
accuracy of medical diagnosis tests [34–36].
Tom Fawcett published several papers regarding the application of ROC curves.
He considers ROC curves and multiple classification systems in the context of game
theory in [57]. In [55], he provides a very thorough theoretical review concerning
in regard to everything that an ROC curve can (and sometimes cannot) represent.
Kristin Bennett extended ROC theory for regression in the paper titled “Regression
Error Characteristic Curves” [12].
ROC curves are a critical component of any binary classification problem.
Classification systems create a real valued number as a decision value for each ob-
served instance of the testing sample. Given a sample of test data, each data point
will be assigned a decision value that typically ranges from -1 to +1. The data points
that are true positive should fall closer to +1, where as the true negative cases closer
to -1. The modeler must determine a threshold value for which to segregate and
predict classes. The outcome in regard to true positive and false positive for one
threshold value would correspond to one point on the ROC curve. If this threshold
value is now incremented by some small value epsilon, from -1 to +1, a range of
operating points will emerge. Plotting these operating points with respect to true
positive (y axis) and false positive (x axis) will generate the ROC curve.
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An ROC curve can also be considered a graphic representation of the rela-
tionship between the probability of a true positive outcome (sensitivity, 1-α error)
and the probability of a false positive outcome (Type II error(β) or 1-specificity).
The overall curve reflects the quality of the classification system. The area under
the curve (AUC) is typically used as method of comparing alternate ROC curves;
the better ROC curve typically has more AUC. Section 3.2 discusses in detail the
meaning of the AUC, to include exactly how this statistic ties with the Wilcoxon
Rank sum statistic and ranked data.
general threshhold, t, used to trigger IDS alarm This t corresponds to a point on the ROC curve, perhaps here.
Probability Density 
Function of Legal 
transactions
Probability Density 
Function of Illegal 
transactions
Figure 2.7: The plot on the left shows the PDFs of legal and illegal trans-
actions (non intruders and intruders), respectively. The ROC
curve on the right shows the possible operating point repre-
sented by the tolerance threshold shown on the PDF plots.
The plot of the probability density functions illustrates the idea of false pos-
itives and true positives. The hashed area represents the probability of a true
positive, and the small red area represents a false positive. Imagine shifting the
threshold, t, to the left. The true positive rating would definitely increase, but so
would the false positive. The user must identify what point on the curve is accept-
able, and this is usually accomplished through a cost-benefit analysis.
39
2.4 Recent Work in Computer Intrusion Detection
Computer intrusion detection systems involve either host-based intrusion de-
tection or network-based intrusion detection. The first part of this section will
cover recent work with host-based intrusion detection, detailing the Schonlau et.
al., or SEA dataset. The second section will briefly cover recent work with network
intrusion detection.
2.5 The Schonlau Dataset
2.5.1 Introduction to the Dataset
The SEA data provided a platform to explore host based intrusion detection.
Before detailing exploratory effort with this data, the history and structure of the
data will be explained. Matthius Schonlau collected this data from an AT&T lab
in New Jersey, observing the UNIX computing behavior of 50 users. The data set
consists of 50 users with each user contributing a stream of 15,000 truncated UNIX
commands. The user’s data stream is further divided into blocks of 100 commands,
thus creating 150 blocks of commands for each user. The first 50 blocks of data is
training data only (contains no masquerading data), and the remaining 100 blocks
of data contains masquerading data that appears based on a probability. Given
that there are 50 users, this implies that in total there are 2,500 tuples of data
in the non-intruded initial set and 5,000 tuples of data that potentially contain
intrusion data. Since the true outcome of each of these subsequent 5,000 tuples
is known, understand that there are only 231 intruded tuples. Only 4.62% of the
data contains simulated intruders, which makes this a very difficult problem. These
simulated intruders involve streams of commands taken from other outside users
(not part of the 50 authentic users). It is a very unbalanced classification problem.
The objective is to determine if a block of data contains masquerading data or not.
2.5.2 Recent Work with the SEA Dataset
Schonlau et. al. [41–43, 128, 129] conducted the original work with this data.
Their contributions included a thorough analysis of several statistical techniques for
identifying masqueraders. Schonlau et. al. explored approaches that include: Bayes
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one-step Markov model, hybrid multistep Markov model, text compression, Incre-
mental Probabilistic Action Modeling (IPAM), sequence matching, and a uniqueness
algorithm [41]. Schonlau stressed the importance of minimizing false positives, set-
ting a goal of 1% or less for all of his classification techniques. Schonlau’s uniqueness
algorithm, explained in [129], achieved a 40% true positive rating before crossing the
1% false positive boundary. Wang [144] used one-class training based on data rep-
resentative of only one user and demonstrated that it worked as well as multi-class
training. Coull [30] applied bioinformatics matching algorithm for a semi-global
alignment to this problem. Lee [101] built a data mining framework for construct-
ing features and model for intrusion detection. Evangelista et. al. applied KPLS
models as a supervised learning approach to the SEA dataset from several variables
that they created for measuring user behavior [50].
Roy Maxion contributed insightful work with this data that challenged both
the design of the data set and previous techniques used on this data [110, 111].
Maxion uses a 1v49 approach in [111], where he trains a Naive Bayes Classifier one
user at a time using the training data from one user as true negative examples versus
data from the forty-nine other users (hence 1v49) as true positive (masquerader)
examples. Maxion claimed the best performance to date in [111], achieving a true
positive rating of 60% while maintaining a false positive rating of 1% or less. Maxion
also examines masquerade detection with a similar data set that contain command
arguments in [110].
2.5.3 Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDs)
There are volumes of material that discuss network intrusion detection. It is a
very broad field. NIDS is another vehicle to explore unbalanced binary classification.
The NIDs problem involves collecting network traffic, which is typically collected as
TCPdump packets [104], and these packets can be either stored for later analysis
or inspected in an online fashion. Credit for some of the earliest work in intrusion
detection goes to Denning who published a paper in 1986 that discussed a framework
for monitoring system audit files [38]. Denning’s original work served somewhat as
a sentry call for the tremendous problem that computer security would become.
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Since then, Denning wrote a book that covers many of the general threats that exist
from the internet [37]. Numerous packet sniffing technology exists, and one of the
more popular programs is Snort [2]. Snort is a rule based system that can employ
both custom rule sets and generic rule sets that generally apply to all. Snort, and
many of the other commercial NIDs, use signature detection. Known malicious code
and malicious network attacks have a particular pattern, and once this pattern is
understood it is simple to devise a technique to detect the pattern, or signature,
and alarm appropriately. A more difficult problem involves detecting novel attacks,
and significant progress is yet to be made towards this challenging problem.
As much as intrusion detection is actively pursued by academic researchers, it
is probably more aggressively pursued by the commercial industry seeking practical
implementations. Crothers wrote a book that takes a common sense, practical
approach towards implementing network intrusion detection [32]. These types of
works are becoming more common which is a clear indicator that the problem of
intrusion detection is vast and organizations want solutions that can be implemented
immediately. Ning, Jajodia, and Wang published some original concepts regarding
distributed intrusion detection systems [82]. Distributed intrusion detection has
increasingly become an important concept since attacks have become distributed
(such as the distributed denial of service attack - ddos), and speed of detection
has becoming extremely important. One of the commonly criticisms of intrusion
detection is that intruders are not detected often until their deed is done, and that
can be too late. Distributed detection may be a technique to improve upon this
problem.
Some of the most popular research in NIDs involves the MIT Lincoln Lab
DARPA testbed [68]. This testbed simulated network traffic that would be com-
mon to U.S. Air Force Base. Eight weeks of traffic was generated at 40 hours per
week. This is almost a gigabyte of TCPdump data per week, which is significant
if anything more than a trivial algorithm will be employed. Bernhard Sick ana-
lyzed this network traffic and generated 140 different variables, and from this set
of variables he utilized evolutionary computing techniques to conduct variable se-
lection [76]. Most of the testing conducted with this data revealed the obvious -
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intrusion detection systems were very good at identifying previously known attacks,
and very poor with anything novel. Marchette wrote a text that explores network
monitoring and intrusion detection from a statistical viewpoint [108]. His work
discusses the fundamentals of network data, techniques to quantify the data, and
methods for detecting malicious activity.
CHAPTER 3
THE RECEIVER OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC
(ROC) CURVE
Given the importance of the ROC curves to intrusion detection and binary classi-
fication problems as a whole, it is worthwhile to dedicate a chapter to discuss the
aspects of this curve. ROC curves are widely studied and utilized for the evaluation
of machine learning applications and medical classification and decision making [55].
Much of the appreciation for ROC curves stems from the complete display binary
classifier performance across the full spectrum of thresholds. This is particularly
important for unbalanced problems where performance in particular ranges of the
ROC curve are of interest. The medical community studies ROC curves largely
to better understand the performance of medical tests and the statistics which can
support a diagnosis [134]. This chapter concludes by introducing the decision ROC
chart, a novel method for illustrating the relationship between ROC curves and
decision values.
Before further discussion, let us define some notation. xi will represent a m-
dimensional pattern or observation, and yi will represent the associated label or class
of this pattern (for binary classification yi ∈ (−1, 1)). ŷi ∈ R1 will represent the
decision value created by the machine learning algorithm, and Ri ∈ (1, 2, ..., N) will
represent the rank of the decision value, an important number when constructing
ROC curves.
3.1 Confusion Matrices
ROC curves are a two dimensional graph, plotting the true positive (TP) rate
on the y or vertical axis and the false positive (FP) rate on the x or horizontal axis.
The confusion matrix is closely related and essentially a subset of an ROC curve.
The confusion matrix displays four numbers - true positive(TP), true negative(TN),
false positive(FP), false negative(FN) - which illustrate the prediction performance





Actual positive TP FN
Label negative FP TN
Table 3.1: The Confusion Matrix
From this confusion matrix there are a number of statistical performance met-
rics which can be derived. All of these metrics are based upon the binary classifica-
tion problem. These metrics are also defined in [92].
Accuracy = TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
True Positive Rate(Recall, Sensitivity) = TP
TP+FN




False Positive Rate = FP
FP+TN
False Negative Rate = FN
FN+TP
The medical community uses the terms specificity and sensitivity, and it is ev-
ident that sensitivity is equivalent to the true positive rate and specificity is equiv-
alent to (1 - false positive rate). It is quite common for medical researchers to
illustrate medical test performance through plotting sensitivity versus specificity.
The more common ROC curve plots the false positive rate on the horizontal axis
and the true positive rate on the negative axis.
A confusion matrix can also display the accuracy of a multi-class problem,
often illustrating model tendencies and which classes the model tends to “confuse”.
The simplest way to better understand confusion matrices is through an example.
Figure 3.1 is a toy dataset that will be used to illustrate several concepts in
this chapter. Let us assume that a threshold of 0 is applied to this dataset, creating
the confusion matrix shown on the right side of figure 3.1.
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Decision Rank (Ri) True


















Actual positive 6 1
Label negative 2 6
Figure 3.1: Toy dataset with sorted decision values, ranks, and true
classes. Confusion matrix illustrates performance with a ŷi
threshold of 0.
3.2 Algorithms for Creating an ROC Curve and Finding the
Area Under the Curve
The simplest and most conceptually straightforward algorithm to create an
ROC curve is to build confusion matrices that illustrate performance for a range of
threshold values. These confusion matrices will each represent a point on the ROC
curve; each confusion matrix will have a unique point on the curve created from the
false positive rate and true positive rate that the confusion matrix represents. In
order to create an empirical ROC curve with the best granularity, a confusion matrix
could be created at a threshold boundary which separates two distinct observations.
It is possible to define these thresholds through either the ranks or actual decision
values. As will be shown in later algorithms, it is more more elegant to manage
the ranks. Algorithm 4 illustrates how to create ROC curves based on confusion
matrices.
Fawcett details algorithm 5 in [55], a method which creates an ROC curve
based solely on ranks . Algorithm 4 is a much more intuitive method, however
algorithm 5 is much more elegant and compact, and requires less computation.
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Algorithm 4 Creating an ROC curve from N confusion matrices.
1: Reverse rank order all observations by ŷi, assigning the smallest rank (1) to the
largest ŷi, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., N)
2: Let p represent the total number of positive instances and b represent the total
number of negative instances
3: for Ri = 1 to N do
4: t = Ri, TP = 0, FP = 0
5: for Rj = 1 to t do
6: if yj = 1 then
7: TP = TP + 1
8: else if yj = −1 then
9: FP = FP + 1
10: end if
11: k = Ri
12: True Positive Rate (TPRk) = TP/p
13: False Positive Rate (FPRk) = FP/b
14: Store or plot (FPRk, TPRk) as k
th point on ROC curve
15: end for
16: end for
17: Let TPR0, FPR0 = (0, 0)
Algorithm 5 Creating an ROC curve solely based on ranks.
1: FP = 0, TP = 0
2: Let (FPR0, TPR0) = (0, 0)
3: for Ri = 1 to N do
4: if yi = 1 then
5: TP = TP + 1
6: else if yi = −1 then
7: FP = FP + 1
8: end if
9: k = Ri
10: FPRk = FP/b
11: TPRk = TP/p
12: Store or plot FPRk, TPRk as k
th point on ROC curve
13: end for
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ROC curves of good classifiers typically have a large convex rise which ap-
proaches the (1,1) point. It is also possible that ROC curves will indicate poor
classifier performance at false positive or true positive ranges. In the security clas-
sification problem, our primary interest involves improving performance in the low
false positive range. An ROC curve which simply plots along the diagonal, creating
an AUC of approximately 0.5, indicates a classifier which contains no predictive
power; this ROC curve indicates random classification, no better than tossing a
coin. It is also possible to have a concave ROC curve, which usually indicates a




























































Figure 3.2: An example of the ROC curve created from the toy dataset
as per algorithm 4. The values in the confusion matrices are
consistent with table 3.1.
It is also of interest to find the area under the ROC curve (AUC), as this is
a good overall performance metric for a binary classification problem. The most
obvious way to find this area is through numerical integration of the curve found in
algorithm 4. Algorithm 6 uses a sum of trapezoidal areas to estimate the AUC.
It is also well known that the AUC has a special probabilistic meaning. The
AUC is equivalent to the probability that a randomly selected positive instance
ranks above (has a smaller Ri) than a randomly selected negative instance. Let
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Algorithm 6 Finding the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) from Numerical
Integration.
1: AUC = 0
2: for k = 1 to N do
3: A = .5(TPRk + TPRk−1)(FPRk − FPRk−1)
4: AUC = AUC + A
5: end for
Ri, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., p) represent the rank of positive instances, and Rj , j ∈ (1, 2, ..., b)
represent the rank of negative instances. This probability is also known as the
Mann-Whitney U statistic, a statistic we will use to find the AUC.
P (Ri < Rj) = AUC = U
Much of the original rank statistics studies which apply to ROC curves can be
attributed to Wilcoxon, Mann, and Whitney who used ranks to measure whether or
not two random variables were statistically different. Wilcoxon’s work was a cursory
exploration to “obtain a rapid approximate idea of the significance of the differences
in experiments” [145]. The dataset utilized in his experiments measured the lethality
of two different fly sprays. Mann and Whitney also used rank statistics to determine
the statistical difference between two treatments, with much more of an emphasis
on describing the underlying distribution of the U statistic [107]. Lehmann provides
a comprehensive study of rank statistics in his book Nonparametrics: Statistical
Methods Based on Ranks, thoroughly discussing the Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistic
and Mann-Whitney U statistic [102].
Let Ri, i ∈ (1..p) represent the rankings of actual attacks, and let Rj , j ∈ (1..b)
represent the rankings of the workstations which were not actually attacked. The
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Statistic, Ws, is equivalent to
∑p
i=1 Ri. Since the sum of all
rankings is 1
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where ϕ(Ri, Rj) =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1 if Ri < Rj0 otherwise
The statistics WXY = Ws− 12p(p+1) and WY X = Wr− 12b(b+1) are also popular
forms of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistic, and it is this form of the statistic that
relates to the area under the ROC curve. The Mann-Whitney U statistic, which is
exactly equal to the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve, is directly











ϕ(Ri, Rj) = AUC (3.2)
Hanley and McNeil show in [71] that the area under the ROC curve equates
to the Mann-Whitney U statistic. Realizing this, algorithm 7 can be used to find
the AUC.
Algorithm 7 Computing the Mann-Whitney U statistic.
1: Wr = 0
2: for i = 1 to N do
3: if yi = −1 then
4: Wr = Wr + Ri
5: end if
6: end for
7: WY X = Wr − 12b(b + 1)
8: AUC = U = WY X
pb
ROC curves are not the panacea for measuring the performance of binary
classification. Although these curves convey significant information, it is important
that researchers understand the limitations and properties of these curves. Many
authors, to include Fawcett [55], Bradley [17], and Mason and Graham [109], advise
due caution when using ROC curves to measure the performance of binary classifiers.
ROC curves are non-parametric. There is value in the simplicity and pragmatism of
displaying a classifier’s output as non-parametric ranks, however it is without doubt




Quite often researchers may only have concern with a portion of the ROC
curve. In the medical community, false negatives are of major concern. It is not
acceptable to have a test commonly dismiss a diseased patient as healthy. Therefore,
physicians are likely to prefer operating in a relatively high false positive range; false
positives are tolerable, but false negatives are not. In the security domain, false
positives can become a significant problem. This is due to the extreme imbalance
between the classes in this problem. In the computer network security domain,
there are significantly more benign connections compared to the number of malicious
connections. A large percentage of false positives can create an overwhelming load
of benign connections tagged as malicious, each of which must be examined. If the
false positive load becomes too burdensome, the system no longer creates value and
simply turns into a bottleneck which end users quickly abandon.
Therefore, it is quite useful to study a portion of the ROC curve, especially if
it is likely that this is the only region which an application will ever operate, the rest
of the ROC curve is relatively meaningless. McClish was likely the first researcher
to write about the concept of partial ROC curves. McClish’s method assumes a
binormal distribution between the two classes which the classifier is attempting to
separate, and her interest involves comparing two ROC curves only within a certain
false positive range [112]. Jiang et. al. analyzed partial ROC curves for specific
ranges in sensitivity, or true positive [84]. Zhang applied the same non-parametric
method established in the Mann-Whitney U statistic to only a portion of the ROC
curve [152]. This non-parametric approach to partial ROC curves is the method
which will be discussed here.
The following discussion of sub-ROC curves and the partial AUC utilizes statis-
tics derived during the course of this research. These statistics are not claimed as
novelties of this thesis. The partial AUC is the truly creative component of this
theory and this concept has been studied by others. ROC stickiness, although a
relatively simple concept, has not been mentioned in the literature reviewed and
could be claimed as a novelty of this work.
One of the simplest ROC metrics involves calculating what type of true positive
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rate to expect before observing a single false positive. Counting from the top of the
rankings until reaching the first negative instance, let R∗i be the rank of the last
positive instance. The stickiness of the ROC curve (stickiness refers to the ROC




The next step beyond sticky ROC curves involves the partial AUC, when
a portion of the false positive range is of interest. In the security classification
problem, the typical ROC curve region of interest is the low false positive domain.
Some authors insist that good performance must occur at a very small false positive
range, such as Schonlau did in [41].
Suppose that in a given dataset, b negative instances exist and p positive
instances exist. If the false positive tolerance, or false positive point of interest




b′ now represents the number of false positives for a specific dataset which













= AUC up to FPPOI
The AUC up to the FPPOI is the partial AUC, the area under the ROC curve
up to the FPPOI. It also may be of interest to observe what the Mann Whitney U
statistic is for that region of the ROC curve. For example, given this small fraction
of observations up to the FPPOI, what is the probability that a positive instance is
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ranked higher than a negative instance? This can be calculated by simply managing
this fraction of observations as its own set of rankings and its own ROC curve. It
has already been established that there are b′ negative instances and p′ positive
instances in this subset. Let R′j , j ∈ (1, 2, ..., b′) define the ranks of the negative
instances in the subset, and let R′i, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., p′) define the ranks of the positive
instances in the subset.
























































Figure 3.3: Illustration of the partial AUC
An example with the toy dataset shown in figure 3.3 will further illustrate the
sub-ROC curve concept. Assume that our false positive tolerance is .375, implying
a FPPOI = b′ = 3 and p′ = 6. From previous equations, W ′r = 5 + 8 + 9 = 22 =⇒
W ′Y X = 16. The AUC up to the FPPOI is 16/(8×9) = .286. It also follows that the
AUC of a sub-ROC curve, considering only these 9 instances as the total number of
observations, would equate to 16/(3×6) = .89.
The probabilistic meaning of the area under the ROC curve enables researchers
to create ROC curves that possess the exact types of attributes of interest, without
the need for any data or prediction modeling. These ROC curves, created strictly
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from pseudo-random numbers, are a novelty of this research and included in section
6.3. The analysis of these pseudo ROC curves, and their underlying rank distri-
butions, provided a solid foundation to show why certain types of fusion methods
created synergistic results. Further discussion of this can be found in chapter 5.
3.4 Pseudo ROC curves
Many of the fundamental concepts regarding ROC curves from this chapter
are applied in chapter 5 to introduce one of the significant novelties of this research.
Chapter 5 discusses the probabilistic meaning of the AUC and utilizes this prop-
erty to create pseudo-ROC curves and rank distributions. Creation of pseudo-ROC
curves and rank distributions provide the underlying theory for ensemble methods
designed specifically for the security classification problem. The detailed discussion
of pseudo ROC curves is left to this future chapter.
3.5 Improved Decision Making with the Decision ROC Chart
The eventual purpose of an ROC curve is to support a decision, however ROC
curves provide an incomplete representation of the decision environment. Important
information not included in ROC curves include balance of classes and decision
values. Practitioners value ROC curves for the insight that these curves provide to
a classifier or detection device, however applying information from the ROC curve is
difficult without some type of translation from ROC space to the decision space. The
decision space for a binary classification problem involves considering the output of
a model, ŷi, and comparing this output with a threshold, t.
Classifiers create decision values. These decision values, ŷi, exist on a spec-
trum in the real number realm (ŷi ∈ R1), where ŷi represents nothing more than the
classifier’s judgment on the class membership of an observation. Classifiers base this
judgment on some type of function created from other observations, so the decision
value becomes the classifier’s similarity or strength of belief metric indicating class
membership. Decision values often contain no true meaning. Many decision values
follow some type of sigmoidal function, clustering in the center and existing in a
lower density at the extreme ends of the the spectrum. For some types of detec-
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tion equipment, decision values could represent the output of some type of sensor.
This could be a chemical measurement as in a medical test or an electronic signal
measurement which exists in many types of detection scenarios. Regardless of the
classification problem, the end result is that a decision must be made whether to
classify an unlabeled instance as positive or negative. ROC curves illustrate the
performance of a classifier, but they do not provide a complete picture or aid in
classification decisions. Practitioners must bridge the gap between ROC curves and
decision values. The following extension to the ROC curve is a simple and novel
method to aid decision makers and assist in bridging the gap from ROC curves to
decision values.

















































Figure 3.4: Decision ROC Chart from data in figure 3.1
The horizontal axis of an ROC curve measures the false positive rate of a
classifier, and this false positive rate is simply a fraction of negative instances.
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Referring to table 3.1, recall that the False Positive Rate = FP
FP+TN
. The extension
to the ROC curve, referred to as the Decision ROC Chart, plots the false positive rate
on the horizontal axis, enabling the bridge between the ROC curve and the decision
value. The vertical axis represents the decision value, ŷi. The Decision ROC Chart
captures much of the information absent from the ROC curve, to include the balance
of the problem, distribution of the decision values, and perhaps most importantly
the connection between the the ROC curve and the decision value through the false
positive rate.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the Decision ROC Chart for the toy running problem
discussed in this chapter from starting in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the Decision ROC Chart for a larger dataset. In addition
to aiding the threshold decision for a classification problem, the Decision ROC Chart
provide clarity to ROC curves for those who are not familiar with ROC curves. The
area under the curve is visibly seen as a probability with the Decision ROC Chart.
It is much more believable, and understandable, that the probability of a positive
value out ranking a negative value is 0.959.
Decision ROC Charts educate decision makers and students involved with
classification. The purpose of these curves is simply to educate, assist in decision
















































Figure 3.5: Decision ROC Chart for a large dataset
CHAPTER 4
COMPUTER INTRUSION DETECTION VARIABLES
This chapter discusses how to harvest variables for machine learning from host-based
monitoring and network-based monitoring. The methods introduced are techniques
that worked. Other methods, perhaps even better techniques for creating variables,
could be possible. This is a chapter designed to illustrate how to transform mea-
surements from a security environment into data that models the environment. This
chapter introduces the necessary first preprocessing steps that must be accomplished
before applying techniques described in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
4.1 Information and Computer Security
There are numerous techniques used to enhance the security of information
and computers. Many of these techniques attempt to block or deter attackers,
preventing them from intruding in the first place. These techniques include many of
our everyday encounters such as user-accounts and passwords, firewalls, and VPN
encryption. All of these techniques aim to keep the wrong people out and the right
people in. However, attackers continually strive to break through these barriers and
invade protected information. These barriers are preventive measures, and digital
firms must augment these preventive measures by implementing intrusion detection
systems (IDS) that monitor the network and detect fraudulent or unusual activity.
Certain characteristics of computer IDS define their effectiveness. The typical
measures of an IDS involve accuracy of detection, often expressed as a true positive
rating and false positive rating. The overall effectiveness of an IDS can be shown on
a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, which plots the full range of a clas-
sification system’s true positive and false positive rates. Typically, minimizing false
positive alarms while maintaining an acceptable rate of true positives is paramount
with intrusion detection systems. Falsely identifying a significant portion of au-
thentic users as intruders represents a problem for a digital firm. Authentic users
could experience temporary restriction or no access to the network. This creates
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frustration on an individual level and could result in reduced efficiency on a larger
scale. Minimizing false positive ratings is a key criterion when evaluating an IDS,
even while realizing that a lower true positive rating will occur.
Intrusion detection is inherently a statistical problem [41]. The problem in-
volves collecting a sample of data, describing the data through statistical attributes,
and then classifying the data based upon these attributes. Intrusion detection of-
tentimes involves identifying intruders without any training data that indicates the
behavior of intruders.
4.2 Types of Intrusion Detection Systems
There are two types of intrusion detection systems: host-based IDS (HIDS),
and network-based IDS(NIDS). Host-based IDS monitor individual workstations,
and Network-based IDS monitor network packets. The types of intrusion detection
used for these types of IDS are inherently different due to the type of data generated
by each. Computer workstations monitored by a HIDS can generate very specific
data regarding user behavior. Networks monitored by HIDS produce one type of
data: network packets.
Monitoring with HIDS is a domain specific task. The purpose of using a HIDS
is to prevent an individual from masquerading as an authentic user and to prevent
authentic users from wandering into computing domains where they do not belong.
Smaller banks of computers with consistent users operating in a relatively secure
environment would be an appropriate domain for a HIDS. The intent of the HIDS
is to capture telling statistics about user behavior that helps to identify a particu-
lar user. This information is then transformed into some type of statistic or set of
statistics that can be used as a benchmark to compare the future behavior of the
same user. If this user’s behavior strays far enough from this statistic, the HIDS will
alarm an intruder. The idea is that computer users have certain behavior, and often
patterns of behavior, that they perform every time they log onto a machine. Signif-
icant deviation from this behavior indicates a potential intruder. The types of data
that can be collected by a HIDS included keystroke statistics, program preferences,
websites visited, times logged on, command usage, etc. HIDS intrusion detection
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often is considered anomaly detection since the purpose is to detect anomalies or
outliers measured against historical statistics.
Monitoring a network with a NIDS is somewhat different. The purpose of a
NIDS is to identify network traffic indicative of network attacks. Examples of this
include individuals attempting to attack into a company’s intranet and computers
inside of the network attempting to attack from within. NIDS typically utilize
some type of packet sniffing software, such as Snort [2], which has the capability to
filter packets based upon certain decision criteria. A NIDS will typically pass any
packets deemed as benign and analyze all of the packets identified as a potential
attack. NIDS utilize known characteristics established from known attacks, and
for this reason these techniques are often referred to as signature based detections.
Previous attacks typically have a certain signature, and a NIDS attempts to identify
matching or similar signatures.
4.3 Analysis of the Host Based Dataset
Section 2.5.1 provides a detailed account of the contents of the SEA dataset.
Although widely used for masquerade detection, this dataset has some limitations
[41]. First, command arguments, which may contain valuable information for in-
trusion detection and authorship, were not collected because of privacy concerns.
Second, the 20 intruders are ”other” users from a general population similar to the
legitimate users and not ”real” masqueraders who may exhibit unusual patterns
distinguished more easily from normal patterns. Third, mistyped commands may
violate the signature profile built for a user. Regardless of these shortcomings, we
found the data to be a valuable set and used it to test our methods.
The initial programming effort involved determining the data dictionary (list
of every unique command). In addition to generating this list, the programs also
report the frequency of the commands and the popularity of the commands (number
of users who use distinct command). In an effort to validate the data dictionary,
frequency, and popularity of the commands, we relied upon a graph created by
Schonlau that plots distinct commands vs. unique commands [129].
Figure B.4 contains Schonlau’s plot from [129] on the right and an identical plot
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used to validate analysis of the data on the left. These plots illustrate the uniqueness
(1 - (total users of that command / total users)) of the distinct commands. As shown,
almost 50% of the distinct commands have a uniqueness of .98, meaning that almost
50% of the distinct commands are used by only one user. In total, there are 856
distinct commands within the entire data set, and within the training data set (first





















Figure 4.1: Distinct commands plotted vs. unique commands
4.4 Schonlau’s Analysis
Before creating text mining variables, much of Schonlau’s original work and
results with this data were recreated. Schonlau developed, analyzed, and compared
numerous detection algorithms. Schonlau’s work includes analyzing unpopular com-
mands, real time hypothesis testing, principal components regression, and structural
zeroes [41–43,128,129].
Following the work of Schonlau accomplished two critical goals. Replicating
his work and achieving the same results through new text mining programs written
in Perl completed a validity check for the programs. Secondly, his work with this
dataset is comprehensive, and understanding and replicating his work provides a
solid foundation of knowledge that enables further exploration of this dataset.
Shortly after finishing the initial programming and validity check with Schon-
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lau’s algorithm based upon unpopular commands [129], new techniques were ex-
plored. It is possible to measure this data in numerous ways and provide variables
that a learning machine can use to predict outcomes. After creating a new set of
variables that measure user behavior, these variables serve as a basis for experi-
mentation in predictive modeling with learning machines. The primary learning
machine utilized in this article is Rosipal’s K-PLS [124]. Although other learning
machines may offer comparable or even better results, our choice to remain with
this particular learning machine is primarily an effort to remain consistent. With
numerous combinations of variables presented to the learning machine with different
preprocessing techniques, exploration of improved classification begins.
4.5 Text Mining Variables
After validating the Perl programs and developing a solid understanding of the
dataset, new variables were necessary to create different techniques that accurately
predict the presence or absence of an intruder. The spirit of these variables come
from Schonlau’s original work [129], however the machine learning approach in-
volving these variables is fundamentally different from Schonlau’s technique. These
variables were created with the goal of developing a technique to measure the behav-
ior of computer users in a manner that captures the differences between intruders
and authentic users. There are a number of techniques available to capture com-
puter user behavior and/or network behavior. The selected technique is largely a
function of the dataset utilized. The new variables and the prediction models in-
volving these new variables work primarily with the latter 10,000 commands from
each user. Therefore, with each user contributing 100 tuples of data for this section,
there are a total of 5,000 tuples that we will examine. These new variables we are
discussing measure the overall characteristics of the 100 commands contained within
the tuple, and these variables can be seen in table 4.5.
An important aspect that remained true throughout the search for effective
classification involved the importance of Mahalanobis scaling the data - essentially
normalizing every entry in the data matrix - by subtracting the mean and dividing
by the standard deviation of the variable. This was due to the extreme ranges
62
Table 4.1: Description of text mining variables
Name of Variable Description
1 new Binary variable that indicates presence of com-
mand never used by this user
2 % of Unix commands Percent of commands that are UNIX
3 % Top 20 most popular com-
mands
Fraction of commands that are within the top 20
most popular commands in the data set
4 % of internet commands Fraction of commands that are internet/email
commands (sendmail and netscape)
5 Average Uniqueness Averages Uniqueness (number between .02 and .98
) of commands in tuple
6 Average Frequency Averages the frequency of each command in the
dataset
7 % of foreign commands Percent of commands never seen before - this will
be zero for all training data
8 xu value xu value from Schonlau’s algorithm[8], essentially
providing a signature index that is based upon us-
age pattern of that particular user
9 user Integer between 1 and 50 that indicates the iden-
tity of the user
of different variables; with similar reasoning, the covariance matrix provides little
useful information, however the correlation matrix provides a true measure of the
interdependency between variables.
4.6 Matrix Plots for Visualizing Variables
It is sometimes possible to predict a response directly from the values of the
variables, without any learning machine or algorithm. If a variable takes on a certain
range of values for one response, and a separate range for another response, it is
sometimes possible to infer with a good degree of certainty the response based on
a single variable or multiple variables that have this property. “Fisher’s Iris data”,
shown in Figure 4.2, is a great illustration of this point. The iris dataset is a classic
multivariate dataset originally analyzed by Fisher in [58] and also included in the
work of Johnson and Wichern [85]. Four predictor variables: petal length, petal
width, sepal length, and sepal width are used to distinguish types of iris flowers.
The AnalyzeTM [46] software package contains an option to color map observations





Figure 4.2: Matrix plots for the description of variables
In the Iris dataset it is apparent that the sepal length and width (first two
variables) will not be as effective determine the type of iris since the colors do not
have a distinct similarity with those in the response column. On the other hand, the
colors generated for the petal length and width are distinctly similar to the response
column. A reasonable assumption is that petal length or petal width can be used to
fairly accurately predict the type of iris. The computer intrusion dataset was sorted
by the “Intrusion/ Non-Intrusion” column and color coded in the same way as the
Iris data set. These new variables introduced for the computer intrusion detection
problem do not exhibit this type of behavior, except for Schonlau’s xu value from
the uniqueness algorithm(7th variable shown adjacent to output variable) and the
1st variable, “new”, which is a binary variable which represents the presence or
absence of commands never seen from a particular user. This is expected because
the xu value is an overall index that predicts the presence or absence of an intruder;
low xu values correspond with potential intruders, and higher xu values indicate
authentic users, hence the inverse relationship illustrated. The correlation of the
“new” variable and the output variable is a direct reflection of the consistent and
stagnant command vocabulary of most of these users.
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4.7 Analysis of the Network-Based Dataset
The analysis of network-based data is an entirely different problem from hos-
based intrusion detection. The network-based data are much more voluminous,
and also contain many more dimensions. It is important to initially have a basic
understanding of network traffic. Network traffic consists of packets of information
sent from a host to a destination. The most popular protocol today is transmission
control protocol / internet protocol (TCP/IP). This protocol breaks messages into
packets, labels the packets, and routes the packets to a host. The receiving machine
ensures all packets are received and assembled correctly based upon this protocol.
TCP/IP is what makes the internet work. There are other protocols, such as user
datagram protocol(UDP) and address resolution protocol(ARP), which exist on the
network, however they are not nearly as prevalent or important as TCP/IP.
The typical collection format of network data is TCPdump. TCPdump is a
UNIX program that collects packets from a network line. This is usually a router
or gateway when attempting to monitor a network. Collecting and analyzing TCP-
dump data is the fundamental method of analyzing network traffic.
The primary dataset for examining network intrusion detection is the 1998
and 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation [68]. This evaluation took place
at the Lincoln Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The MIT
researchers collected several weeks of data from an Air Force base that was not
exposed to any known network attacks. The researchers then artificially inserted
attacks within this data through simulation. The end result was a dataset with
known attacks of several types, and the start and end of these attacks is known
and marked. This is exactly the type of information necessary for machine learning
research. However, there is a significant challenge involving the representation of
this data.
TCPdump data is alphanumeric data presented as a header followed by the
payload of data. An example of five different TCPdump packets are shown in figure
4.3.
There are several problems with directly analyzing TCPdump packets. The
first problem is the volume. An average eight hour day of traffic from the DARPA
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Figure 4.3: Printout of five network packets captured by TCPdump
network data consists of around 700,000 packets. The second problem is leveraging
information from the packets. A single packet gives minimal information, however
all of the packets from a connection between two computers provides all of the
information exchanged during the connection. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze
connections rather than packets. This enables an abstraction of information which
will begin to provide a much more manageable data representation. A connection is
simply a completed exchange of information between two computers. Connections
can consist of less than ten packets or several hundred packets. The software utilized
for the analysis of connections is TCPtrace, a TCP connection analysis tool written
by Shawn Ostermann [116].
TCPtrace provides an overall summary of the connection, to include the num-
ber and type of packets, date-time group of the connection, duration, and other
useful analysis. This is again represented in an alphanumeric format, however I
wrote Perl program which parses the TCPtrace representation into a numeric rep-
resentation which is compatible with machine learning software. An example of
TCPtrace output for a TCPtrace connection is shown in figure 4.4.
After parsing TCPtrace output with the Perl program, the connection can
be represented as a single tuple of 80 variables. Each tuple must furthermore be
marked as either an attack or non-attack, and an example of how to mark tuples as
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Figure 4.4: Printout of TCPtrace representation of a TCP connection
such is shown in chapter 8.
Bernhard Sick performed similar analysis based upon this same data set [76].
Sick examined feature selection techniques with a neural network to predict out-
comes for this data. His data consists of 137 features (he uses a large number of
binary variables - thus creating more variables). He shared this data and I have
been able to apply both the one-class SVM and K-PLS as initial experiments. It
is a goal in this research to utilize both the TCPtrace collected data and Sick’s
data to improve our understanding and ability to predict network based intrusions.
A detailed explanation of a data flow diagram representing the data processing for
both host based computer intrusion detection and network based computer intrusion
detection is located in Appendix A.
CHAPTER 5
CREATING SYNERGY WITH UNSUPERVISED
CLASSIFICATION
5.1 Introduction
This chapter includes exploratory work involving intelligent subspace selection
and much of the original efforts that led to important findings regarding the fusion
of classifiers included in chapter 6. A novel method for receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curve analysis and anomaly detection is proposed. The ROC curve
provides a measure of effectiveness for binary classification problems, and this chap-
ter specifically addresses unbalanced, unsupervised, binary classification problems.
Furthermore, this work explores techniques in fusing decision values from classifiers
and using ROC curves to illustrate the effectiveness of the fusion techniques. In
describing an unbalanced classification problem, understand that this is a problem
that has a low occurrence of the positive class (generally less than 10%). Since
the problem is unsupervised, the one-class SVM is utilized. The chapter includes a
discussion of the curse of dimensionality experienced with the one-class SVM, and
to overcome this problem techniques involving subspace modeling are explored. For
each subspace created, the one class SVM produces a decision value. The aggrega-
tion of the decision values occurs through the use of fuzzy logic, creating the fuzzy
ROC curve. The primary source of data for this research is a host based computer
intrusion detection dataset.
5.2 Introduction to the Problem
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate synergistic combinations of multiple
classifiers for the unbalanced, unsupervised binary classification problem. The SEA
data and the Ionosphere data from the UCI data repository will be explored in this
chapter.
Combinations of multiple classifiers (CMC), also referred to as multiple classi-
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fication systems (MCS) or committee machines, is an active area of research today.
Given the numerous classification techniques and vast problem area domain, re-
search within this field seems only bounded by creativity and computational power.
A particularly interesting problem that involves CMC is the unbalanced, unsuper-
vised binary classification problem. Consider the following example that referred
to as the “airport security problem”. An airport security system exists in layers,
all the way up to and including the aircraft while it is airborne. Each layer in this
security system can be considered a classifier; the objective of each layer is to deter-
mine whether or not an intruder, for example, breaches security. How should these
classifiers be arranged? How can the results of classifiers be combined to achieve
synergistic results?
An unsupervised classifier is handicapped by the fact that it often cannot learn
from true positive (intruders) examples. The only examples available to learn from
are true negatives (non-intruders). Furthermore, the problem is unbalanced. This
means that the frequency of intruders is very small; in an airport, this number of
true positives is a tiny fraction of a percent. Some airports work for years without
experiencing an intruder. Yet the cost of not identifying a true positive can be
catastrophic, and the cost of falsely identifying non-intruders, or having too many
false positives, can create is also formidable.
Given a classification problem of high dimension (perhaps >10 variables), ini-
tial experimental results indicate that the creation of subspaces and aggregation of
the subspace classification decision values results in improved classification over a
model that utilizes all variables at once (the unsupervised classification model that
will be utilized is the one-class SVM [127]). This is often known as the “curse of
dimensionality”. Creating subspaces for outlier detection is not a new concept [74].
However, considering this problem as a function of one-class SVM outputs to create
a “fuzzy ROC curve” is novel. As multiple classifiers combine, synergistic improve-
ment in ROC curves can be observed. Fuzzy logic is the basis for the aggregation.
Each classifier will create a decision value that ranges from -1 to +1, where +1 should
indicate the negative (non-intruder) class, and -1 indicates the positive (intruder)
class. These decision values represent a degree of membership in an intruder or a
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non-intruder class. The decision values must be combined to make a final decision,
and fundamentals of fuzzy logic can be used to aggregate these decision values.
As mentioned earlier, unsupervised learning does not perform well in higher
dimensions. A valid question would be to ask why not try a dimension reduction
technique, such as principal components. Principal components work well with bal-
anced classification problems, however caution is necessary with unbalanced prob-
lems. Often the difference between an intruder and non-intruder is subtle, and
principle components can dilute the information content of the variables.
The overall performance measure is the area under the ROC curve, or AUC,
with a secondary performance measure of good performance at low false positive
rates. Overall, the ROC curve created from the subsets should exceed the curve
created by processing one lump sum of variables. Claiming success requires this to
occur. The results section shows several instances where this occurred. Secondly,
in the range of low false positives, where intrusion detection and security systems
typically operate, performance must be good which means that in the range from 0
to 50% true positive, the false positive rate diverges slowly from 0. Examples of this
are shown in the results section. Typically good low false positive range performance
and increased AUC will occur simultaneously, but not always.
Figure 5.1 is a cartoon sketch that summarizes the goal of the work in this
chapter. There is an assumed high dimensional dataset, X ∈ RN×m. X contains
N instances or observations, x1,x2, ...,xN , where xi ∈ R1×m. Modeling the data
in subspaces reduces dimensionality problems and fusing the results of subspace
























































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.1: A sketch of subspace modeling to seek synergistic results
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5.3 Dataset and Model
This chapter explores many facets of recent research, to include intrusion de-
tection models, outlier detection, and fusion of classifiers using fuzzy ROC curves.
Recent work with classifier fusion and fuzzy ROC curves will be discussed during
the presentation of the methods for that material.
Schonlau et. al. [41–43, 128, 129] conducted the original work with the data
explored in this chapter. A detailed discussion of this data can be found in sections
2.5.1 and 4.3. Throughout these experiments normalization of the data occurs(by
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation). The dataset contains
5000 observations and a host of variables to measure these observations (see [50,
135] and section 4.3 for a description of variables). The training set consists of
2500 observations and the test set contains 2500 observations. After eliminating all
positive cases from the training data, 2391 negative cases remain which are used
for training the one-class SVM. Recall that the one-class SVM trains with solely
negative instances. In the testing data, there are 122 positive cases out of the 2500
observations.
The one-class SVM is an outlier detection technique originally proposed in
[127]. Stolfo and Wang [132] successfully apply the one-class SVM to this dataset
and compare it with several of the techniques mentioned above. Chen uses the one-
class SVM for image retrieval [27]. The simplest way to express the one-class SVM
is to envision a sphere or ball, and the object is to squeeze all of the training data
into the tightest ball feasible. This is analogous to the idea of variance reduction for
distribution estimation; given a set of data, I want to estimate a distribution that
tightly defines this data, and any other data that does not look the same will not
fit this distribution. In other words, once the distribution is estimated, data that
does not fit the distribution will be considered an outlier or not a member of the
negative class. Consider the following formulation of the one-class SVM originally
from [127] and also clearly explained in [27]:
If we consider X1, X2, ..., Xl ∈ χ instances of training observations, and Φ is a










subject to ‖ Φ(Xi) − c ‖2≤ R2 + ζi, ζi ≥ 0 for i ∈ [l] (5.1)
This minimization function attempts to squeeze R, which can be thought of
as the radius of a ball, as small as possible in order to fit all of the training samples.
If a training sample will not fit, ζi is a slack variable to allow for this. A free
parameter, v, enables the modeler to adjust the impact of the slack variables. The
output, or decision value for a one-class SVM, takes on a values from -1 to +1,
where values close to +1 indicate datapoints that fit into the ball and values of -1
indicate datapoints lying outside of the ball. A detailed discussion of the one class
SVM can be found in section 2.2.3.2.
5.3.1 Curse of Dimensionality
It is commonly understood that high-dimensional data suffer from a curse of
dimensionality. This curse of dimensionality involves the inability to distinguish dis-
tances between points because as dimensionality increases, every point tends to be-
come equidistant as volume grows exponentially. This same curse of dimensionality
occurs in the one-class SVM. (The SVM tool used for this research is LIBSVM [24]
with a linear kernel.)
Figure B.4 illustrates an experimental example of the curse of dimensionality
where there are originally 27 meaningful variables, however meaningless probe vari-
ables (uniform (0,1) random variables) are added to create degradation. The area
under the ROC curve, or AUC, will serve as a measure of classifier performance. See
chapter 3 for a discussion of ROC curves. Tom Fawcett also provides an excellent
discussion of ROC curves in [55].
5.4 Method to Create Fuzzy ROC Curves
The following technique seeks to overcome this curse of dimensionality. The
technique involves creating subspaces of the variables and aggregating the outputs
of the one-class SVM for each of these subspaces.
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Figure 5.2: Curse of dimensionality induced by the introduction of probe
variables
5.4.1 Subspace Modeling
Intelligent subspace modeling is an important first step. Orthogonal subspaces
are desired, because we are interested in subspaces that measure different aspects of
the data. The idea of creating diverse classifiers is not novel [15,96,97,99], however
in the literature the measures of classifier diversity involve functions of the classifier
output. This is feasible with supervised learning, however in unsupervised learning
this is more difficult because there are no true positive examples to measure diversity
against. I propose measuring diversity through the actual data. The following
method involves an analysis of the correlation between principal components of
each subspace.
Given a Mahalanobis scaled data matrix X, containing m variables that mea-
sure n observations, create l mutually exclusive subspaces from the m variables.
Assume there are k variables in every subspace if m is divisible by l. Experience
with the one-class SVM indicates that for k > 7, increased dimensionality begins
to degrade performance, however this is simply a heuristic and may vary depending
upon the unsupervised classifier selected. For each subspace, principal components
can be calculated. L will refer to the matrix that contains the principal component
loading vectors (eigenvectors). To determine correlation between principal compo-
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nents, calculate the principal component scores for each subspace, where S=XL. Let
πi represent subspace i, and consider Si as the score matrix for the πi. Calculate the
pairwise comparison for every column vector in Si against every column vector in
Sj , i = j. This would be the equivalent of concatenating Si for all i and calculating
the correlation matrix, Σ.
We are interested in values approaching zero for every pairwise correlation
across subspaces (principal components within subspaces are orthogonal and there-
fore their correlation is zero, as seen in Figure 5.5). However, there are a combina-
toric number of subspace combinations to explore.
















Equation 5.2 assumes that m is divisible by l, and even if this is not true the
equation is almost identical and on the same order of magnitude. Our approach
to search this subspace involved the implementation of a simple genetic algorithm,
utilizing a chromosome with m distinct integer elements representing each variable.
There are many possible objective functions that could pursue minimizing principal
component correlation between subspaces, and I utilized the following letting q ∈
(1, 2, ..., l):
min max
∀πq
| ρij | ∀(i = j) (5.3)
The fitness of each member is simply the maximum | ρij | value from the
correlation matrix such that ρij measures two principal components that are not in
the same subspace.
5.4.1.1 The Genetic Algorithm
The purpose of this GA is to seek optimality for equation 5.3. Appendix C
contains the perl code written to implement this GA. Principal components from the
same subspace will have 0 correlation, however principal components from different
subspaces will have correlation. If principal components are correlated, then this is
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an indicator that the subspaces measure the same behavior. Therefore, uncorrelated
principal components are desirable.
The chromosome consisted of 26 elements, and each of these elements repre-
sented a variable. The initial population consisted of 50 randomly ordered chro-
mosomes. Figure 5.3 is an example of the chromosome encoding used in this algo-
rithm(this is actually the best configuration discovered to date). The three subsets
are extracted as shown, and then the AnalyzeTM [46] software package calculates the
principal components and correlation of the principal components across subspaces.
23 31525138252416161920264221814121171721109
subset 1 subset 2 subset 3
crossover point
Figure 5.3: Illustration of chromosome and subspaces
The selection of chromosomes followed the common roulette wheel process,
where chromosomes with a better fitness receive a higher probability of being se-
lected. In order to retain the fittest chromosome found, an elitist rule retains the
single best chromosome and passes it to the next generation. Immigrants were also
implemented. These were two new random chromosomes who took the place of the
least fit chromosomes selected for breeding. After selecting a group of chromosomes
for breeding, these chromosomes had a 40% chance of directly passing to the next
generation and a 60% chance of crossover. Crossover occurred at the point shown in
Figure 5.3. This crossover option was somewhat unorthodox since a clean crossover
could not occur due to the fact that every element in the chromosome must be
unique. Therefore, after executing a crossover, the new chromosomes required ad-
justment to ensure unique elements. This adjustment occurred only on the first
half of the new chromosome (before the crossover point); ie, if a redundant element
occurred in the new chromosome, this would randomly be replaced by one of the
variables not yet accounted for in the new chromosome.
The last step involved mutation. Mutating chromosomes also required special
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consideration due to constraints of chromosome elements. Each element had a 1%
chance of encountering mutation. If an element was selected for mutation, the
element was simply swapped with its mirror element. If the chromosome contains
l elements, and the kth element is selected for mutation, then I swap this with the
(l − k)th element, which I refer to as its mirror.
5.4.2 Output Processing
After selecting the subspaces, prediction modeling begins. As mentioned pre-
viously, the choice for a prediction model is the one-class SVM with a linear kernel.
However, the problem of classifier fusion still persists. Classifier fusion techniques
have been discussed in [15, 96, 97, 99]. Classifier fusion is a relatively new field and
it is often criticized for lack of theoretical framework and too many heuristics [97].
The methods in this chapter do not claim to provide a solution to this criticism.
The presented method of classifier fusion is a blend of techniques from fuzzy logic
and classifier fusion, and although it may be considered another heuristic, it is op-
erational and should generalize to other security problems.
5.4.2.1 Mapping into Comparable Decision Spaces
For each observation within each subspace selected, the classifier will produce
a decision value, dij, where dij represents the decision value from the j
th classifier
for the ith observation. Since the distribution of the output from almost any clas-
sification technique is questionable, first consider a nonparametric measure for the
decision value, a simple ranking. oij represents the ordinal position of dij (for the
same classifier, meaning j remains constant). For example, if d71 is the smallest
value for the 1st classifier, o71 = 1. This nonparametric measure allows comparison
of classifiers without considering the distribution. However, do not rule out the dis-
tribution altogether. Next create pij, which is the Mahalanobis scaled (normalized)
value for dij. In order to incorporate fuzzy logic, oij and pij must be mapped into
a new space of real numbers, let us call Λ, where Λ ∈ (0, 1). This mapping will be
pij → δij and oij → θij such that δij , θij ∈ Λ. For oij → θij this is a simple scaling
procedure where all oij are divided by the number of observations, m, such that
θij = oij/m. For pij → δij , all pij values < −1 become -1, all pij values > 1 become
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1, and from this point δij = (pij + 1)/2.
5.4.2.2 Fuzzy Logic and Decisions with Contention
There are now twice as many decision values for every observation as there were
numbers of classifiers. Utilizing fuzzy logic theory, T-conorms and T-norms can be
considered for fusion. The choice between T-norms and T-conorms depends upon the
type of decision. The medical community is cautious of false negative tests, meaning
that they would rather have error on the side of falsely telling someone that they have
cancer as opposed to letting it go undetected. The intrusion detection community is
concerned about minimizing false positives, because too many false positives render
an intrusion detection system useless as analysts slog through countless false alarms.
In the realm of one-class SVMs, the original decision values will take on values
ranging generally from -1 to +1, where values closer to +1 indicate observations
that fit inside the ball or estimated distribution (indicating non-intruders), and
values closer to -1 indicate outliers (potential intruders). Consider the max and
min, simple examples of a respective T-conorm and T-norm. Systems that need to
be cautious against false negatives will operate in the realm of the T-norms, creating
more false alarms but missing fewer true positives. Systems that need to be cautious
against false negatives will operate in the realm of the T-conorms, perhaps missing
a few true positives but generating fewer false positives. Figure 5.4 illustrates the
domain of aggregation operators.
Intersections(T-Norms) Unions(T-Conorms)Averages
0 max (0, x + y – 1) x x y min(x,y) max (x,y) x + y - x x y min(1, x + y) 1
Properties of T-Norms
T(x,y):  [0,1] x [0,1] > [0,1]
T(x,0) – T(0,x) = 0
T(x,1) = T(1,x) = x
T(x,y) = T(y,x)
T(x,T(y,z)) = T(T(x,y),z)
T(x,y)     T(y,x) if x    u, y    u≤ ≤ ≤
Properties of T-Conorms
S(x,y):  [0,1] x [0,1] > [0,1]
S(x,0) – S(0,x) = x
S(x,1) = S(1,x) = 1
S(x,y) = S(y,x)
S(x,S(y,z)) = S(S(x,y),z)
S(x,y)     S(y,x) if x    u, y    u≥ ≥ ≤
Properties of (Normalized)
Average Functions
H(x,y):  [0,1] x [0,1]       [0,1]
min(x,y) < H(x,y) < max(x,y)
H(x,H(y,z))   H(H(x,y),z)  ≠
Figure 5.4: Fuzzy aggregation operators
One problem with T-norms and T-conorms is that contention within aggrega-
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tion is not captured. By contention I am referring to a vast difference of decision
values between classifiers. However, contention can be captured and considered ap-
propriately. Typically, if contention exists, a system needs to reflect caution. In
other words, if we are minimizing false positives and contention exists in a decision,
we may simply choose negative or choose a different aggregator for contentious deci-
sions. If contention exists in a medical decision, it is likely that the initial diagnosis
will report positive (cancer detected) and then further tests will be pursued. There
are numerous ways to measure contention, and one of the simplest is to consider
the difference between the max and min decision values. If this difference exceeds a
threshold, contention exists and it may be best to choose a different aggregator or
make a cautious decision.
5.5 Results with Masquerading Data
Experimental results involved the SEA dataset. There are m=26 variables
and n=2500 observations in the training data. For our subspace selection, there are
l=3 subspaces creating subspaces containing 9, 9, and 8 variables respectively. For
each subspace we consider three principal components. The genetic algorithm used
the fitness function shown in Equation 5.3, roulette wheel selection, a crossover rate
of .6 and mutation rate of .01. Our number of generations = population size = 50.
Figure 5.5 is the correlation matrix of the principal components from our selected
subspaces, where max∀πq | ρij |= .4 ∀(i = j).
Given this subspace configuration, LIBSVM can calculate the one-class SVM
decision variables. Given the decision variables dij, map dij → oij → θij and
dij → pij → δij as described in section 5.7. The decision rule was to take the
maximum value unless there was contention > .5, and in this case take the median
of all decision values. The ROC curves shown in figure 5.6 and tabled values in
Table 5.2 illustrate the results. The red (superior) ROC curve represents the result
with some type of aggregation, the green (inferior) ROC curve represents the result
without any aggregation and utilizing 26 variables for the one-class SVM input.
As Figure 5.6 illustrates, different decision rules create various outcomes. The
best plot, (d), integrates all decision variables as the algebraic sum. Table 5.1
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Figure 5.5: Correlation matrix of subspace principal components
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5.6: ROC plots illustrating effect of different decision rules
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Table 5.1: Decision rules for ROC plots in Figure 5.6
ROC Plot Decision Rule for Each Observation (i); (t = threshold for contention)
(a) algebraic sum of (θij)∀j
(b) algebraic product of (θij)∀j
(c) if t < .5, algebraic sum of (δij , θij)∀j; if t ≥ .5, median (δij , θij)∀j
(d) algebraic sum of (δij , θij)∀j
Table 5.2: Overall Results with Best Subsets.
∀δij , θij ∀θij ∀δij
AUC comment AUC comment AUC comment
T-norms
minimum .695 .8632 poor low
FP
.7













maximum .8206 poor high
FP
.7967 .825










.8548 .887 low FP
not the
best
describes the decision rules.
These results provide interesting insight. It is an overall assumption that T-
conorms provide the best rules for the security classification problem. However, for
the ordinal decision variables (θij), T-norms performed well. The ordinal variables
are interesting in themselves since there is no distance considered when comparing
variables; the only aspect considered is order. This is a non-parametric method for
comparison, and this is done since the distribution of the decision variables is not
easy to estimate and perhaps should not be assumed. The distance based decision
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variables (δij) do not perform well with T-norms. Overall, the ROC plot d appears
to perform best since there is exceptional performance for low false positive rates
and the overall AUC is among the best. The idea of contention deserves much more
study, and this parameter is likely to need tuning. It obviously does impact the
overall results and warrants consideration, however it is not entirely understood.
Table 5.3 is an illustration of poor results, which should reinforce some of the claims
previously made.
Table 5.3: Overall Results with Worst Subsets.
AUC ∀δij , θij AUC ∀θij AUC ∀δij
T-norms



























Table 5.3 illustrates the results obtained for the worst subset encountered (the
configuration that scored highest for our minimization fitness function). This is in-
teresting to observe since it is difficult to show that some type of optimality has been
reached by minimizing the correlation between principal components. Empirically,
this shows that there are much worse configurations and it is worth exploring for
improved subspace configurations.
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5.6 Seeking Diverse Subspaces with Nonparametric Statis-
tics
It is widely known that diversity is desirable for classifier fusion [97, 98], and
there are numerous methods for measuring classifier diversity for supervised classi-
fication. It is undesirable to have multiple classifiers that all make the same errors
in the same direction; it is desirable to have classifiers making different mistakes
on different instances, and when combined, synergistic performance occurs through
intelligent combination. A simple regression model illustrates this idea. This model
can be expressed as Xw=y, where X ∈ RN×m, w ∈ Rm×1, y ∈ RN×1. If y is known
for the training data, the measures of diversity shown in [97, 98] apply. However,
when y is either unknown or only contains the negative class, measures of diver-
sity must involve X. Therefore, since our desire is to create subspaces of a high
dimensional dataset, we seek diverse subspaces.
In order to measure this diversity, a distance measurement, dij, will be cal-
culated for the ith observation in every jth subspace. The distance measurement
is the Euclidean distance of the observation point to the subspace centroid. How-
ever, other distance measurements should not be discounted, and nonlinear kernel
distance measurements can also be considered. This distance measurement will pro-
vide the basis of our intelligent subspace modeling. Our interest is to find subspaces
that are not correlated with respect to dij . If subspaces are correlated with respect
to dij , these subspaces capture similar behavior. Uncorrelated subspaces indicate
subspaces that are somewhat orthogonal, and we interpret this as diversity.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the idea of correlated versus uncorrelated subspaces based
upon Kendall’s W , a nonparametric measure of concordance which calculates agree-
ment across multiple subspaces using only ranks. The vertical axis in figure 5.7
measures dij, and the ranking of the points is obvious from plots. Similar ordering
occurs in the subspaces on the left with a higher W , however the subspaces on the
right contain a much more random order, and W reflects a lower value.
Kendall’s W provides a scalar measurement of agreement or disagreement of
the rankings between subspaces. In order to compute W , first map dij → Rij such
that Rij represents the rank of the i

















































































W = 0.82 W = 0.35
Figure 5.7: A comparison of correlated and uncorrelated subspaces
centroid. Assuming that there are N points in our training data and l subspaces,
Kendall defines W as follows in [89]:
W =
12S









− l(N + 1)
2
)2
It is our hypothesis that diverse subspaces will create a small W , and this
diversity will provide improved ensembles for unsupervised learning. The same
genetic algorithm is used to minimize W .
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves provide an elegant, simple rep-
resentation of the performance of a binary classification system, based entirely upon
nonparametric ranks. The curve presents the relationship between a false positive
rate and a true positive rate across the full spectrum of operating points, which can
also be considered the full spectrum of a continuous threshold value for a decision
method. The nonparametric interpretation of the ROC curve and the AUC is dis-
cussed in [17, 71, 109]. Many machine learning algorithms provide a real number,
or soft decision value, as the output. It is difficult, and often not necessary, to as-
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sociate this output to a probability distribution. It is more meaningful to consider
this output as a degree of confidence towards one class or the other. Interpreting
this soft decision value as a ranking leads directly to the nonparametric statistics
associated with the area under the ROC curve. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistic,
which is directly proportional to the Mann-Whitney U statistic, provides this asso-
ciation. Chapter 3 provides a detailed summary of ROC curve construction and the
relationship between ROC curves and ranks.
5.7 Mapping into Comparable Decision Spaces
For each observation within each subspace selected, the classifier will produce
a decision value, Dij , where Dij represents the decision value from the j
th classifier
for the ith observation. oij represents the ordinal position, or rank, of Dij (for the
same classifier, meaning j remains constant). For example, if D71 is the smallest
value for the 1st classifier, o71 = 1. In order to incorporate fuzzy logic, oij must
be mapped into a new space of real numbers, let us call Λ, where Λ ∈ (0, 1). This
mapping will be oij → θij such that θij ∈ Λ. For oij → θij this is a scaling procedure
where all oij are divided by the number of observations, N , such that θij = oij/N .
5.8 Experimental Results
Two datasets have been explored for the experimental results. The first
dataset, which we will refer to as the Schonlau et. al. or SEA dataset, is a computer
intrusion dataset originally created by Schonlau and discussed in [41–43, 128, 129].
The data consists of the combination of text mining variables (described in [50]) and
recursive data mining variables (described in [135]) derived from the SEA dataset.
In total there are 26 variables.
The results shown in table 5.4 and figure 5.8 illustrate the improvements ob-
tained through our nonparametric ensemble technique for unsupervised learning.
The plot of the ROC curves shows the results from using 26 original variables that
represented the SEA data as one group of variables with the one-class SVM and
the result of creating l = 3 subspaces of features and fusing the results to create
the fuzzy ROC curve. It is interesting to notice in the table of results that nearly
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every aggregation technique demonstrated improvement, with the most significant
improvement in the T-norms.
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AREA UNDER THE CURVE : 0.9318
Fuzzy_ROC Curve, AUC = 0.9318
26 vars, AUC = .7835
Figure 5.8: ROC for SEA data using algebraic product with contention
The ionosphere data is included to illustrate the performance of our ensemble
technique with a balanced benchmark data set. This dataset is available from the
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UCI repository, and it consists of 34 variables that represent different radar signals
received while investigating the ionosphere for either good or bad structure. For
this experiment we again chose l = 3.
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AREA UNDER THE CURVE : 0.9604
Fuzzy_ROC Curve, AUC = 0.9604
34 vars, AUC = .931
Figure 5.9: ROC plot for ionosphere data with minimize aggregation
technique
It is very logical to ask why a simple dimension reduction technique, such
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as principal components, is not sufficient to overcome the curse of dimensionality.
Principal components capture variance, and by utilizing principal components the
modeler is assuming that the variables from the training and testing data follow
similar distributions, and furthermore that it is possible to identify novelties as an
outlier along one of these axis of maximal variance, or principal component. If this
novelty occurs as an outlier from only one variable, and this variable contributes
minimal variance to the dataset in the training sample, it is likely that this novelty
will go undetected. Furthermore, it is important that subspaces consist of meaning-
ful dimensions for causality analysis [117].
For both the SEA data and the ionosphere data, principal components analysis
was used as a dimension reduction technique to compare performance versus the
ensemble method. For the SEA data, the PCA technique did improve classification
reaching an AUC of .91, however the diverse subspaces with T-norm aggregation
performed comparable to this and in some cases better. For the ionosphere data,
however, the PCA technique actually degraded performance, achieving an AUC of
0.89 and falling well short of the best ensemble shown above.
T-norms provide the best aggregation for both datasets. This illustrates the
idea of diversity, where different classifiers apparently correctly identify different
positive cases. Every aggregator does not create improved performance with the
ionosphere data; actually, it is only the minimization operator that improves per-
formance. Furthermore, the impact of diversity does not seem as significant with
the ionosphere data as it is with the Schonlau data. It is possible that a different
distance measure could be appropriate for the ionosphere data.
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate the work that took place during
the course of this research to explore subspace modeling and model aggregation.
Throughout the chapter, T-norms performed well. The next chapter will describe
why a particular T-norm, the min, consistently performs well with unbalanced data.
The important findings included in the next chapter would never have been possible
without the exploratory work discussed in this chapter.
CHAPTER 6
SYNERGISTIC CLASSIFIER FUSION
This chapter includes the most important findings of this thesis. Unbalanced classi-
fication is a fundamental theme of this thesis, and this chapter explains why model
fusion for unbalanced datasets performs differently than model fusion for balanced
data. Exposing this difference provides researchers with an additional parameter,
the balance of the data, which must be considered when building ensembles of clas-
sification models.
6.1 Introduction
Consider several sensors responsible for detecting some type of anomolous be-
havior. The sensors serve as sentries to a larger system. Suppose that every sensor
reacts to every observation, evaluating or ranking the observation based upon a
history of known behavior. Suppose that for each observation, some of the sensors
have an opportunity to closely observe and measure an observation (a “good” mea-
surement), and some of the sensors remotely observe (a “poor” measurement). All
of the sensor measurements will be considered for the decision, and it is unknown
which sensors closely observe and which ones remotely observe. How should the
measurements of these sensors fuse to create the best signal? What other consid-
erations regarding the observed population should be included when choosing the
fusion method? What other information should be considered when choosing the
fusion method for this situation?
These are a few of the questions that this chapter addresses. This scenario
is also one potential application of synergistic classifier fusion. Synergistic classifier
fusion is an ensemble technique designed for the unbalanced classification problem,
very applicable with SCPs. Synergistic classifier fusion uses one additional piece of
information to improve performance - assumed imbalance of the classes. With this
simple assumption, it is possible to take advantage of the behavior of rank distri-
butions and use min or max aggregators for synergistic performance. The generic
88
89
framework of this chapter considers the classic case of model ensembles. With model
ensembles, fusion of ranks is all the more important because the underlying distri-
butions of the model decision values is unknown. Several important novelties stem
from this chapter:
• Pseudo ROC curves. ROC curves are a performance metric. However, it is
entirely possible to examine the underlying statistics which create ROC curves
to better understand classifier behavior. Typically ROC curves are built from
a classification scenario and simply observed for what they are. However, how
does an ROC curve with an AUC of 0.7 differ from an ROC curve with an
AUC of 0.9? How does an ROC curve with an AUC of 0.9 that measures
a classification problem with a 90% negative class differ from an ROC curve
with an AUC of 0.9 that measures a classification problem with a 50% negative
class? These questions can be explored with Pseudo ROC curves.
• Rank distributions from pseudo ROC curves. Rank distributions illustrate
the behavior of classifiers from a non-parametric position. ROC curves are
non-parametric, and the underlying distributions of the ranks which create
ROC curves are non-parametric. When comparing two classifiers, comparing
them with non-parametric statistics makes sense. The underlying distribution
of classifier decision values is unknown - using (non-parametric) ranks enables
comparison of classifiers on a level field. These rank distributions also lead to
consideration of the max and min aggregation or fusion metrics.
• The min and max aggregators provide robust classifier fusion for imbalanced
classification problems. This chapter will discuss the behavior of rank distribu-
tions for imbalanced classification problems - rank distributions of imbalanced
classification problems behave with different likelihoods (discrete rank prob-
abilities) than a balanced problem. It is possible to take advantage of this
difference in likelihoods to improve classification.
This chapter discusses the methods utilized to achieve synergistic classifier
fusion and the underlying theory explaining why this synergistic classifier fusion
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occurs. The fusion methods described provide consistently robust solutions to the
security classification problem. The first part of this chapter introduces the fusion
method and the experimental results achieved. The second part of this chapter
explains why this technique consistently performs well.
6.2 Recent Related Work
Recent work involving ensemble methods which contain combinations of fea-
ture subsets include Breiman’s work on Random Forests [19] and Ho’s work with
Random Subspaces [74]. Both of these methods use a random approach for subspace
selection, which is different from the method proposed in this chapter. Furthermore,
both of these authors utilize decision trees and the average (avg) function to fuse
or aggregate the ensemble. This chapter will show that the avg aggregator alone
is not the best aggregator for the security classification problem. Furthermore, the
methods described in this chapter generalize to the machine learning domain where
it is assumed that model output involves real valued decision values as opposed to
a binary decision value which is the case with decision trees.
Other recent work in ensemble techniques include Kuncheva’s extensive work
on combinations of pattern classifiers and diversity of classifier combinations in
[96–99]. Bonissone et. al. and Evangelista et. al. have introduced the idea of
fuzzy fusion of classifiers in [15] and [48, 49], respectively. Some of the work in
cluster ensembles ( [133], [117]) also relates to the material in this chapter. The
pseudo ROC curve and rank distributions discussion in this chapter has also been
published by Evangelista et. al. in [51].
6.3 Pseudo-ROC Curves
A study of pseudo-ROC curves and rank distributions will provide support and
insight to the underlying behavior of classifier fusion for the security classification
problem. This discussion is critical in understanding why certain classifier fusion
metrics work best when fusing multiple models in the security classification domain.
ROC curves are based entirely upon ranks. Furthermore, the Mann-Whitney
U statistic, which is equivalent to the area under the ROC curve, is also equivalent to
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the probability that any random positive instance is ranked higher than a negative
example. Stated formally, let us refer to R(xi) as the rank of observation xi. The
aforementioned property of the Mann-Whitney U statistic indicates the following:
U = P{R(xi|yi = 1) < R(xj|yj = −1)}
When referring to the rank of an observation, a higher rank is a smaller value,
meaning that a rank of 1 is considered higher than a rank of 10, for example. Given
this property, it is entirely possible to create pseudo-ROC curves.
ROC curves represent the performance of a binary classifier, based entirely
upon how the binary classifier ranks the observations and the true class of these
observations. However, if an assumption is made that a classifier has a certain
discriminating ability reflected in the AUC or Mann-Whitney U statistic, artificial
ranks can be created with pseudo-random numbers. The simplest way to accomplish
this is assuming normal distributions for the sake of creating artificial ranks. Sup-
pose A and B are two random variables such that P (A > B) = U , or equivalently
P (A−B > 0) = U . If W = A−B, and it is assumed that W is a standard normal
random variable, clearly A and B are also normal random variables with a variance
of .5. The following table provides examples of this relationship ((w ∼ N(µ, σ2)
represents a normal distribution with a mean of µ and a variance of σ2, with the
same notation for the distributions of a and b).
Table 6.1: Examples of Distributions for Creating Artificial Ranks
P (A > B) = .9 w ∼ N(1.28, 1) a ∼ N(1.28, .5) b ∼ N(0, .5)
P (A > B) = .8 w ∼ N(.84, 1) a ∼ N(.84, .5) b ∼ N(0, .5)
P (A > B) = .7 w ∼ N(.52, 1) a ∼ N(.52, .5) b ∼ N(0, .5)
Given the distributions shown in table 6.1, it is now possible to create random
numbers which will behave with the desired probability of P (A > B) = U . This
will also enforce that P (R(a) > P (R(b)) = U .
These rankings will now enable the creation of pseudo-ROC curves with an
area under the curve equivalent to U . The essence of this method is that it allows for
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the study of ROC curves where control variables consist of the AUC, the number
of positive examples, and the number of negative examples. An example of five

































Figure 6.1: Five pseudo-ROC curves
Pseudo-ROC curves serve a multitude of purposes. ROC curves are a very
popular method to assess the performance of a binary classifier. Empirical research
involving ROC curves has largely been limited to the analysis of curves created by
the output of models with real data. The study of ROC curves solely created from
the output of classification models limits our ability to fully understand and explore
the complete beahvior of ROC curves and ranks. The study of pseudo-ROC curves
places a number of parameters into the hands of the researcher - the discriminating
power (reflected in the U statistic), proportion of the classes, and total number
of observations are all parameters controlled by the researcher with pseudo-ROC
curves.
ROC theory research focuses extensively on the topic of the nonparametric
statistics which impact ROC curves. This is primarily the Wilcoxon Rank Sum
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statistic and Mann-Whitney U statistic [17, 55, 71]. Exceptions to this include [45]
and [54, 57] where the authors have taken creative looks at ROC curves to include
the application of game theory. However, the concept of the pseudo-ROC curve and
use of this method to improve our understanding of ROC curves is a novel approach.
6.4 Rank Distributions
Given a U statistic and desired number of positive and negative instances, it is
possible to create rank distributions. Let us consider p positive instances, b negative
instances (choosing the letter b to signify a benign or negative observation), and
N = p + b total observations. The rank distribution will be a discrete probability
distribution, or probability mass function, with 1...N possible states, or ranks. Rank
distributions reflect the likelihood that a particular rank is a positive or negative
observation. For every case there is a given U , p, and b. This information is all that
is necessary to create two rank distributions, one for positive observations and one
for negative observations.
6.4.1 Utilizing Simulation to Create Rank Distributions
Simulation will be utilized to study these distributions. As stated in [10],
estimating probabilities by simulation due to pragmatic necessity (because the ana-
lytical solution is very difficult) is an acceptable approach. Given a simulation that
models behavior based upon true probabilities, the simulation estimates these prob-
abilities with high accuracy. The combinatoric complexity and implications of order
statistics involved with these rank distributions become problematic in creating an
analytical solution for the mass functions of the rank distributions. This combina-
toric complexity can be shown with a brief example. Suppose that we are interested
in a rank distribution with p = 1 positive instances and b negative instances. This
rank distribution can be solved using the binomial probability distribution. Let r
represent the rank of the one positive instance, where r ∈ (0, 1, 2, ...b). If r = 0, the
positive instance is ranked first and has come out on top of all negative instances;
if r = b, the opposite is true (lowest ranking). Given a prediction model with some
accuracy, intuition indicates that P (r = b) should be small, and P (r = 0) or at least
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U b−r(1 − U)r
However, this is a trivial case when p = 1, which is typically never the case.
Given a value of p > 1, complexity of the analytical solution grows quickly. There are
two ways to attempt to solve the problem analytically for p > 1. The first involves
attempting to create a discrete probability distribution, similar in essence to the
binomial distribution above. This involves managing a distribution that will contain
a high degree of combinatoric complexity. The other approach involves studying the
order statistics of the underlying distributions that generated the ranks. If q is a
continuous random variable which generated the ranks for positive instances, and c
is the same for the negative instances, then (q(1), q(2), ..., q(p), ) and (c(1), c(2), ..., c(b), )
represent the ordered values of the positive and negative instances, respectively.
Again defining P (r = 0) as the probability a positive instance ranks above all other
instances, this equates to the following:
P (r = 0) = P (q(1) > c(1))
This is a relatively simple problem, assuming that the underlying distributions
of q and p are known. However, solving the probability that r equates to (1,2,...,b+p)
is not as simple.
P (r = 1) = P{(q(2) > c(1)) ∪ (c(1) > q(1) > c(2))}
P (r = 2) = P{(q(3) > c(1)) ∪ (c(1) > q(2) > c(2)) ∪ (c(2) > q(1) > c(3))}
...
The study of these probabilities through simulated rank distributions is much
more practical and demonstrates sufficient evidence of the behavior of these rank
probabilities.
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6.4.2 Behavior of Rank Distributions
These ranking distributions have interesting behavior which directly impact
the outcome of ROC curves. First consider two extreme cases. The first extreme case
involves a classifier with no predictive power, and in this case U = .5. The resulting
rank distributions would simply be two uniform distributions ranging between 1 and
N (shown as the right plot in Figure 6.2). The other extreme case would be the
perfect classifier where U = 1. This case would also create two uniform distributions,
however the distribution for the ranks of the positive observations would range from
1...p and the uniform distribution of the negative observations would range from
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RANK FREQENCIES (10 positive samples, 90 negative samples)
positive
negative
Figure 6.2: The histograms on the left represent perfect classification(U =
1, and the histograms on the right represent a random (mean-
ingless) classifier (U = .5). These histograms resulted from
simulations each with 90 positive instances, 10 negative in-
stances, and 1000 simulation runs. The histograms clearly
indicate uniform distributions.
Typically, however, U ranges somewhere between .5 and 1. As U increases
from .5 to 1, the histogram representing the positive class experiences a reduction in
the frequencies of the larger ranks and an increase in the frequencies of the smaller
ranks. It is also evident as this shift occurs that the distribution of the positive
(minority) class begins to take on the familiar form of the exponential distribution.
Figure 6.3 illustrates exactly this phenomenon. This figure illustrates an example
which involves 10% positive instances, and each line represents the rank distribution
of the positive instances for different values of U . Notice the familiar shape of the








 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
RANK FREQENCIES (10 positive samples, 90 negative samples)
U = AUC = .5
U = AUC = .6
U = AUC = .7
U = AUC = .8
U = AUC = .9
U = AUC = 1.0
Figure 6.3: The histograms shown above illustrate how the rank frequen-
cies for the minority class transition as U spans the spectrum
between .5 and 1.
6.5 Behavior of Fused Classifiers
Analyzing how these rank distributions behave provides insight for model fu-
sion. The fusion metric utilized in the most popular ensemble techniques such as
random forest, bagging, and the random subspace method, is the average [18,19,74].
The average is a powerful aggregator, especially if all of the models possess roughly
the same predictive power.
Model fusion involves considering several models, all of which measure the
same observations, and for each observation fuse the results of each model to arrive
at a final decision value for each observation.
Good prediction occurs for a model when the decision value distribution of
the positive class achieves separation from the decision value distribution of the
negative class. Fusion with the avg function invokes the properties of the central
limit theorem, and improved separation occurs as a result of variance reduction.
This can be further explained in a brief example. Assume that three models each
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create a distribution for the decision values of the negative class with a mean of
-1 and a variance of 1. Assume the distributions of the positive class have a mean
of 1 and a variance of 1. The fused model, using the avg aggregator, will create
a distribution for the decision values of the negative class with a mean of -1 and
a variance of 1/3. The positive class will have a mean of 1 and variance of 1/3.
Tighter distributions for both the positive and negative classes creates improved
prediction. The fundamental premise of pattern recognition becomes stronger.
6.5.1 Why the Average and min Fusion Metrics Work
The disadvantage of the avg aggregator involves the equal weighting and in-
clusion of all models, good and bad. When fusing security classification problem
models, it is likely that some of the models are poor classifiers. Therefore, it is de-
sirable to utilize fusion that is robust against poor classifiers without knowing which
classifiers are poor. This is precisely what the min aggregator accomplishes. Given
an unbalanced classification problem, the rank distributions which result clearly
favor the highest rankings and quickly tail off (see figure 6.3). The behavior is
remarkably similar to the exponential distribution. An interesting property of the
exponential distribution involves the distribution of the min of this distribution.
Given an exponential random variable x distributed with a mean (and standard
deviation) of θ, the distribution of the min of x, x(1), is exponential with a mean





F (x) = 1 − e−x/θ
F (x(1)) = 1 − (1 − F (x))n





This property indicates that the distribution of x(1) contains less dispersion,
concentrating in a tighter range. This concentration enables separation, however
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more importantly the min fusion metric creates robustness against poor classifiers.
In the security classification problem, we now understand from our study of rank
distributions that given a good model the probability of encountering a large rank
value for a positive instance is small. It is more likely to observe a small rank
value. The min fusion metric indiscriminately eliminates large rank values. This
indiscriminant elimination works based on the fact that there are a small number
of positive instances. Machine learning researchers will immediately question the
contribution of this fusion metric since it is difficult to identify how this fusion metric
improves classification. Haykin indicates in [72] that one of the fundamentals in
every classification or pattern recognition problems involves ensuring the inclusion
of all available information. The min aggregator works based upon our assumption
that there is a small number of positive instances. This information contributes and
improves performance.
Figure 6.4 illustrates rank distributions for several fusion metrics. This exper-
iment involved fusing a model set where 60% of the models predicted well at a rate
of U = .9, and 40% of the models create random prediction at a rate of U = .5. It
is assumed that 10% of the observed instances are positive. Figure 6.4 illustrates
the performance of the min, max, and avg fusion metrics. The max fusion metric
does not work well. This metric flattens the dispersion of the positive instances,
creating poor separation between the positive and negative rank distributions. The
avg fusion metric clearly works well, creating two normal distributions produced
from the effect of the central limit theorem. These distributions contain minimal
overlap. The min aggregator creates the familiar exponential distribution effect, and
although there is separation, the quality of the separation is clearly questionable. In
the spirit of fuzzy logic, it is possible to combine these metrics. This combination,
created simply by computing min +avg
2
, creates two distributions which appear tighter
than those created from the avg fusion metric without any obvious improvement in
performance.
The improvement in performance is not evident until plotting the ROC curves
from these rank distributions. Figure 6.5 contains these ROC curves. There are five
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RANK FREQENCIES (10 positive samples, 90 negative samples)
positive
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Figure 6.4: The plot in the upper left represents the distributions of the
positive and negative classes for a classifier that predicts with
a U = .9. Simulating that there were 3 classifiers with this
accuracy and 2 classifiers with U = .9, the other plot represent
the performance of various fusion metrics when 60% of the
models predict well and 40% predict randomly.
is apparent that the avg and min aggregators perform well, achieving performance
close to the convex hull of the ROC curves. However, it is the fusion metric of min+avg
2

























































































Figure 6.5: The dominant min+ avg / 2 fusion method was compared
against the min and avg with a paired t-test, resulting with a
p-value of nearly 1 illustrating a very high level of statistical
significance in the difference.
6.5.2 An Illustration of Rank Fusion
It is useful to illustrate rank fusion through a toy problem. Table 6.2 shows
three models, two of which perform adequately and one which appears to have no
predictive power. The resulting ranks created by the min, avg, and min +avg/2
functions are also shown. Realize that the resulting columns do not equate to
f(R1(xi), R2(xi), R3(xi)) = f(oi1, oi2, oi3). The aggregation columns represent
R(f(oi1, oi2, oi3)). Particularly for the min function, ties must be solved which is
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done simply at random. Immediately following any aggregation, decision values are
immediately mapped to ranks, or oij . Table 6.2 is consistent with Algorithm 8 which
is detailed later in this chapter; if desired, an interested reader could recreate the
last six columns to reinforce the concept.
Table 6.2: A Toy Rank Fusion Problem





Class = oi2 = oi2 = oi2+oi22
0 8 15 5 6 10 5.005 8.807 16 8 12.005 12
0 16 16 19 7 17 7.006 15.003 18 20 19.000 19
0 17 18 13 15 9 9.008 14.400 19 17 18.004 18
0 15 20 8 19 1 1.002 12.601 2 15 8.504 8
0 11 13 7 1 2 1.008 6.804 4 3 3.509 3
0 14 9 4 9 18 4.007 10.808 12 12 12.008 13
0 6 6 9 18 3 3.004 8.402 10 5 7.503 6
0 13 7 20 10 5 5.003 11.007 15 13 14.008 16
0 18 17 11 3 13 3.002 12.410 8 14 11.006 11
0 7 8 16 4 7 4.003 8.402 11 4 7.508 7
0 19 19 6 8 19 6.001 14.202 17 16 16.510 17
0 12 11 14 20 15 11.003 14.404 20 18 19.008 20
0 4 10 15 5 11 4.009 9.000 13 9 11.005 10
0 5 12 17 11 6 5.003 10.209 14 11 12.509 14
0 20 3 18 17 16 3.001 14.801 7 19 13.007 15
1 3 2 10 16 12 2.001 8.605 5 6 5.508 5
1 9 4 3 14 20 3.003 10.007 9 10 9.509 9
1 1 5 1 12 14 1.003 6.609 3 2 2.508 1
1 10 1 12 13 8 1.001 8.804 1 7 4.005 4
1 2 14 2 2 4 2.005 4.801 6 1 3.505 2
AUC 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.44 0.43 - - 0.88 0.853 - 0.920
6.6 The Properties of Synergistic Fusion - a Factorial De-
sign Illustration
There is a fundamental synergistic fusion property discussed in this chapter.
Stated simply, this property claims that when fusing ranks, there is improved dis-
criminating power from the min aggregator if the problem is unbalanced with a
minority positive class. The opposite is true for the max aggregator if the problem
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is unbalanced with a minority negative class. The chapter supports this property
with a discussion that includes a statistical explanation of the behavior of ranks cre-
ated in a classification problem as well as the scenario depicted in figure 6.5. Figure
6.5 provides results for only one scenario, or parameter set. This begs a question:
how does this fusion strategy behave across the spectrum of each parameter? A way
to address this question involves creating a factorial design. Factorial design stems
from a body of knowledge known as design of experiments, or DOE. R.A. Fisher was
a pioneer of DOE, and researchers give much credit to Fisher for the current studies
involving DOE [16]. For a comprehensive collection of Fisher’s work to include his
DOE work, see [59].
The DOE for this problem involved four factors. These factors were derived
from simply considering what parameters effect this fusion problem. These param-
eters, or factors, include:
• balance: the number of observations (out of 1000) which are members of the
negative class. This factor becomes the most important factor in the exper-
iment. The primary hypothesis of this study claims that the balance of the
problem closely relates to the utility of the min aggregator. This experiment
will reinforce this hypothesis.
• AUC of “good” models: the assumed area under the curve (AUC) or
predictive power of effective models. A major assumption includes that all of
the “good” models predict with a specific accuracy.
• fraction “good”: the percent of models predicting with the accuracy of
the AUC, and all others have no predictive power (AUC = .5). If all of the
models are “good”, the average (avg) aggregator suffices. The min aggregator
is more robust against these powerless classifiers. This is simply by favoring
smaller ranks which statistically tend to be members of the positive class for
good models classifying in an imbalanced environment (positive minority).
The avg aggregator considers all of the models equally, and therefore becomes
susceptible to meaningless ranks created by the “poor” models.
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Table 6.3: Design of Experiments
balance AUC of fraction number
good models good of models
min 500 0.8 0.4 2
value
max 980 0.95 1 8
value
step 160 0.05 0.2 2
• number of models: the number of models fused. This has an important but
subtle effect on the outcome that will be discussed later in the chapter.
There were 4 levels explored for each factor creating 44 = 256 design points
(dp). Each design point consisted of 30 repetitions, each repetition utilizing 1000
observations for each experiment. Three different fusion strategies were employed
at each design point: min, (min +avg)/2, and avg.
Table 6.3 illustrates the values of the parameters considered in the DOE. The
balance of the class ranges from 500 negative instances (completely balanced) to
980 negative instances (severely imbalanced) with a step of 160 between levels. The
’balance’ parameter is not explored for a minority negative class. This is because the
exact same property observed with the min aggregator for the minority positive class
can be observed for the max aggregator if a minority negative class is considered. It
is a symmetrical property that will not be shown for the sake of limiting redundancy.
The AUC of the “good” models ranges from .8 to .95 with a step of .05 between
levels. There was definitely a bias to explore the higher end of AUC values; further
experimentation should consider exploring the lower range of AUC values. The
fraction of “good” models replicates the unknown sensors or models in the ensemble
which predict well, assuming that the others predict randomly (AUC = .5). This
fraction ranges between .4 and 1 with a .2 step, exploring a slight minority of “good”
models to observing a majority of “good” models. Brief experimentation indicated
that having a fraction of “good” models less than .4 created poor and inconsistent
performance across the board. The number of models ranged from 2 to 8 with
a step of 2. Larger numbers of models severely favor the avg aggregator. Central
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limit theorem becomes stronger as the number of models increases therefore favoring
the avg aggregator. The min aggregator works based upon the simple premise
that positive instances are more likely to rank as a low number when considering
imbalanced (positive minority) problems. Given an imbalanced problem (minority
positive class) with a small number of models to fuse, the min aggregator is less
likely than the avg aggregator to be affected by a random model.
Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 illustrate the results of the DOE. Every experimental
result is shown in this table for the sake of complete transparency of this experiment.
An interested reader may want to inspect various design points, and all are present
to inspect. The sorted order of the design points is intentional. The design points
are ordered from the balanced case (500 negative instance) to the imbalanced case
(980 negative instances). Inspection of the tables will reveal that the min aggregator
performs better as imbalance increases. The (min +avg)/2 aggregator continues to
present the best performance for higher imbalance. This is a heuristic, no doubt,
but it is a heuristic that is supported with theoretical discussion and close ties to
fuzzy logic. The discriminating power of the central limit theorem surfaces from the
avg aggregator, and the min aggregator provides robustness against random models
for imbalanced scenarios.
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Figure 6.6 compares the performance of the avg aggregator and the (min +avg)/2
aggregator. The min aggregator is not plotted or discussed as it is inferior as a stand
alone aggregator. The balance factor is the critical factor. Scatter plots exploring
the spectrum of the other factors is entirely possible and has been explored, however




























































































































AUC of avg aggregator
balance = 980
Figure 6.6: These plots compare the AUC achieved when fusing with the
avg aggregator versus the (min +avg)/2 aggregator. Every plot
contains the full spectrum of design points with the exception
of the balance factor which is held constant for each plot. No-
tice that as imbalance increases, the (min +avg)/2 aggregator
becomes more dominant.
Several test statistics can serve to illuminate this experiment. One of the
most interesting statistical tests is an analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the four
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Table 6.4: Experimental results and full factorial table - part 1.
balance AUC of fraction number min min+avg avg
good models good of models AUC AUC AUC
dp1 500 0.8 0.4 2 0.6787 0.701 0.7084
dp2 500 0.85 0.4 2 0.7121 0.7366 0.7502
dp3 500 0.9 0.4 2 0.7376 0.7703 0.7837
dp4 500 0.95 0.4 2 0.766 0.8042 0.8192
dp5 500 0.8 0.6 2 0.6816 0.7025 0.7074
dp6 500 0.85 0.6 2 0.708 0.7354 0.7458
dp7 500 0.9 0.6 2 0.7414 0.7677 0.7777
dp8 500 0.95 0.6 2 0.764 0.8014 0.8164
dp9 500 0.8 0.8 2 0.848 0.8725 0.8789
dp10 500 0.85 0.8 2 0.8972 0.9178 0.9258
dp11 500 0.9 0.8 2 0.9406 0.9596 0.9639
dp12 500 0.95 0.8 2 0.9771 0.9871 0.9897
dp13 500 0.8 1 2 0.8458 0.872 0.8797
dp14 500 0.85 1 2 0.8965 0.9206 0.9265
dp15 500 0.9 1 2 0.9413 0.9591 0.9646
dp16 500 0.95 1 2 0.9768 0.9865 0.9894
dp17 500 0.8 0.4 4 0.6981 0.7661 0.7841
dp18 500 0.85 0.4 4 0.7256 0.8013 0.825
dp19 500 0.9 0.4 4 0.7463 0.8368 0.8683
dp20 500 0.95 0.4 4 0.7607 0.8639 0.9025
dp21 500 0.8 0.6 4 0.6971 0.7631 0.7853
dp22 500 0.85 0.6 4 0.7303 0.7981 0.8269
dp23 500 0.9 0.6 4 0.7471 0.834 0.8674
dp24 500 0.95 0.6 4 0.7582 0.8625 0.9027
dp25 500 0.8 0.8 4 0.7938 0.8641 0.8884
dp26 500 0.85 0.8 4 0.8271 0.9081 0.9322
dp27 500 0.9 0.8 4 0.8592 0.9403 0.9636
dp28 500 0.95 0.8 4 0.8775 0.9644 0.9858
dp29 500 0.8 1 4 0.8888 0.9379 0.9514
dp30 500 0.85 1 4 0.9324 0.9722 0.98
dp31 500 0.9 1 4 0.9669 0.9906 0.9949
dp32 500 0.95 1 4 0.9896 0.9986 0.9995
dp33 500 0.8 0.4 6 0.6402 0.7126 0.7318
dp34 500 0.85 0.4 6 0.6553 0.7475 0.7673
dp35 500 0.9 0.4 6 0.6699 0.7722 0.8076
dp36 500 0.95 0.4 6 0.6795 0.7989 0.8404
dp37 500 0.8 0.6 6 0.7719 0.8813 0.9043
dp38 500 0.85 0.6 6 0.8022 0.9196 0.9444
dp39 500 0.9 0.6 6 0.8261 0.9472 0.971
dp40 500 0.95 0.6 6 0.8361 0.966 0.99
dp41 500 0.8 0.8 6 0.8387 0.9341 0.9524
dp42 500 0.85 0.8 6 0.8796 0.9657 0.9788
dp43 500 0.9 0.8 6 0.9036 0.9834 0.9941
dp44 500 0.95 0.8 6 0.9173 0.9926 0.999
dp45 500 0.8 1 6 0.9042 0.9679 0.9791
dp46 500 0.85 1 6 0.9468 0.9889 0.9945
dp47 500 0.9 1 6 0.9767 0.9976 0.9991
dp48 500 0.95 1 6 0.9942 0.9997 1
dp49 500 0.8 0.4 8 0.6611 0.767 0.795
dp50 500 0.85 0.4 8 0.674 0.8016 0.8355
dp51 500 0.9 0.4 8 0.6897 0.8341 0.876
dp52 500 0.95 0.4 8 0.6945 0.8644 0.9063
dp53 500 0.8 0.6 8 0.7642 0.8973 0.9194
dp54 500 0.85 0.6 8 0.7959 0.9331 0.9557
dp55 500 0.9 0.6 8 0.8095 0.9574 0.9787
dp56 500 0.95 0.6 8 0.8191 0.9727 0.9932
dp57 500 0.8 0.8 8 0.8188 0.9378 0.9579
dp58 500 0.85 0.8 8 0.8461 0.9656 0.9817
dp59 500 0.9 0.8 8 0.8646 0.9831 0.9949
dp60 500 0.95 0.8 8 0.8755 0.9919 0.9991
dp61 500 0.8 1 8 0.9167 0.9829 0.991
dp62 500 0.85 1 8 0.9548 0.9953 0.9982
dp63 500 0.9 1 8 0.9815 0.9992 0.9999
dp64 500 0.95 1 8 0.9957 1 1
dp65 660 0.8 0.4 2 0.6965 0.7116 0.7162
dp66 660 0.85 0.4 2 0.7323 0.7515 0.7503
dp67 660 0.9 0.4 2 0.7755 0.7943 0.7843
dp68 660 0.95 0.4 2 0.8093 0.8263 0.815
dp69 660 0.8 0.6 2 0.6975 0.7156 0.7105
dp70 660 0.85 0.6 2 0.7345 0.755 0.7413
dp71 660 0.9 0.6 2 0.7754 0.7909 0.7805
dp72 660 0.95 0.6 2 0.8103 0.8285 0.8143
dp73 660 0.8 0.8 2 0.8446 0.8734 0.8801
dp74 660 0.85 0.8 2 0.8941 0.9214 0.9274
dp75 660 0.9 0.8 2 0.9429 0.9621 0.9648
dp76 660 0.95 0.8 2 0.9771 0.9878 0.9883
dp77 660 0.8 1 2 0.8459 0.876 0.8788
dp78 660 0.85 1 2 0.8955 0.9218 0.9274
dp79 660 0.9 1 2 0.9407 0.9624 0.9646
dp80 660 0.95 1 2 0.9766 0.9885 0.989
dp81 660 0.8 0.4 4 0.7208 0.7746 0.7891
dp82 660 0.85 0.4 4 0.7568 0.8192 0.8289
dp83 660 0.9 0.4 4 0.786 0.8603 0.8651
dp84 660 0.95 0.4 4 0.8123 0.8914 0.9032
dp85 660 0.8 0.6 4 0.7225 0.7792 0.7841
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Table 6.5: Experimental results and full factorial table - part 2.
balance AUC of fraction number min min+avg avg
good models good of models AUC AUC AUC
dp86 660 0.85 0.6 4 0.7585 0.82 0.8256
dp87 660 0.9 0.6 4 0.7878 0.8576 0.8701
dp88 660 0.95 0.6 4 0.8085 0.8912 0.9027
dp89 660 0.8 0.8 4 0.808 0.8758 0.8839
dp90 660 0.85 0.8 4 0.8517 0.92 0.9312
dp91 660 0.9 0.8 4 0.8866 0.9563 0.9651
dp92 660 0.95 0.8 4 0.9101 0.9772 0.985
dp93 660 0.8 1 4 0.8866 0.943 0.9518
dp94 660 0.85 1 4 0.9321 0.9758 0.9786
dp95 660 0.9 1 4 0.9673 0.9932 0.9945
dp96 660 0.95 1 4 0.9902 0.9991 0.9994
dp97 660 0.8 0.4 6 0.6674 0.7295 0.7337
dp98 660 0.85 0.4 6 0.6909 0.7681 0.7708
dp99 660 0.9 0.4 6 0.7122 0.797 0.8091
dp100 660 0.95 0.4 6 0.7271 0.8274 0.8369
dp101 660 0.8 0.6 6 0.7932 0.8971 0.9029
dp102 660 0.85 0.6 6 0.8285 0.9322 0.9424
dp103 660 0.9 0.6 6 0.8642 0.9628 0.9725
dp104 660 0.95 0.6 6 0.8769 0.9791 0.9896
dp105 660 0.8 0.8 6 0.8537 0.9417 0.953
dp106 660 0.85 0.8 6 0.8925 0.9739 0.9788
dp107 660 0.9 0.8 6 0.9217 0.9901 0.994
dp108 660 0.95 0.8 6 0.94 0.9969 0.9991
dp109 660 0.8 1 6 0.9041 0.9738 0.9785
dp110 660 0.85 1 6 0.9473 0.9916 0.9944
dp111 660 0.9 1 6 0.9764 0.9982 0.9992
dp112 660 0.95 1 6 0.9939 0.9999 1
dp113 660 0.8 0.4 8 0.6852 0.7851 0.7959
dp114 660 0.85 0.4 8 0.7134 0.8232 0.8349
dp115 660 0.9 0.4 8 0.7353 0.8588 0.8756
dp116 660 0.95 0.4 8 0.7479 0.8853 0.9084
dp117 660 0.8 0.6 8 0.7909 0.91 0.9219
dp118 660 0.85 0.6 8 0.8235 0.9436 0.9568
dp119 660 0.9 0.6 8 0.8495 0.9704 0.9801
dp120 660 0.95 0.6 8 0.8609 0.986 0.9926
dp121 660 0.8 0.8 8 0.8357 0.9458 0.9548
dp122 660 0.85 0.8 8 0.8687 0.9752 0.981
dp123 660 0.9 0.8 8 0.8965 0.9901 0.994
dp124 660 0.95 0.8 8 0.9117 0.9967 0.9991
dp125 660 0.8 1 8 0.9141 0.9871 0.9901
dp126 660 0.85 1 8 0.956 0.9967 0.9979
dp127 660 0.9 1 8 0.9812 0.9996 0.9999
dp128 660 0.95 1 8 0.9958 1 1
dp129 820 0.8 0.4 2 0.7165 0.7232 0.7048
dp130 820 0.85 0.4 2 0.7669 0.7634 0.7475
dp131 820 0.9 0.4 2 0.8102 0.8102 0.781
dp132 820 0.95 0.4 2 0.8562 0.8524 0.8105
dp133 820 0.8 0.6 2 0.7195 0.7233 0.7183
dp134 820 0.85 0.6 2 0.7666 0.7664 0.746
dp135 820 0.9 0.6 2 0.8104 0.8008 0.7817
dp136 820 0.95 0.6 2 0.8574 0.856 0.8098
dp137 820 0.8 0.8 2 0.8484 0.8756 0.8768
dp138 820 0.85 0.8 2 0.8965 0.9242 0.9231
dp139 820 0.9 0.8 2 0.9415 0.9623 0.9637
dp140 820 0.95 0.8 2 0.9769 0.9893 0.9885
dp141 820 0.8 1 2 0.8431 0.8751 0.8766
dp142 820 0.85 1 2 0.8928 0.9262 0.9269
dp143 820 0.9 1 2 0.9424 0.9637 0.9643
dp144 820 0.95 1 2 0.9762 0.9889 0.9885
dp145 820 0.8 0.4 4 0.7479 0.7912 0.778
dp146 820 0.85 0.4 4 0.7948 0.8378 0.825
dp147 820 0.9 0.4 4 0.8384 0.8804 0.8629
dp148 820 0.95 0.4 4 0.8725 0.919 0.8989
dp149 820 0.8 0.6 4 0.7482 0.7942 0.7782
dp150 820 0.85 0.6 4 0.7944 0.8368 0.823
dp151 820 0.9 0.6 4 0.8358 0.8847 0.8655
dp152 820 0.95 0.6 4 0.8742 0.9197 0.9024
dp153 820 0.8 0.8 4 0.8214 0.8867 0.8859
dp154 820 0.85 0.8 4 0.8736 0.9321 0.9275
dp155 820 0.9 0.8 4 0.9118 0.9642 0.9624
dp156 820 0.95 0.8 4 0.9415 0.9863 0.9835
dp157 820 0.8 1 4 0.8856 0.9492 0.9483
dp158 820 0.85 1 4 0.9306 0.9785 0.9791
dp159 820 0.9 1 4 0.9661 0.9941 0.9934
dp160 820 0.95 1 4 0.9902 0.9993 0.999
dp161 820 0.8 0.4 6 0.7031 0.745 0.7282
dp162 820 0.85 0.4 6 0.7371 0.7888 0.77
dp163 820 0.9 0.4 6 0.7761 0.8274 0.8048
dp164 820 0.95 0.4 6 0.8024 0.8615 0.8355
dp165 820 0.8 0.6 6 0.8216 0.9075 0.9044
dp166 820 0.85 0.6 6 0.8674 0.9471 0.9415
dp167 820 0.9 0.6 6 0.8993 0.9735 0.9701
dp168 820 0.95 0.6 6 0.9241 0.9897 0.9873
dp169 820 0.8 0.8 6 0.8664 0.951 0.95
dp170 820 0.85 0.8 6 0.9093 0.979 0.9781
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Table 6.6: Experimental results and full factorial table - part 3.
balance AUC of fraction number min min+avg avg
good models good of models AUC AUC AUC
dp171 820 0.9 0.8 6 0.9432 0.9935 0.9926
dp172 820 0.95 0.8 6 0.9631 0.9989 0.9987
dp173 820 0.8 1 6 0.9055 0.9771 0.9787
dp174 820 0.85 1 6 0.944 0.9935 0.9937
dp175 820 0.9 1 6 0.9765 0.9988 0.9989
dp176 820 0.95 1 6 0.9944 1 1
dp177 820 0.8 0.4 8 0.7262 0.8029 0.7892
dp178 820 0.85 0.4 8 0.7668 0.8505 0.8324
dp179 820 0.9 0.4 8 0.8024 0.8881 0.8724
dp180 820 0.95 0.4 8 0.8264 0.9159 0.9013
dp181 820 0.8 0.6 8 0.8251 0.9225 0.9186
dp182 820 0.85 0.6 8 0.8631 0.9575 0.9545
dp183 820 0.9 0.6 8 0.8948 0.9809 0.9779
dp184 820 0.95 0.6 8 0.9155 0.9927 0.9915
dp185 820 0.8 0.8 8 0.8559 0.9557 0.9535
dp186 820 0.85 0.8 8 0.9015 0.9825 0.981
dp187 820 0.9 0.8 8 0.9287 0.9946 0.9938
dp188 820 0.95 0.8 8 0.9468 0.9988 0.999
dp189 820 0.8 1 8 0.915 0.99 0.9893
dp190 820 0.85 1 8 0.9562 0.998 0.998
dp191 820 0.9 1 8 0.9812 0.9998 0.9998
dp192 820 0.95 1 8 0.9954 1 1
dp193 980 0.8 0.4 2 0.728 0.7265 0.7133
dp194 980 0.85 0.4 2 0.7938 0.7497 0.7466
dp195 980 0.9 0.4 2 0.857 0.82 0.7837
dp196 980 0.95 0.4 2 0.9124 0.8583 0.8047
dp197 980 0.8 0.6 2 0.7288 0.7275 0.7128
dp198 980 0.85 0.6 2 0.7895 0.7851 0.7556
dp199 980 0.9 0.6 2 0.8462 0.8127 0.7651
dp200 980 0.95 0.6 2 0.9169 0.8697 0.8019
dp201 980 0.8 0.8 2 0.8525 0.874 0.869
dp202 980 0.85 0.8 2 0.8927 0.9153 0.9256
dp203 980 0.9 0.8 2 0.9473 0.96 0.9598
dp204 980 0.95 0.8 2 0.9729 0.9893 0.986
dp205 980 0.8 1 2 0.8451 0.8775 0.8802
dp206 980 0.85 1 2 0.8946 0.9193 0.9271
dp207 980 0.9 1 2 0.9383 0.9595 0.9558
dp208 980 0.95 1 2 0.9734 0.9883 0.9868
dp209 980 0.8 0.4 4 0.7815 0.802 0.771
dp210 980 0.85 0.4 4 0.8349 0.851 0.8175
dp211 980 0.9 0.4 4 0.895 0.8909 0.8601
dp212 980 0.95 0.4 4 0.9538 0.9391 0.8969
dp213 980 0.8 0.6 4 0.7745 0.7981 0.7821
dp214 980 0.85 0.6 4 0.8396 0.8684 0.817
dp215 980 0.9 0.6 4 0.8981 0.9 0.8601
dp216 980 0.95 0.6 4 0.9499 0.9318 0.8889
dp217 980 0.8 0.8 4 0.8529 0.8939 0.8898
dp218 980 0.85 0.8 4 0.9007 0.9343 0.9285
dp219 980 0.9 0.8 4 0.9479 0.9699 0.9568
dp220 980 0.95 0.8 4 0.9764 0.9873 0.9782
dp221 980 0.8 1 4 0.89 0.9497 0.9494
dp222 980 0.85 1 4 0.928 0.9786 0.9812
dp223 980 0.9 1 4 0.9637 0.9936 0.993
dp224 980 0.95 1 4 0.9916 0.9992 0.9988
dp225 980 0.8 0.4 6 0.7416 0.7525 0.7137
dp226 980 0.85 0.4 6 0.8015 0.803 0.7767
dp227 980 0.9 0.4 6 0.8753 0.8578 0.8084
dp228 980 0.95 0.4 6 0.921 0.8986 0.8353
dp229 980 0.8 0.6 6 0.8559 0.9068 0.8947
dp230 980 0.85 0.6 6 0.9109 0.9549 0.935
dp231 980 0.9 0.6 6 0.9474 0.9812 0.9631
dp232 980 0.95 0.6 6 0.9788 0.9912 0.9853
dp233 980 0.8 0.8 6 0.8823 0.9567 0.9494
dp234 980 0.85 0.8 6 0.9268 0.9786 0.9716
dp235 980 0.9 0.8 6 0.9669 0.9946 0.9928
dp236 980 0.95 0.8 6 0.9862 0.9993 0.9986
dp237 980 0.8 1 6 0.9059 0.9782 0.9678
dp238 980 0.85 1 6 0.9453 0.9951 0.9911
dp239 980 0.9 1 6 0.9762 0.9991 0.9981
dp240 980 0.95 1 6 0.9935 0.9999 0.9997
dp241 980 0.8 0.4 8 0.7723 0.8194 0.7865
dp242 980 0.85 0.4 8 0.8461 0.8769 0.8396
dp243 980 0.9 0.4 8 0.9014 0.9046 0.865
dp244 980 0.95 0.4 8 0.9515 0.9388 0.8945
dp245 980 0.8 0.6 8 0.8556 0.9297 0.92
dp246 980 0.85 0.6 8 0.9076 0.96 0.9552
dp247 980 0.9 0.6 8 0.9547 0.983 0.9714
dp248 980 0.95 0.6 8 0.9785 0.9952 0.9911
dp249 980 0.8 0.8 8 0.8872 0.9654 0.9532
dp250 980 0.85 0.8 8 0.9254 0.9837 0.9781
dp251 980 0.9 0.8 8 0.9677 0.9963 0.992
dp252 980 0.95 0.8 8 0.9879 0.9993 0.9978
dp253 980 0.8 1 8 0.921 0.9886 0.9879
dp254 980 0.85 1 8 0.9542 0.9981 0.9979
dp255 980 0.9 1 8 0.9834 0.9998 0.9996
dp256 980 0.95 1 8 0.9958 1 1
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factor experiment. The primary reference for this analysis was [118]. Multi-factor
ANOVA is a compact method to analyze the effect of each individual factors as well
as the interaction between factors. As factors in an experiment grow, complexity
grows quickly as well. Furthermore, a large number of factors creates challenges in
explaining multifactor interaction with many factors [118]. The statistic, or yield
as it often is called in DOE, analyzed in table 6.7 is the difference between the avg
aggregator and the (min + avg)/2 aggregator. The purpose of the analysis is to
determine whether or not additional evidence exists supporting the hypothesis that
the (min + avg)/2 aggregator works well. It is necessary to define a few terms and
statistics used in this experiment. Detailed discussion of the statistics can be found
in [118]. The long list of formulas has been included below to show the complexity
and potential for explosive growth if one wanted to analyze more factors with this
type of DOE analysis. Using the conventions and methods shown by Peterson





The subscripts represent the ith level of ’balance’ (factor A), jth level of ’AUC of
good models’ (factor B), kth level of ’fraction good’ (factor C), lth level of ’number of
models’ (factor D). The
min+avg
2
and avg are the average result of thirty repetitions

























































































































































































ijkl − C − SSA − SSB − SSC − SSD − SSAB −
SSAC− SSAD− SSBC− SSBD− SSCD− SSABC− SSABD− SSACD−−SSBCD
SSE = SSTot− SSA− SSB− SSC− SSD− SSAB− SSAC− SSAD− SSBC−
SSBD − SSCD − SSABC − SSABD − SSACD −−SSBCD
Table 6.7: ANOVA summary table for factorial experiment.
d.f. SS MS F p value
A 3 406.04 135.35 223.10 1.00
B 3 5.36 1.79 2.95 0.95
C 3 32.27 10.76 17.73 0.99
D 3 21.36 7.12 11.74 0.99
AB 9 6.37 0.71 1.17 0.65
AC 9 189.97 21.11 34.79 0.99
AD 9 15.18 1.69 2.78 0.98
BC 9 1.27 0.14 0.23 0.01
BD 9 10.78 1.20 1.97 0.91
CD 9 35.78 3.98 6.55 0.99
ABC 27 28.19 1.04 1.72 0.91
ABD 27 10.57 0.39 0.65 0.13
ACD 27 33.58 1.24 2.05 0.96
BCD 27 10.49 0.39 0.64 0.13
error 26 15.77 0.61
The MS can be calculated by dividing the SS by the degrees of freedom (d.f.).
The F statistic is the mean square statistic divided by the MSE, which is .61 in
our experiment. The ’balance’ factor, shown first and represented as A in the table,
clearly has a strong influence on the yield in our model (recall that we defined the
yield as the difference between (min + avg)/2 and avg. This strong relationship is
expected based on the plots shown in figure 6.6. It is also interesting to note that the
’fraction good’ and ’number of models’ have a strong impact on the yield. This makes
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sense. As the number of models increases, the average becomes a much stronger
aggregator. If more than eight models are to be fused, the average will perform the
best. This relationship with the yield is evident in the correlations shown in table
6.8. Some of the strong interactions revealed in the experiment deserve discussion
as well. The ANOVA table shows where interactions exist, however coupled with
the correlations the direction of the relationship becomes more apparent. If the
fraction of good models is large, the average aggregator again will dominate. The
purpose of the min aggregator is to provide robustness against week or completely
useless classifiers which the decision make does not have the ability to identify or
eliminate. It is interesting to note that the AUC of the good models seems to have
a minimal effect. Part of this reason could be that the span of the AUCs examined
was not very large. I would expect a larger span to effect overall performance
more significantly. The correlation between the (min +avg)/2 aggregator and the
balance of the model is undeniably strong. Every statistic examined, and the graphs
plotted, clearly indicate that this fusion method strongly relates to the balance of
the problem. At a minimum, this evidence should encourage modelers to consider
fusion methods beyond the average when solving unbalanced classification problems.
Hopefully it inspires some to look further into this relationship and further develop
the underlying theory.
Table 6.8: Correlations between factors and yield.
balance AUC of fraction number
good models good of models
(min+avg)/2 - avg 0.70 0.08 -0.17 -0.14
min - avg 0.58 0.16 0.06 -0.46
Paired t tests were also conducted for the differences between the (min +
avg)/2 and the avg aggregator. This could also be viewed as a paired t between the
x and y axis for each of the plots in figure 6.6. Each paired t test returned highly
significant values (∼ 1E-10 for each test). For ’balance’ equal to 500 and 660, the
average aggregator tested as superior. For the more highly imbalanced levels where
’balance’ was 820 and 980, the (min + avg)/2 was undoubtedly superior.
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6.7 Experimental Results with Several Datasets
This section includes empirical evidence for the previous discussion of syn-
ergistic classifier fusion. In addition to detailing results, this section also presents
a method to create ensembles that will be referred to as the leave-l -features out
ensemble method.
6.7.1 The leave-l-features-out Ensemble Method
Common problems in the security classification domain involve a large number
of features and difficulty in feature selection. Feature selection is difficult because
selecting salient features for a classification problem typically requires an adequate
labeled sample of the positive and negative classes in training data. In the security
classification domain, the positive class is a minority and often may not exist or
may exist very sparsely in the training data. In either case, feature selection quickly
becomes problematic. The solution proposed in this research involves using a subset
of features in multiple models and then fusing these features to create a final decision
value.
Consider the subspace creation technique for the security classification prob-
lem in this section as a proposed method for creating an ensemble. This is the
same technique utilized in chapter 5. This section explicitly shows the technique
in pseudo-code. Furthermore, considering again the practitioner, illustrating this
technique shows how to bridge the gap between theory and application.
Feature selection is difficult in unbalanced problems, and this is a technique
to reduce the effect of noisy features without identifying them. Explanation of
underlying theory for the fusion technique used in this section will follow in later
sections of this chapter, however the experimental results are presented first to create
interest and perhaps some questions in the mind of the reader.
Again working in our security classification problem framework, it is assumed
that a dataset, X ∈ RN×m, exists. X contains N instances or observations, x1,x2, ...,xN ,
where xi ∈ R1×m. There are m variables to represent every instance. For every in-
stance there is a label or class, yi ∈ {−1, +1}. The unbalanced nature of this
problem indicates a prevailing negative or healthy class and minimal instances of
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the positive or unhealthy class.
The fusion method proposed first shuffles the ordering of the features in order
to preserve randomness, and the next step builds a model from a subset of features.
This method of building the ensemble is very similar in method to the leave one
out model validation technique, except features instead of instances are left out and
rather than leaving out one item, typically a small percentage (less than half) of
the features is removed for each model in the ensemble. For example, if the leave
out quantity (l) chosen is 10%, there will be ten models created, and each subset of
features left out will be mutually exclusive however the features used to build each
model will have significant overlap.
For example, suppose ten features, {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j} existed in a dataset.
m = 10, and suppose we choose a leave out quantity of l = 2. The first step is to
randomly order the features: {g, j, a, b, i, d, c, e, f, h}. Next, create m/l = F = 5
models with the following features:
{a, b, i, d, c, e, f, h}
{g, j, i, d, c, e, f, h}
{g, j, a, b, c, e, f, h}
{g, j, a, b, i, d, f, h}
{g, j, a, b, i, d, c, e}
These models would all be trained with the same data observations, each model
built with the aforementioned leave out strategy. This leave out strategy creates
F = 5 models each with different performance, and typically several of the models
predict well and several are likely to perform poorly. Next, introduce the test data
to each model and collect the results (decision values for each model). For each
observation within each subspace, the classifier will produce a decision value, Dij ,
where Dij represents the decision value from the j
th classifier for the ith observation.
oij represents the ordinal position, or rank, of Dij (for the same classifier, meaning
j remains constant). For example, if D71 is the smallest value for the 1
st classifier,
o71 = 1. The purpose of using the rank rather than the actual value, or scaled value,
of the decision value hinges on the issue of fusing models. When fusing models it
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is important that the variables which are being fused represent a similar unit of
scale and magnitude. Essentially it is important to ensure that the fusion combines
apples and apples rather than apples and oranges. The problem with decision values
involves the underlying (and unknown) distributions of these values. It is possible
to normalize the decision values from each model, however even then there is still
influence from the parametrics of the underlying distribution. In order to get away
from this “apples to oranges” problem, ranks are fused. Ranks eliminate parametric
influence.
The algorithm describing this fusion method follows:
Algorithm 8 Fusing SCP Models
1: Select a number of features, l, to leave out from every model
2: Build F = (m/l) (rounding up if m is not divisible by l) models
3: Map Dij → oij
4: for i = 1 to N do
5: fuse oij for j = 1..F
6: end for
6.7.2 Experimental Results
Initial experimental results with this fusion method explored a range of fusion
methods, primarily focused on the max, avg, and min, and the spectrum spanning
these functions. Four datasets were examined in this experiment. The Sick dataset
was used twice with a different leave out value.
Dataset m N p∗ l comment
P300 100 4200 2100 10 Courtesy of Wadsworth Lab,
www.wadsworth.org
Ionosphere 34 351 126 5 UCI Repository
Schonlau 26 5000 231 5 www.schonlau.net, [48–50]
Sick 137 5393 250 10 see ( [76])
Sick 137 5393 250 50 see ( [76])
Table 6.9: Datasets examined; m represents dimensionality, N represents
no. of observations, l represents the leave out quantity. (∗ p
represents the number of positive instances in the dataset.)
The learning model used for each dataset was the one-class SVM. Seven
different fusion techniques were examined to include the algebraic product, min,
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(min +avg)/2, avg, (max +avg)/2, max, algebraic sum. When fusing models with
fuzzy logic aggregators (especially the algebraic sum and algebraic product), it is
necessary to map the rank values into a range between 0 and 1. This is a simple
scaling which can be done without the loss of any information. In order to measure
the benefit of these fusion methods, the experiment involved 30 iterations of each
fusion method, each with a different random training and test sample. The bench-
mark comparison for each fusion method was a one class SVM model built from
all available variables in the dataset. This is referred to as the base model in the
plots. Essentially the comparison involved whether the ensemble created with the
fusion method improved performance over the benchmark model with all variables
considered in one lump sum. The plots in figure 6.7 indicate performance of the
fusion methods for each of these datasets.
Dataset algebraic min (min+avg)/2 avg (max+avg)/2 max algebraic
product sum
Ionosphere NS 0.000000 0.000026 NS NS NS NS
Schonlau 0.002224 0.038938 0.003518 0.009601 0.267514 NS 0.148508
Sick, l = 50 0.042059 NS 0.043812 0.629893 NS NS NS
Sick, l = 10 0.000065 0.279550 0.015050 0.004289 NS NS NS
P300 0.000000 0.004074 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000001 0.000000
Table 6.10: paired t-test values for the comparisons illustrated in Figure
6.7.
This experiment provided strong indications that certain fusion methods per-
form best. The paired t-test values in Table 6.7.2 indicate that the min fusion
methods work best, with the function of (min+avg)/2 being the only function which
illustrated a significant difference (improvement with fusion) for every dataset. A
t-test value of ’NS’ indicates that there was a difference in the mean of the exper-
iments, however the direction of the difference was inverted. It indicated that the
base model performed better. In order to eliminate confusion, an ’NS’ indicates that
the fused method was Not Significantly better than the base model.
Figure 6.7 provides insight into the behavior of various fusion methods. For
each dataset, 30 different experiments were conducted. Each of these experiments
consisted of a different random split of the data (typically a 50 / 50 split between































































































































































Sick (leave out 50) Sick (leave out 10)
P300
Figure 6.7: Synergistic fusion results for actual data
features in order to achieve different leave out ensembles (as per algorithm 8). The
base model performance, shown on the horizontal axis, represents the performance
of the one-class SVM with a linear kernel utilizing all variables. The vertical axis
represents the performance of the fused models. Points plotted above the diagonal
represent superior fused model performance. Points along the diagonal represent
negligible differences in performance, and points below the diagonal illustrate supe-
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rior performance of the base model. For every model except for the P300 data, the
test data contained no more than 50% positive instances. The balance of positive in-
stances contained within the data has a significant effect upon which fusion method
works best. This will be explained in detail in the next section. Furthermore, it is
apparent that the (min + avg) / 2 aggregator worked well for every model.
This experiment presents strong indications that certain fusion methods work
best. The experiment alone cannot justify this claim, however coupled with the
previous analysis of rank distributions and the effect of balance when fusing ranks,
the argument for including the min when fusing ranks for unbalanced classification
becomes convincing.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter present several novel thrusts which present opportunities for im-
proved ensembles as well as future directions for research with ensemble techniques.
Simulating rank distributions and creating pseudo ROC curves provide in-
sight into the non-parametric statistics behind ROC curves and create number of
analytical advantages. The insight provided by possessing control of the several
parameters to include prediction power, balance of classes, and number of models
enables analysis which is not possible when analyzing fusion metrics and ROC curves
created from actual data. Analysis with actual data limits a researchers control of
the parameters.
A critical advantage of this simulation analysis involves the convincing evi-
dence created through simulation. Since the rank distributions and ROC curves
are created from first principles and model generic, there is no concern of bias due
to the characteristics of the data or behavior of a particular model. Results are
general, and the general results of the simulation analysis provide a broader range
of applicability for the research included in this chapter.
The final and perhaps most important finding in this chapter involves consid-
eration of the min and max aggregators when fusing models. The avg aggregator
has long been considered the best aggregator for fusion [18, 19, 74]. When compar-
ing decision values or non-binary classification systems, the avg is essentially the
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only metric considered. However, it is well known that there is a flaw of averages,
including bias from outliers. The rank distributions studied in this chapter clearly
illustrate that there are different likelihoods associated with balanced classification
problems as opposed to unbalanced classification problems. The min or max aggre-
gator capitalize on this difference in likelihoods and create improved results.
Intersections(T-Norms) Unions(T-Conorms)Averages









Figure 6.8: Spectrum of fuzzy aggregators.
Much opportunity for future research exists from the research proposed in
this chapter. An analytical solution for the rank distributions would be a signif-
icant contribution. Additionally, this research only explores fusion metrics from
one part of the aggregation spectrum. The fuzzy logic aggregation spectrum (see
figure 6.8) encompasses the aggregators included in classic fuzzy logic, such as the
the aggregators to the left of min and to the right of max, however it also includes
the aggregation possibilities between the min and max. Fusion with (min +avg)/2
is simply a heuristic that works well based upon theoretical understanding of the
min and avg aggregators. However, it is possible that the midpoint between these
aggregators is not appropriate. Perhaps it changes based upon the balance of the
problem. Future research should consider these possibilities.
CHAPTER 7
SOME STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF THE
GAUSSIAN KERNEL MATRIX
Kernel-based pattern recognition has gained much popularity in machine learning
and data mining because of proven performance and broad applicability [130]. Clus-
tering, anomaly detection, classification, regression, and kernel based principal com-
ponent analysis are just a few of the techniques that use kernels for some type of
pattern recognition. The kernel is a critical component of these algorithms - ar-
guably the most important component. There are many different kernels, however
one of the most popular is the gaussian kernel. Machine learning researchers clearly
favor the gaussian kernel as a top choice from all of the available kernels, and this is
largely a result of the gaussian kernel’s unique properties and detection of nonlinear
patterns.
Before proceeding too far, let us clarify some notation. Let us assume that
there is a given data set X ∈ RN×m. X contains N instances or observations,
x1,x2, ...,xN , where xi ∈ R1×m. There are m variables to represent each instance i.
For every instance there is a label or class, yi ∈ {−1, +1}. Equation 7.1 illustrates
the formula to calculate a gaussian kernel.
κ(i, j) = e
−‖xi−xj‖2
2σ2 (7.1)
A significant disadvantage for this kernel is the need to tune for the proper
value of σ. This can be accomplished manually, through trial and error. An au-
tomated technique could involve stepping through a range of values for σ, perhaps
in a gradient ascent optimization, seeking optimal performance of a model with
training data. Regardless of the method utilized to find a proper value for σ, this
type of model validation is common and necessary when using the gaussian kernel.
Although this approach is feasible with supervised learning, it is much more diffi-
cult to tune σ for unsupervised learning methods. The one-class SVM, originally
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proposed by Tax and Duin in [137] and also detailed by Scholkopf et. al. in [127],
is a good example of an unsupervised learning algorithm where training validation
is difficult due to the lack of positive instances. The one-class SVM trains with all
negative instances or observations, and based upon the estimated support of the
negative instances, new observations are classified as either inside the support (pre-
dicted negative instance) or outside of the support (predicted positive instance). It
is quite possible, however, that there are very few or no positive instances available.
This poses a validation problem.
The supervised learning approaches use validation based upon the availability
of positive and negative classes of data. This validation requires the solving of mul-
tiple models, however it is also possible to explore direct kernel tuning for supervised
learning as well. Direct tuning for supervised learning is briefly discussed in section
7.4.
There are several significant advantages of using an algorithm which automates
the tuning of the gaussian kernel. The first advantage is the elimination of manual
tuning, a tedious and often erroneous (due to the common mistake of overfitting)
process. Another advantage is the potential for this algorithm to expand the use of
gaussian kernels to many more models. Both [137] and [127] state that tuning the
gaussian kernel for the one-class SVM is an open problem. The described automated
tuning also introduces a fast method to include gaussian kernels within learning
ensembles.
7.1 Recent Work
Tax and Duin [137] and Scholkopf et. al. [127] performed the groundbreaking
work with the one-class SVM. Stolfo and Wang [132] successfully apply the one-class
SVM to the intrusion data set that we use in this paper. Chen et. al. [27] uses the
one-class SVM for image retrieval. Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini [130] provide the
theoretical background for this method.
Tax and Duin [138] discuss selection of the σ parameter for the one-class
SVM, selecting σ based upon a predefined error rate and desired fraction of support
vectors. This requires solving the one-class SVM for various values of σ and the
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parameter C, referred to in this paper as 1/νN = C. This method relies on the
fraction of support vectors as an indicator of future generalization. Tuning of the
parameter C does not significantly impact the ordering of the decision values created
by the one-class SVM; tuning of σ influences the shape of the decision function and
profoundly impacts the ordering of the decision values. When seeking to maximize
the area under the ROC curve (AUC), the ordering of the decision values is all
that matters. The technique in this paper is very different from the one which is
mentioned in [138]. We use the kernel matrix directly, therefore the one-class SVM
does not need to be solved for each change in value of σ. Furthermore, tuning the
kernel matrix directly requires the tuning of only one parameter.
The other outcome of this research involves further insight into the statistics of
this kernel. The gaussian kernel has special properties, and the squared coefficient
of variance, introduced in this chapter, illustrates some of these special properties.
Improved understanding of the statistical behavior of this kernel opens possibilities
to improved applications and better insight into how and why this kernel performs
well.
7.2 The One-Class SVM










subject to ‖ Φ(xi) − c ‖2≤ R2 + ζi and ζi ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., N
















Scholkopf et. al. point out the following reduction of the dual formulation












This reduction occurs since we know that κ(xi,xi) = 1 and
∑
i αi = 1. Equa-
tion 7.4 can also be written as min α′Kα. Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini [130] explain
that α′Kα is the weight vector norm, and controlling the size of this value improves
the statistical stability, or regularization of the model.
All training examples with αi > 0 are support vectors, and the examples which
also have a strict inequality of αi <
1
vN
are considered non-bounded support vectors.
In order to classify a new test instance, v, we would evaluate the following
decision function:







Before evaluating for a new point, R2 must be found. This is done by finding
a non-bounded support vector training example and setting the decision function
equal to 0 as detailed by Bennett and Campbell in [8]. If the decision function is
negative for a new test instance, this indicates a negative or healthy prediction. A
positive evaluation is an unhealthy or positive prediction, and the magnitude of the
decision function in either direction is an indication of the model’s confidence.
7.3 Method
The behavior of the gaussian kernel is apparent when examined in detail. The
values lie within the (0,1) interval. A gaussian kernel matrix will have ones along
the diagonal (because ‖ xi−xi ‖= 0). Additionally, a value too small for σ will force
the matrix entries towards 0, and a value too large for σ will force matrix entries
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towards 1.
There is also a property of all kernels, which we will refer to as the fundamental
premise of pattern recognition, which simply indicates that for good models, the
following relationship consistently holds true:
(κ(i, j)|(yi = yj)) > (κ(i, j)|(yi = yj)) (7.5)
Consistent performance and generalization of the fundamental premise of pat-
tern recognition is the goal of all kernel based learning. Given a supervised dataset, a
training and validation split of the data is often used to tune a model which seems to
consistently observe the fundamental premise. However, in an unsupervised learning
scenario positive labeled data is limited or non-existent, and furthermore, models
such as the one-class SVM have no use for positive labeled data in the training data.
A first approach towards tuning a kernel matrix for the one-class SVM might
lead one to believe that the matrix should take on very high values, indicating that
all of the kernel entries for the training data is of one class and therefore should
take on high values. Although this approach would first seem to be consistent with
the fundamental premise in equation 7.5, this approach would be misguided. The
magnitude of the values within the kernel matrix is not an important attribute. The
important attribute is actually the spread or the variance of the entries in the kernel
matrix. At first this may seem to be anomalous with equation 7.5, however a closer
examination of the statistics of a kernel matrix illustrates why the variance of the
kernel matrix is such a critical element in model performance.
Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini point out that small values of σ allow classifiers
to fit any set of labels, and therefore overfitting occurs [130]. This phenomenon is
shown later in figures 7.4 and 7.5. They also state that large values for σ impede a
classifiers ability to detect non-trivial patterns because the kernel gradually reduces
to a constant function. The following mathematical discussion supports these com-
ments for the one-class SVM. Considering again the one-class SVM optimization
problem, posed as min α′Kα. Assuming use of the gaussian kernel, if the sigma
parameter is too small and κ(i, j) → 0, the optimal solution is αi = 1/N . Equa-
tion 7.4, the objective function, will equate to 1/N (since
∑
i(1/N)
2 = 1/N). If
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the sigma parameter is too large and κ(i, j) → 1, the optimal solution is the entire
feasible set for α. Given these values for the variables and parameters, the objective








































The objective function bounds are (1/N, 1), and the choice of σ greatly influ-
ences where in this bound the solution lies.
7.3.1 The Squared Coefficient of Variance
In order to find the best value for σ, a heuristic is employed. This heuristic
takes advantage of the behavior of the one-class SVM when using the gaussian
kernel. The mean and the variance of the non-diagonal kernel entries, κ(i, j)|i = j,
play a crucial role in this heuristic. We will refer to the mean as κ̄ and the variance
as s2. For any kernel matrix where i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, there are N2 − N off diagonal
kernel entries. Furthermore, since all kernel matrices are symmetrical, either the
upper or lower diagonal entries only need to be stored in memory, of which there
are l = (N2 − N)/2. From here forward, the number of unique off diagonal kernel
entries will be referred to as l.
It is first necessary to understand the statistic used in this heuristic, the coef-
ficient of variance. The coefficient of variance is commonly referred to as 100 times
the sample standard deviation divided by its mean, or 100s
x̄
. This statistic describes
the relative spread of a distribution, regardless of the unit of scale. Due to the
scale and behavior of κ̄ and s, this coefficient of variance monotonically increases
for gaussian kernels as σ ranges from 0 to ∞. Using the sample variance rather
than the standard deviation, different behavior occurs. The monotonic increase of
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the coefficient of variance occurs because when σ is small, s > κ̄; however, as σ
increases, there is a cross-over point and then s < κ̄. However, the variance of
κ(i, j)|i = j is always smaller than the mean of κ(i, j)|i = j. This property is what
makes the variance of a kernel matrix such a critical component for the direct tuning
method. The proof follows. For the sake of notation simplicity, xk ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ [l],
will represent off diagonal kernel entries, that is entries κ(i, j)|i = j.
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The fact that the variance of κ(i, j)|i = j is always smaller than the mean of
κ(i, j)|i = j indicates that the squared coefficient of variance, s2/κ̄, is a fraction.
Furthermore, as σ ranges from 0 to ∞, this fraction ascends to a global max. In
order to protect against division by zero and round off error, a small value, ε, can
be added to the denominator.
The results in the following objective function for optimization which can be
solved quickly with a gradient ascent algorithm. Solving the optimization problem






∀(i = j) (7.6)
such that
κ(i, j) = e
−‖xi−xj‖2










j=i+1(κ(i, j) − κ̄)2
l − 1
Figure 7.1: Color visualization of a kernel matrix with various values for
σ. This visualization involves 100 observations where kernel
entries close to 0 are light; darker entries represent values
closer to unity.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the impact of sigma on the kernel matrix. The dataset
used to create figure 7.1 was the ionosphere data which is available from the UCI
repository. These data are all of the negative class, and it is evident that both the
kernel element values and the dispersion of these values changes as σ changes. The
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optimal value for σ for this dataset is 1, and the color visualization of the kernel
matrix when σ = 1 clearly indicates that there is dispersion in the kernel matrix.
However, it is also noticeable that the central tendency of the kernel entries for this
optimal σ is a small value, closer to zero than one. This is consistent for all of the
datasets. This is why it is important to use a metric that detects relative dispersion
and is not biased by the magnitude of the kernel entries.
7.3.2 Visualization of the One-Class SVM
It is useful to visualize the decision function of the one class SVM with a small
two dimensional dataset. The dataset utilized for this experiment is a toy dataset
created by the author and shown in figure 7.2. The points were generated from a
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Figure 7.2: Toy two dimensional dataset - the cross data
Figure 7.3 illustrates the behavior of the gaussian kernel for the two dimen-
sional cross data. Notice that the squared coefficient of variance, s2/(κ̄ + ε) peaks
for σ = .1. This will prove meaningful after reading the next section of this chapter.
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 illustrate how the decision function of the one class SVM
changes as σ increases across the same spectrum as many of the plots in this chapter.
These plots were created with the PM3D function in gnuplot 4.0 [140].
The plots corresponding to a small σ value clearly illustrate that overtraining
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Figure 7.3: Gaussian kernel statistics for the two dimensional cross data
the other hand, large values of sigma simply draw a tight oval around the points
without defining the shape or pattern. The best value for sigma lies somewhere in





















































































































































































































































Figure 7.4: Visualization of one class SVM for smaller values of σ
7.3.3 Why Direct Tuning of the Kernel Matrix Works
As mentioned previously, it is desirable to minimize α′Kα. α is sparse when
there are few support vectors, and this sparseness is typically desirable to minimize
complexity and improve regularization. However, meaningless sparse solutions for
α can occur as all κ(i, j) → 0. Meaningful sparse solutions for α occur when the
kernel matrix entries are not concentrated either towards 0 or 1, but are showing































































































































































Figure 7.5: Visualization of one class SVM for larger values of σ
which clearly define the margin of the density approximated by the one-class SVM.
Although the variance, s2, is a good indicator of the dispersion in the kernel matrix,
it is biased towards a larger σ since variance is affected by unit of scale or magnitude.
s2/(κ̄+ ε) is robust against unit of scale. This statistic illustrates the dispersion of a
distribution regardless of scale. For the one-class SVM, the optimal value for σ and
maximum value for s2/(κ̄ + ε) typically occurs as σ increases from 0 and the kernel
entries first begin to illustrate dispersion. When there is maximal dispersion in the
kernel matrix, the values assigned to α will reflect the behavior and relationships
of observations, which is the purpose of the statistical learning. Maximal dispersion
of the kernel matrix also supports the fundamental premise of pattern recognition.
When σ is not properly tuned, the values assigned to α will be erroneously based
upon the behavior of the optimization problem or the optimization algorithm used
to solve the problem.
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7.4 Comments on Supervised Learning
A similar approach can be taken for the supervised binary classification prob-
lem. Recall that the fundamental premise of pattern recognition states that for all
good models, (κ(i, j)|(yi = yj)) > (κ(i, j)|(yi = yj)). Therefore, if we can achieve
maximum clarity on the distribution of (κ(i, j)|(yi = yj)) − (κ(i, j)|(yi = yj)), op-
timal model performance should occur. This maximal clarity occurs when there
is dispersion in this distribution, again by examining a metric inspired from the





κ̄yi=yj − κ̄yi =yj + ε
This optimization only considers the case when κ̄yi=yj − κ̄yi =yj > 0, meaning
that the two extremes of the kernel tuning spectrum are simply eliminated. This
method focuses on the difference between similar kernel elements and dissimilar
kernel elements. This is essentially the margin, or the boundary that defines the
separation of the two classes. Achieving clarity on this margin is the key to tuning
for supervised learning. Unlike unsupervised learning, validation is possible with
supervised learning. It is entirely possible to automate tuning in a supervised setting
using validation to tune the kernel. If validation is possible, it should be performed.
The heuristic shown above could be an additional measure used to check the behavior
of the kernel for supervised learning, however it is always prudent to use model
validation if it is possible.
7.5 Experimental Results
In order to evaluate the performance of the direct tuning heuristic, several
experiments were conducted. The data included three benchmark sets: banana,
chessboard, and ionosphere (from UCI repository). Additionally, two computer
intrusion datasets named Schonlau and Sick, after their respective creators, are also
examined. The Schonlau data involves determining authenticity of a user based on
UNIX commands. This data was originally discussed in [41, 42, 129] and the actual
data used in this paper was also discussed in [48–50]. The Sick data was originally
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examined in [76]. The parameter ν is set to .5 for every experiment.
Dataset dimensions positive negative comment
Banana 2 50 50 see [62]
Chessboard 2 50 50 www.cs.wisc.edu/
∼olvi/data/check1.txt
Ionosphere 34 126 225 UCI Repository
Schonlau 26 231 4769 www.schonlau.net
Sick 137 250 5143 see [76]
For each dataset, one half of the negative class was used for training the
one-class SVM and the test data comprised of the other half of the negative class
and all members of the positive class. The same split remained consistent for all
experiments for the purposes of control and consistency. The performance measure
























































































Figure 7.6: Experimental results for three benchmark datasets
133
The three benchmark datasets clearly illustrated optimal performance when
s2/(κ̄ + ε) is optimal. For each of the benchmark solutions, a gradient ascent algo-
rithm was tested and converged on the optimal σ within 4-6 iterations depending
on the initial values and dataset. An initial value of 1 for σ seemed to work well

























































Figure 7.7: Experimental results of two computer intrusion datasets
The two computer intrusion datasets did not clearly indicate this same type of
ideal performance. The Schonlau dataset performed the worst by far, and the Sick
dataset did indicate a region of good performance. The value of σ seemed indifferent
for the Sick data. σ tuning will always be a data dependent heuristic, and it is quite
possible that sigma tuning with these datasets requires robust validation in order
to discover the sensitive σ window where optimal performance occurs. However,
anytime that the dataset requires such robust validation to uncover a sensitive σ
window, researchers should exercise caution. This is an indication that overtraining
is taking place, meaning that the function to classify this data has potentially found
a spurious pattern within the data that may not generalize.
This can be explained by taking a closer look at the behavior of the squared
coefficient of variance as dimensionality increases. Dimensionality is a fundamen-
tal problem with the security classification problem. Chapter 1 briefly introduces
the problem of dimensionality with kernel based learning, specifically illustrating
the impact of dimensionality on the gaussian kernel assuming normality of the un-
derlying variables. The gaussian kernel, κ(i, j) = e
−‖xi−xj‖2
2σ2 , compares two vectors
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or observations utilizing the euclidean distance squared, ‖ xi − xj ‖2. It is well
known that as dimensionality grows, points within the space approach becoming
equidistant [93]. This indicates that it becomes more difficult distinguish similar
from dissimilar points utilizing a distance metric such as the euclidean distance.
The gaussian kernel transforms this distance in a non-linear fashion, however this
distinguishability problem manifests itself through the sensitivity of the kernel to





Figure 7.8: Four normal distributions with different squared coefficients
of variance
Consider the following example. Figure 7.8 illustrates four different normal
distributions with various squared coefficients of variance. An initial observation
of these plots could lead one to question whether or not there is a difference be-
tween the coefficient of variance and the variance of the distribution. However, it
is entirely possible that the variances of each one of those distributions are equal.
Variance is relative, however the coefficient of variance is not. The gaussian kernel
distribution is an excellent distribution to analyze with the squared coefficient of
variance. It is a non-zero distribution, preventing false conclusions that could occur
with a distribution centered on or near zero. Notice that the axis are not labeled in
Figure 7.8. This is intentional. There is a difference that seems subtle at first, how-
ever when considered in the context of the gaussian kernel it becomes more obvious.
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The squared coefficient of variance is a ratio and therefore not influenced by the
magnitude of the random variable. Variance is influenced by the magnitude of the
random variable. The squared coefficient of variance (or the coefficient of variance)
is an overall indicator of the dispersion of a distribution, regardless of the magnitude
of the values the random variable assumes. This indifference to magnitude is critical
with the gaussian kernel since κ(i, j) ∈ (0, 1), with values typically clustering at the
extremes for most values of σ. The experiments in this chapter indicate that the
best values for σ often occur when the kernel values are small. The actual variance
of the kernel for these values of σ would be a small number, however the squared
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Figure 7.9: Mean value for gaussian kernels with various values of σ
Figures 7.9 and 7.10 illustrate the behavior of the kernel as σ changes. Figure
7.10 illustrates the behavior of the squared coefficient of variance of the gaussian
kernel as σ changes for dimensionalities (m) ranging from 1 to 500. The squared
coefficient of variance is a smaller value as dimensionality grows. The kernel is more
likely to cluster at the extremes, and there is a small range of σ where transition
occurs between the extremes.
The distance between points in a large dimensional space will be a random
variable with a small squared coefficient of variance, indicating that in a large di-
mensional space points become equidistant. This problem with dimensionality could
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explain why the Schonlau and Sick datasets did not perform well. The ionosphere
data also contains quite a few dimensions, however many of these dimensions con-
tain very little variance. Some of the features are highly imbalanced and binary,
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Figure 7.10: Squarred coefficient of variance for gaussian kernels with var-
ious values of σ
Figure 7.10 illustrates the behavior of the squared coefficient of variance of
the gaussian kernel as σ changes for dimensionalities (m) ranging from 1 to 500.
The squared coefficient of variance is a smaller value as dimensionality grows. The
kernel is more likely to cluster at the extremes, and there is a small range of σ
where transition occurs between the extremes. This behavior of the gaussian kernel
for high dimensional spaces explains why the gaussian kernel tends to be sensitive
with only a small viable range for σ.
The final experiment of this chapter involved exploring whether or not reducing
dimensionality for the Schonlau and Sick datasets would improve the performance
of the squared coefficient of variance heuristic. Figures 7.11 and 7.12 illustrate
the performance of the squared coefficient of variance heuristic as dimensionality
reduced through principal components. The AUC of both datasets degrade very
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Figure 7.11: Schonlau results after principal component reduction
is well known that principal components reduce noise and capture the essence of
a multidimensional space, and it is quite possible that this dimensionality reduc-
tion serves to stabilize the classifier across the spectrum of σ values and reduce the
likelihood of overtraining or finding spurious patterns. This statement, however, is
simply an unsupported hypothesis that requires further investigation. The purpose
of the experiments summarized in figures 7.11 and 7.12 involved supporting the pre-
vious discussion which indicated that the squared coefficient of variance coefficient
performs well in a smaller dimensional space.
7.6 Conclusions
Direct tuning of the gaussian kernel matrix is a novel and promising approach.
The squared coefficient of variance heuristic proposed is grounded and supported



































0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000
σ






















0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000
σ


















Figure 7.12: Sick results after principal component reduction
gaussian kernel, exposing special properties of this kernel and linking these special
properties to classifier performance.
The significance of tuning the gaussian kernel for unsupervised learning applies
directly to ensemble methods. Techniques such as bagging [18], random subspace
selection [74], and fuzzy aggregation techniques [48, 49] can be employed for unsu-
pervised learning with the gaussian kernel.
Future research could involve automated tuning approaches for supervised
learning, however this approach will clearly have to outperform the traditional tech-
nique of validation. Direct tuning for supervised learning would be faster, but first




During the course of the research discussed in this dissertation, several datasets
have been used to illustrate theory and heuristics. Additionally, there were three
different case studies explored that demonstrate security classification problem ap-
plications. The typical classification problem framework requires instances repre-
sented as vectors, with each instance classified in a positive or negative class. The
security classification problem (SCP) introduced in this dissertation requires further
that the instances are unbalanced, a typical characteristic of security environments.
All three case studies discussed in this chapter represent SCPs. During the course of
discussing each case, practical comments will be included which highlight the pro-
cess behind converting the data from its raw format to a usable machine learning
format. This preprocessing is often the most difficult aspect of this type of work.
Efficient and meaningful preprocessing is largely a product of experience, and this
chapter aims to share some of that experience. The three case studies explored in
this chapter, all SCPs, consist of two military applications and one network security
application.
• Skaion Dataset. The Skaion Corporation donated a sample of simulated net-
work data for the sake of the research in this dissertation. This network data
consisted of TCPdump data (approximately 28,000 connections). The data
contains numerous automated attacks, all of which have been identified with
Snort [2]. This case illustrates that machine learning applications easily repli-
cate the performance of signature based detection, leading us to the argument
that machine learning applications could replace or minimally augment signa-
ture based detection based upon their ability to detect new attacks which are
slight variations of previous attacks. Signature based detections cannot detect
these types of subtle changes whereas machine learning applications provide
potential to detect similar signatures or patterns.
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• Geospatial Datamining for Threat Templating. This application involves pre-
diction modeling of military threat incidents based upon geospatial statistics.
The geospatial statistics measure the distance from the incident location to
specific terrain features with the underlying assumption that incidents occur
with a similar terrain feature proximity pattern. It is possible that this pattern
exists beneath even the awareness of the threat.
• Insights into Insurgent Response to Traffic Flow Strategies. This effort in-
volved simulating the effect of different traffic control point (TCP) strategies
on a vehicle born improvised explosive device (VBIED). The SCP application
involved with this application included a data farming exercise which explored
a broad parameter space in an attempt to discover patterns which consistently
succeeded or failed. This was a particularly ground breaking effort which in-
volved a novel application (effect of TCP strategies versus VBIED success),
unique computing techniques, and finally assessment which applied techniques
which are a novel product of this dissertation. A detailed account of this work
has been published in [66].
8.2 Skaion Dataset
The Skaion dataset provided an opportunity to analyze TCPdump data con-
taining labeled attacks previously identified with Snort signatures. The purpose
of this case study involved validating previously discussed network data connection
quantification (utilizing TCPtrace and Perl programs) and exploring the feasibil-
ity of using machine learning applications to learn and detect attacks identified by
signature based detection schemes.
This study exposed several useful insights:
1. Quantification of network traffic and labeling of network traffic connections
for the purpose of machine learning is possible and relevant for network security.
2. Color visualization of large, high dimensional datasets is a useful and newly
viable method to illustrate linear patterns within the data.
3. Machine learning applications closely replicate signature based detection
and present potential to detect new security vulnerabilities which may be detected
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due to their similarity to recognized signatures.
In a simple yet exploratory effort, quantification of network traffic connections
utilizing TCPtrace [116] provided a platform to build a bridge between network
data and machine learning. TCPtrace quantifies and aggregates network traffic
based upon connections. TCPtrace provides a summary which can be parsed for
further processing. The Skaion data contained unique IP addresses for the attacks
identified by Snort, and therefore labeling connections based upon IP addresses was
a straight forward match and parse operation with Perl. Figure 8.1 illustrates this
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Figure 8.1: Conversion of TCPdump traffic to vector summaries of con-
nections
Once the preprocessing depicted in figure 8.1 this network security problem
becomes a machine learning problem. TCPtrace creates over 60 variables for sta-
tistical learning. This particular application contained two types of attacks: back-
ground scanners and background attackers. Table 8.1 is a description of the attacks
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contained in the Skaion dataset.
Table 8.1: Skaion Data
Exploit Name Short description Rate observed
(attacks/day)
loopback web Malformed loopback packet web server scan 275.5
openssl too open OpenSSL KEY-ARG overflow exploit 24
opensslapache bug Apache OpenSSL bug exploit 112
ssh crc32 OpenSSH CRC32 overflow exploit 21.5
iis50 webdav IIS 5.0 WebDav attacks 3
apache chunked Apache Chunked Encoding overflow exploit 31
iis idq IIS ”IDQ” exploit 38.5
iis50 printer overflow IIS 5.0 printer overflow exploit 137
frontpage fp30reg chunked MS Frontpage buffer overflow exploit 20.5
ddk iis ”ddk” IIS overflow attack 32
iis asp overflow IIS ”.asp” overflow exploit 75
wvftpd Wvtftp-0.9 Buffer Overflow 32
iis40 htr IIS 4.0 .HTR Buffer Overflow 70.5
iis w3who overflow IIS w3who.dll ISAPI Overflow 23
squid ntlm authenticate Squid NTLM Authenticate Overflow 5.5
webstar ftp user Stack overflow in OS X WebSTAR FTP server 64
blackice pam icq UDP overflow targeted at ISS BlackIce program 91
windows ssl pct Microsoft SSL PCT MS04-011 Overflow 9.5
windows nsiislog post IIS nsiislog.dll ISAPI POST Overflow 4
(The information in this table was provided courtesy of the Skaion corporation.)
Scanning attacks are typically probing efforts with an attempt to find an un-
protected port or an effort to map the network. The background attacks primarily
consist of buffer overflow or known bug exploitations. It is not particularly critical
to know the specifics of the attacks and scanning efforts for the purpose of this
research. The critical aspect for this research is the ability to label connections
either as benign or as the type of attack that they represent. If labeled attacks do
not exist in the dataset under consideration, it is possible to simply run Snort and
label as necessary. A very useful contribution to this research field would be a util-
ity that accepts TCPdump as input and outputs vector summaries of connections
with signature based alerts labeled on the flagged connections. This is a capabil-
ity gap that currently exists between the networking community and the machine
learning community. The technique proposed in this dissertation addresses this gap
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however the computing solution is not sophisticated enough to fully overcome the
aforementioned gap.
After representing this dataset as labeled connections, it was apparent that
learning signature based detection schemes would be relatively trivial. Most of these








Figure 8.2: Color visualization of Skaion data
This color visualization offers much information. This plot is a color visualiza-
tion plot using a new feature available with gnuplot 4.0, the PM3D plot [140]. An
astute initial observation challenges the possibility of displaying 28,000 observations
when this is more pixels than a computer screen contains. PM3D overcomes this
problem with an elegant algorithm which fuses pixels based upon the desired color
of adjacent colors, allowing for visualization of such a large dataset. The value of
visualizing a dataset in this manner involves identifying obvious linear breaks in the
data. The three types of connections include benign, scanning attacks, and back-
ground attacks. The last feature in this plot is the label, and therefore it should
display clean linear breaks for each class. However, all other features are simply
statistics from the data. Notice the clean breaks which occur in the latter half of
the feature space. These features primarily involve the segment size and the window
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size. The segment size involves the amount of non-header raw data transmitted in
a packet, and the window size involves the ability of the receiving host to receive
certain size segments. A network engineer would be interested in explaining why
these are the most important features involved in identifying an attack which can
be identified with signature based methods, however consider the machine learn-
ing approach to this problem. With minimal background knowledge in computer
networks, the critical features used in Snort attacks have been identified. Exploita-
tion of these features for the purpose of learning Snort signatures is now possible.
What is more interesting involves the potential to identify future attacks which
can be slight modifications of the attacks currently identifiable by Snort signatures.
Machine learning applications are likely to identify slight modifications, associat-
ing these modifications with similar patterns. However, signature based detection
schemes will not identify these patterns modifications. This key weakness in sig-
nature based detection, an inability to generalize due to the need to identify exact
signatures, opens the door for machine learning applications.
Experimental results with this particular dataset indicated near perfection
with KPLS pattern recognition, achieving an AUC of .99 or 1 with each experiment.
This result is not surprising due to the obvious linear separation evident in figure
8.2.
8.3 Geospatial Datamining for Threat Templating
Much interest exists in the fields of predicting crime and threat or enemy
activity. Many American cities employ data analysis experts in crime labs for the sole
purpose of tracking and predicting crime patterns based upon geospatial statistics.
This chapter discusses a geospatial prediction modeling application which could
easily be characterized as a security classification problem.
8.3.1 Recent Work
Using geographical information to solve problems has been applied throughout
history. Chawla et. al. use several historical examples in [26] to illustrate the legacy
of geographical problem solving. One example included an Asiatic cholera break out
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in London in 1855. Officials used a map to identify locations of the outbreak, and
they identified a water pump in the middle of the locations. After turning off the
water pump, the outbreak stopped. Scientists have since shown Asiatic cholera as a
water borne disease. Another example included a 1909 observation that linked the
healthy teeth of Colorado Springs residents to a higher than normal concentration
of fluoride in drinking water for the residents. This was before scientists confirmed
the importance of fluoride in fostering healthy teeth. I have personally witnessed
geospatial statistics applied to common military tactics. While training at the Joint
Readiness Training Center in Louisiana, a training center designed to tax light
infantry units in hot, jungle environment, it is common to encounter mine strikes
and mortar attacks clustered in specific areas. Intelligence officers draw equal sized
circles around the locations of these mine strikes and attacks, and commanders
target locations where these circles appear to meet. The circles represent the radius
of a potential cache. These targeting actions typically involve ambushes and search
and destroy missions looking for enemy caches. Crime research with geospatial data
is a very popular field of study. Often referred to as crime mapping, applications
became very wide spread across police districts in the last two decades [79]. Spatial
analysis also manifests in econometrics, such as the work in [4] by Anselin.
Stephen Riese’s threatmapper is a recent military application which seeks to
find threat incident patterns by characterizing incidents as a vector of proximity
measurements to specific terrain features, such as a bridge, four lane highway, large
metropolitan center, etc. Stated plainly, threatmapper strives to find the “hotspots”,
areas likely to contain enemy activity, in a tactical scenario. The application is a
kernel based method, considering two incidents as similar if surrounding terrain is
similar however the actual distance between the two points could be quite significant.















xg ≡ gth test instance
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n = (1, 2, ..., N) positive instances for training
i = (1, 2, ..., I) feautures
hi ≡ standard deviation of the feature
An initial inspection of the method reveals that threatmapper builds models
solely based upon positive incidents, or the incidents which involved an attack. It
builds models from a single class, similar to the one class SVM. However, examples
from the other class are available. Excluding an entire class from a model limits
the information available to a model for no known reason. Haykin indicates in [72]
that one of the fundamentals in every classification or pattern recognition problems
involves ensuring the inclusion of all available information. Excluding an entire class
from the model violates this fundamental. Another questionable aspect involves
inclusion of the standard deviation of the features rather than the more common
practice in machine learning which is to assume scaled features. It is a relatively
small observation, however inclusion of the standard deviation adds complexity to
the model and computational complexity which is not necessary.
8.3.2 Experimental Design
The purpose of examining the threatmapper application was to determine
whether or not the algorithm (kernel density with spatial preference) in use could be
improved or replaced by another algorithm. An initial assessment of the threatmap-
per system revealed a very robust and creative geospatial method. Much of this sys-
tem included sophisticated Geographic Information System (GIS) interaction with
map databases and incident databases which create the eventual dataset for predic-
tion. However, the algorithm seemed to provide room for improvement.
Five other prediction models were compared against the kernel density with
spatial preference model. The experimental design divided the dataset into three
groups - a training set, test set, and validation set. The training and testing set
contained points from the same geographical region. The difference in the two sets
simply involved a temporal change. The training set occurred during one year, and
the test set occurred during the following year. This explored how well we could
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predict in an area where we observed threat behavior.
Table 8.2: Experimental design for threatmapper experiment.
data set number of number of number of
observations positive incidents (p) negative incidents (b)
training 7450 420 7030
buffer zone 3155 unknown unknown
testing 7450 200 7250





Figure 8.3: Color visualization of geospatial data
A buffer zone divided validation set from the training data and the test data.
The validation set included events that occurred both during the same time as
the training set and the next year. Figure 8.4 illustrates this design. Figure 8.4
represents a map, showing a cartoon depiction of the buffer zone and the relationship
between the training, testing, and validation groups. Table 8.2 details the specifics
of the these groups.
Figure 8.3 illustrates the data explored in this experiment. Again utilizing
the power of PM3D [140] to visualize a matrix with more elements than pixels on a
computer screen, this visualization clearly shows that the incident data will not be a
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trivial dataset to predict. Although there seems to be a fuzzy line of separation, it is
certainly not as crisp as the line of separation shown in figure 8.2. Later experiments
will show that this pessimistic observation regarding the predictability of this data,
strictly based thus far on data visualization, proves accurate.
Buffer Zone
• Terrain overlayed by 
200m x 200m squares 
(18000+ squares)
• Each square represents 
an observation
• Each observation 
characterized by geo-
spatial variables
• Train (  ) and test (  ) in 
same geographical area
• Validate (  ) in different 
geographical area
Figure 8.4: Experimental design for geospatial learning
Subtle challenges exist with geospatial data. One of these subtle challenges
involves the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) assumptions necessary
in many statistical models. This assumption is not valid with geospatial data [26].
There is inherent similarity based upon geographical proximity, which boils down to
the distance between two points. Regardless of what variables a model utilizes, this
underlying factor cannot be overlooked and will affect the outcome. This problem
manifested itself as a significant difference in prediction performance between the
test dataset and the validation dataset. Figure 8.5 illstrates the performance of six
different models on the test dataset. The SVM models performed markedly better












































































































































Poisson Regression Linear Regression Spatial Density
1 Class SVM Binary SVM KPLS
Figure 8.5: Comparison of models on the geospatial test data
Figure 8.6 illustrates the performance of six different models on the validation
dataset. None of the models performed well on this data. The regression models
were the better of the six however, and it is interesting to notice that the SVM
models performed very poorly. The binary SVM was almost a perfectly random
model.
The reason for this performance relates to the i.i.d. discussion from the pre-
vious paragraphs. Consider SVM models. SVM models are solely based upon the
similarity of an evaluated point against the support vectors, or defining points, of
training dataset. Regression models are built from the independent variables of the
data.
Recall the one class SVM decision function where mathbfxi is an m dimen-
sional vector, i = 1, 2, ..., N . In order to classify a new instance, v, we would evaluate
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Figure 8.6: Comparison of models on the geospatial validation data







The decision function of the binary SVM is somewhat simpler, however it is
again defined with the α vector and kernel similarities between instances as shown





α is a sparse N dimensional vector, αi ∈ (0, 1). If αi is greater than zero, this
means that the ith instance is a support vector. This means that this particular
instance, or vector, helps define the margin of separation in the case of the binary
SVM or the enclosing hypersphere in the case of the one class SVM. SVMs create
decision functions based upon specific instances from the training set. This is fun-
damentally different from regression models. Regression models create a function
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from the independent variables, or features. This fundamental difference does help
explain why the SVM models perform well in the same terrain (test dataset) but
poorly on a different set of terrain (validation dataset). With geospatial data, two
points that are adjacent on the terrain will have unavoidable similarities. SVM
models will detect this type of similarity and always have a bias to measure geo-
graphically proximate points as similar. Many of the threat incidents occurred in the
same proximity, forming clusters of incidents in the data (see figure 8.7). The poor
performance of the SVMs in validation data is likely due to the models attempting
to classify points based on their geographic similarity to the training data, which
is a doomed effort since none of the points have geographic proximity. Regression
models attempt to find the independent variables which best describe the classifica-
tion function. Geographic proximity is not the critical factor in these models, thus
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Figure 8.7: Color visualization of geospatial function
Figure 8.7 is a color map visualization of actual incident data (bottom red-
colored map) and two attempted predictions of these incidents (top two maps).
The purpose of this illustration is to show that many incidents did occur in clusters.
Furthermore, the top two maps show how different two different prediction functions
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can be with this type of data. The top left map is the kernel spatial method, and the
top right is the binary SVM. The models trained on the training data (not shown)
and the test data which these functions attempt to predict is the red color map on
the bottom.
Prediction modeling of geospatial data has tremendous application potential.
Many techniques have been created to model and visualize geospatial patterns. How-
ever, evaluation of the performance of various prediction models for geospatial data
is a gap in the research. Furthermore, gaps exist involving how to create a model
for one piece of terrain based upon behavior in another piece of terrain. These gaps
offer opportunities for future research. The gap addressing modeling and application
in separate pieces of terrain offers particular opportunity for military applications
where this type of problem occurs every time a unit changes its area of responsibility.
8.4 Insights into Insurgent Response to Traffic Flow Strate-
gies
Suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) create devas-
tating results. SVBIEDs are an intimidation tool, and the terrorists who employ
these tactics hope to instill fear and uncertainty. The behavior of SVBIEDs is poorly
understood and sparse. In an attempt to improve understanding of SVBIEDs and
their environment, a simulation exercise with map aware non-uniform automata
(MANA) ensued. The complete experiment is documented in [66]. Several of the
concepts discussed in this thesis were employed in this experiment. This section will
highlight the related applications from the experiment.
MANA is an agent based simulation platform. For this experiment, a VBIED
released into a road network with an overall goal of detonating at an entry control
point (ECP) which was located somewhere in the center of the terrain. As the
VBIED progressed through the road network, the VBIED passed several TCPs.
Each TCP could potentially identify and engage the VBIED, and the likelihood of
this engagement was controlled by several factors which affected identification and
the TCP strategy which affected VBIED exposure to TCPs.
The fundamental objective of this project involved identification and assess-
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ment of key factors in determining VBIED success. Soldiers with recent experience
in theatre provided information during surveys and interviews, enabling identifica-
tion of the factors. Eleven important factors emerged, and these factors are shown
in table 8.3. The TCP strategy deserves additional explanation. There were five
different traffic control point (TCP) strategies analyzed, and each strategy involved
a slightly different arrangement of TCPs on the terrain.
Table 8.3: Description of factors and measure of effectiveness
Factor Name Min Max Description
TCP strat 1 5 TCP strategy, numbered 1-5, representing vignettes base, filter,
grid, open
CD TCP 5 5029 Communications distance (in meters) of the traffic control point
(TCP) spotters
CL TCP 0 1824 Communications latency (in seconds) of the traffic control point
(TCP) spotters
CD ECP 5 5029 Communications distance (in meters) of the entry control point
(ECP) spotters
CL ECP 0 1824 Communications latency (in seconds) of the entry control point
(ECP) spotters
Stealth 67 99 Stealth of the insurgent, measured as in index in MANA - a larger
number implies better concealment
OrgRepulse -99 61 insurgent tendency to avoid blue forces observed with organic in-
telligence, measured as an index in MANA - a larger value implies
increased repulsion
InorgRepulse -99 61 insurgent tendency to avoid blue forces observed with inorganic
intelligence, measured as an index in MANA - a larger value implies
increased repulsion
Vspeed 10 74 Speed of the insurgent after making visual contact with the entry
control point (ECP), measured in kmph
b detect 5 517 Detection range (observes an entity) in meters of blue forces
b classify 5 517 Classification range (classifies an entity) in meters of blue forces
insurgent y 0 1 Not a factor - primary measure of effectiveness - defined as insur-
gent reaching target and detonating
The max and min shown in table 8.3 spanned 33 levels in the design of experi-
ments(DOE). The DOE utilized allowed for the analysis of 11 different factors with
only 33 design points. This is a special DOE known as the nearly-orthogonal Latin
hypercubes (NOLH) developed by Cioppa in [29]. Designs were readily evolved from
those used in the initial study and are complimentary for comparison.
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The factor descriptions and ranges are given in table 8.3. Utilizing eleven
factors, 33 design points emerged. The NOLH designs require many fewer runs than
more traditionally employed designs, are more efficient, and sample the interior of
the factor levels hypercube [126]. After conducting 30 simulation iterations for each
design point, analysis of the primary measure of effectiveness, insurgent success,
followed.
Creating the 33 design points with eleven different factor values requires 341
adjustments assuming that each factor could be adjusted in one location in MANA.
This was not the case. Several of the factors spanned multiple states in MANA,
nearly quadrupling the total number of adjustments required for the design of ex-
periments (DOE).
In order to support simulation validation efforts and create an agile framework
for integrating the DOE, several programs were created to perform special tasks.
The programs were all written in Perl and exploited MANAs underlying xml model
files. Model files contain unique branch paths to every parameter (some of which
were the factors), represented in a tree structure. The program built to implement
the DOE followed these steps:
1. Create file vars.txt containing branch path to the m factors in the DOE.
2. Mark factors in base MANA xml file based on variables read from vars.txt..
3. Read DOE matrix and for i = 1...n design points in DOE, assign j = 1...m
factor levels to marked variables for each design point.
This method creates n xml files, each of which runs 30 iterations. The final
analysis involves aggregating 30 x n simulation output files to assess the measures
of effectiveness. A key lesson learned involved building a program and file manage-
ment framework robust enough to tolerate changes in the DOE and base scenario,
an inevitable event. Robustness enables regeneration of results with minimal man-
ual intervention. Another goal should also include scalability; a well constructed
framework will step from one scenario and DOE to another relatively seamlessly.
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8.4.1 Results and Discussion
The data generated in the MANA vignettes enabled a search for insights re-
garding insurgent success or failure based on factors shown in Table 8.3. These
factors were identified based on feedback from participants at the Armor Officer
Captains Career Course and from the literature. The data exploration involved
determining significant factors and combinations of factors and building models to
classify insurgents outcomes as a function of the factors.
NOLH assumes near-orthogonality of the factors. The factors displayed very
little correlation, supporting this assumption as shown in figure 8.8. Examining
the correlations prior to the simulation helps support this assumption; however the
correlation matrix provides insight when examined with the measures of effectiveness
after the simulation.
Figure 8.8 illustrates the correlation matrix on a color map, an intuitive rep-
resentation which is especially useful with high dimensional datasets. Variables one
through 11 in this plot respectively follow the variables listed in Table 8.3; variable
twelve represents insurgent success. This plot aids analysts in discovering obvious
linear relationships in the data in addition to validating data behavior. Another
useful plot that enables validation and identification of obvious linear relationships
is the color (grey scale) map of the actual data shown in figure 8.9.
Figure 8.8: Correlation matrix of eleven factors and insurgent success
Sorted on the insurgent success measure of effectiveness (last column), the
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color map provides a summary of the entire dataset. This figure illustrates relative
distributions, balance of the data, and potential patterns. It provides the same type
of utility for multi-dimensional data that a scatter plot provides for two dimensional
data, primarily enabling validation and human understanding.
Figure 8.9: Matrix plot of data
8.4.2 Predictive modeling with MANA data farming
The data created from 990 simulation runs creates a platform for prediction
modeling. Exploring simulation data for predictability potentially provides decision
makers with a tool to shape their environment. The overall goal of this study aims to
mitigate insurgent threat, and predictive models fill a vital gap in this effort. Since
this study examined a binary measure of effectiveness (insurgent success), evaluation
of the prediction models was possible with receiver-operator-characteristic (ROC)
curves. It is also possible to supplement ROC curves with a decision ROC chart,
a novel plot introduced in this dissertation which supplements the ROC curve by
bridging the gap between the false positive rate and the decision values (see figure
8.10.
Data farming has been casually mentioned a few times and deserves expla-
nation. Data farming involves a search of the parameter space, often involving a
brute force search across many design points or a robust method for searching a
large parameter space (such as in this application) with fewer design points. Barry
and Koehler [7] and Horne and Meyer [77] provide much of the background for data
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Figure 8.10: Decision ROC chart illustrating binary SVM performance
for MANA data farming data
farming in their Winter Simulation Conference papers. The purpose of data farming
is to detect previously unknown relationships and explore a broad range of hypothe-
ses [77]. The strongest relationship observed in this experiment was between the
TCP strategy and VBIED success. This is shown in figure 8.8.
This experiment was as much of an academic exercise as an applied effort. As
an academic exercise, this experiment provides a framework for data farming with
MANA and a methodology for the type of experimental design necessary to utilize
machine learning and prediction modeling. It is also an applied effort, seeking to
improve our understanding of a poorly understood threat. The simplest way to cri-
tique this modeling effort would be to point out that validation is not possible simply
due to our lack of understanding of VBIEDs. This is undoubtedly true. However,
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the methodology and framework is valid. When we do improve our understand-
ing of this VBIED threat or realize the need for this type of modeling framework
for another application, researchers can potentially capitalize on the progress and
methodology set forth in this experiment.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This dissertation aims to improve the modeling of security classification problems.
There are two major thrusts of the contributions. One thrust involves advances in
the theory and methodology that tackles unbalanced classification. The other thrust
addresses applications, illustrating techniques and methods to solve specific types
of security classification problems. This conclusion includes comments on both of
those major thrusts as well as some final remarks regarding future directions for this
research.
9.1 Contributions to Theory and Methodology
Security classification problems, and unbalanced classification in general, are
a special type of classification problem. The typical modeling and evaluation efforts
used for balanced problems are often inadequate for unbalanced cases. Balanced
classification modeling implicitly or explicitly makes a number of assumptions which
are not always appropriate for unbalanced problems. For that reason, unbalanced
classification deserves to be considered a special case by its own. The research
contributions in this dissertation stem from the fact that these assumptions do not
consistently hold for unbalanced classification. When these assumptions hold true,
models perform adequately. However, when these assumptions do not hold true,
implications and alternative methods must be considered to improve model accuracy.
Unbalanced classification offers a special case when these assumptions do not hold,
presenting a gap in the methods available. This dissertation has largely been an
exploration of these gaps. The following itemized list includes the theoretical and
methodological contributions of this work. These contributions have been associated
with an assumption from balanced classification that does not hold with unbalanced
classification. This provides illustration of the gaps that exist and the efforts and
progress made to fill the gaps.
• Balanced classification assumption 1: Feature reduction is possible. This dis-
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sertation clearly shows the impact of increased dimensionality (shown in sec-
tions 1.5.6, 1.6, and 2.2.3.3). More is not necessarily better when considering
dimensions, or features. In its most simple form, feature reduction for balanced
classification involves measuring a feature’s behavior with one class, compar-
ing that behavior with the other class, and discarding features which do not
demonstrate a different behavior. There are much more advanced methods for
feature reduction, many of which involve iterative model evaluation such as
in [91]. Modeling in subspaces and aggregating the output of subspace mod-
els (shown in chapters 5 and 6) creates a platform to reduce dimensionality
without the loss of information.
• Balanced classification assumption 2: When aggregating the decision values
from an ensemble of models, the average works best. Bagging, an ensemble
method introduced by Breiman in [18], is one of the most popular and suc-
cessful ensemble methods in the literature. The aggregation method utilized
is the average, and the use of the average for combining numeric model out-
put has essentially become the assumed norm. Chapter 6 clearly illustrates
a case for considering alternate aggregation methods, especially when fusing
unbalanced problems. Moreover, chapter 6 shows that as the severity of im-
balance increases, the value of including the min aggregator as part of the
fusion method increases. An important aspect of this property requires that
the fused values are ranks, eliminating the parametric influence of actual de-
cision values. The analysis of rank distributions, pseudo ROC curves, and the
behavior of these ranks when considering an imbalanced classification problem
(shown in chapter 6) comprise what I consider the most valuable findings of
this research.
• Balanced classification assumption 3: Model tuning is possible through itera-
tive training and testing. Model validation with actual positive instances may
be possible with some unbalanced classification problems, however many prob-
lems include very little or no examples of the positive class. When the latter is
the case, model tuning with iterative training and testing may not be possible.
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Chapter 7 introduces an approach to overcome manual tuning and validation
for the gaussian kernel. The most important contributions of that chapter
involve insights into the statistical properties of the gaussian kernel and the
gaussian kernel matrix. Improved understanding of this kernel could lead to
automated tuning methods. Chapter 7 included one heuristic for automated
tuning that is based on the statistical properties presented in the chapter.
• Balanced classification assumption 4: ROC curves and the area under the
curve provide sufficient evaluation of model performance. Evaluation of models
is an open area of research. Good evaluation metrics provide model assessment
that decision makers understand, evaluate without bias across a broad spec-
trum of model performance, and communicate complete information. ROC
curves and the area under the curve are excellent performance measures for
binary classification, however they are not complete. A small but important
contribution of this research involves the decision ROC chart, a novel method
(shown in chapter 3) that augments the ROC curve with a graph depicting
the relationship between decision values and the false positive rate. Further-
more, the chart communicates the balance of the problem. This contribution
presents a more complete picture of model performance than the ROC curve
alone.
9.2 Contributions to Applications
There are two primary application domains addressed in this dissertation.
Military tactical applications and computer intrusion detection applications. These
domains are riddled with security considerations. These considerations motivated
coining of the term “security classification problem”, an environment characterized
with severe or nearly complete imbalance. This is a very common environment in
security scenarios.
Chapter 4 and chapter 8 address methods utilized to model military tactical
classification problems and computer intrusion detection classification problems.
Including these applications and describing the models utilized shares knowledge
explaining how to measure these two types of scenarios. The most difficult aspect
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of modeling is quite often simply getting started. Determining what and how to
measure often creates unexpected challenges. Preprocessing unruly, alphanumeric
data creates challenges as well.
Chapter 4 describes the text mining techniques used to measure host based
intrusion detection data. This chapter also illustrated methods to measure network
based intrusion detection. Much of today’s network intrusion detection involves
strict rule-based methods designed to detect signatures of known attacks. Utilizing
existing and freely available tools, chapters 4 and 8 show how to measure network
traffic and use machine learning techniques to learn from these signature based
methods. The value of this work involves the potential to detect previously unseen
attacks which may slightly vary from previously known signatures. Slightly modified
malicious events can evade signature based detection, however machine learning
methods provide a means to potentially recognize these attacks.
Chapter 8 also includes two military scenarios modeled and preprocessed to
harness the predictive power of machine learning methods. One scenario involves
geospatial models, and the other scenario is a simulation scenario which explores a
relatively large parameter spectrum for a simulation model. Both of these scenarios
illustrate the applicability of framing military scenarios, which easily extend to
other physical security scenarios such as crime prevention, as security classification
problems.
A crucial lesson learned from these applied cases involves computing tools (see
Appendix A). The majority of the work included in this dissertation would not
have been possible without the use of Perl, a high level programming language, and
the UNIX computing environment. Perl enables rapid prototype development and
handles messy data extremely well. Understanding how to compute in the UNIX
environment provides opportunity to batch large experiments. These tools provide
the freedom and power to build and run experiments seeking to illustrate theoretical
results or simply provide proof of principle.
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9.3 Future Directions
Tremendous opportunity for future work exists in many different areas that
this research explores. Several major research domains have been touched in this
dissertation, and this section will be organized in accordance with these domains.
9.3.1 Computer Intrusion Detection
As long as computer technology continues to grow, computer intrusion will
always be a research rich field. This is largely due to the parallel growth of malicious
efforts. The term intrusion detection has actually grown somewhat outdated and
out of vogue with most of the commercial detection efforts, replaced by intrusion
prevention systems. The argument claims that detection is too late. Prevention
stops malicious activity before it starts. Stopping new malicious acts before the
security community officially recognizes the signatures, typically after an exploit, is
a promising direction. Part of the analysis discussed in chapter 8 directly relates
to this direction, and machine learning and pattern recognition techniques offer
potential to capitalize on this future research direction. Pattern recognition exists
to identify similarity - perhaps not exact matches, but similar. New malicious acts
often grow or mutate from existing successful malicious acts. Identification of these
malicious acts could result from pattern recognition that identifies similarity.
Host-based intrusion detection also offers opportunity for future research.
Many intranets that serve to facilitate communications within organizations attempt
to maintain user and administrator security. The typical security measures taken
involve a user ID / password and compartmentalized privileges. However, user
identification could be much more sophisticated than this. Just as the Schonlau
data explores techniques to measure a user’s vocabulary and command behavior,
measurement of other computer behaviors is possible. Measurement of keystroke
behavior, mouse movement and clicking behavior, and program usage offer similar
behavior matching opportunities. Profiling a user’s computer behavior then cre-
ates the potential to monitor the user for extreme changes in behavior, indicating a
potential breach in security or fraudulent login.
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9.3.2 Tuning of the Gaussian Kernel
Improving the automation of any part of machine learning helps accomplish an
overarching goal of the field - building intelligent machines. The unique statistical
properties of the gaussian kernel provide opportunity to automate tuning. It is
undoubtedly true that there is a range for σ that exists for every classification
problem which creates a stable kernel matrix that generalizes well for the data. The
gap that exists in this effort involves theoretical proof, perhaps as a bound, that
relates the statistics of the kernel to the generalization of the model.
9.3.3 Ensemble Methods
Ensemble methods are a relatively new and exciting field in machine learning.
One future direction that could be identified relates directly to the above subsection.
This effort would pursue automation of ensembles in general. The analysis of data
and identification of the best type of model and ensemble is largely a human task
today. Automation of this task would be a valued contribution.
An additional potential direction which relates to chapter 6 involves finding
an analytical solution for rank distributions. The rank distributions described in
chapter 6 include parameters which describe the accuracy of rankings and the bal-
ance of the classes. In order to overcome not knowing the analytical solution of the
distributions, simulation was utilized. An analytical solution to these distributions
would contribute immensely to improve understanding of ensembles and the ranks
which create ROC curves.
9.3.4 Intelligent Selection of Subspaces and Dimensionality Reduction
with ICA
Chapter 5 discusses several proposed methods for intelligent subspace cre-
ation. There is no theoretical proof that shows the creation of intelligent subspaces
improves performance beyond simply randomly selecting subspaces. This disserta-
tion includes much exploratory effort which addresses intelligent subspace selection,
to include several proposed methods, however underlying theoretical investigation is
lacking. The contribution of this future direction would not only include improved
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ensembles but could also be considered a means for dimensionality reduction for
unsupervised learning.
Independent Component Analysis (ICA) as a means for feature reduction is
another avenue for exploration. The application of ICA typically involves signal
detection and noise reduction. ICA creates a linear transformation of data, similar
to PCA. However, there is no current method to identify the information content of
independent components. For every principal component, an eigen value represents
the amount of information contained in the principal component (via the related
loading vector or eigen vector, see section 2.2.1.1). No such measure exists for
independent components. This type of measure could render ICA as a feasible
feature reduction method.
9.3.5 Geospatial Prediction Modeling
Geospatial prediction modeling are often applications of security classification
problems. Geospatial prediction and geospatial statistics contain subtle challenges.
Correlation will always exist between two points with geographical proximity, and
models which train and test on the same terrain will always contain this bias. This
bias creates challenges when validating or attempting to apply models to a different
piece of terrain. The application of this problem manifests often in military scenar-
ios. Units may analyze the enemy behavior within a certain set of terrain and expect
this behavior to generalize to another set of terrain when the unit moves for a future
operation. Crime analysis may also encounter this challenge when analyzing similar
crimes or the same criminal on two separate pieces of terrain. Furthermore, since
geospatial analysis always summarizes two a two dimensional map representation,
opportunity exists with visualization techniques. Geospatial prediction modeling
and geospatial pattern analysis have become very popular amongst the military and
crime enforcement, however it is a young field with opportunity for growth.
9.4 Concluding Remarks
The applicability of the security classification problem is extensive today, and
the domains include information security, physical security, and infrastructure se-
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curity. It is a ubiquitous problem that impacts our way of life. Unbalanced bi-
nary classification problems exist in medicine, the military, computer networks, and
homeland security. Significant decisions must be made that boil down to a simple
yes or no answer. The research in this document aimed to improve our ability to
provide the correct response to important decisions.
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A.1 Some of the Technology Utilized
There are several computing techniques and programs that enabled the re-
search contained in this thesis. The numerical experiments detailed in the previous
chapters are a result of programs written by others, programs written by me, and
the availability of some useful computing platforms. Some of the techniques and
programs utilized are worth discussing. The purpose of this discussion is to share
tools that worked well and comment on the context of their use.
Most of the numerical computing was completed in a UNIX environment.
Some of this occurred on entirely UNIX based systems, however much of the devel-
opment and analysis occurred on my PC with a program that replicates a UNIX
environment, cygwin. cygwin enabled the development of scripts that were eventu-
ally transferred to a remote UNIX machine which then ran the necessary number of
experimental iterations. The remote computing program utilized was SSH Secure
Shell, a useful application which includes both a remote terminal window and a
remote ftp window.
A.2 The Computing Processes
Figure A.1 represents the computing and data processing for the security prob-
lem applied to either host based or network based computer intrusion detection.
This data flow assumes subspace modeling is preferred. Each of these processes
represents computing that often consists of Perl programs that I wrote to analyze
and manipulate data and state of the art prediction modeling software written by
others. A brief description of each of these processes follows.
• 1.0 Capture Raw Data. This is the mechanism that captures either user com-
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Figure A.1: Data flow diagram (DFD) of security classification applied to
computer intrusion detection
will require the greatest disk storage of any process due to the raw and un-
compressed nature of captured data.
The following processes apply only to network based intrusion detection.
• 2.0 Generate TCP Connection Summaries. TCPtrace generates the connec-
tion summaries from the TCPdump data. This process can reduce the size of
the data down to one tenth and represents a significant abstraction of infor-
mation.
• 3.0 Create Variables from TCP Connection Summaries. I wrote several Perl
programs to parse the TCPtrace output into a numerical flat file format which
is compatible with either LIBSVM or AnalyzeTM . This process again reduces
the size of the data to about one tenth of the size of the TCPtrace connection
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summaries.
The following processes apply only to host based intrusion detection.
• 4.0 Generate Data Dictionary and Command Popularity Profiles. User log
data will consist of repetitive commands and activities which reflect the be-
havior of a user. In order to create statistics such as frequencies and average
command popularity, a data dictionary and command popularity profile must
be created. These will be created for the entire population and each user.
• 5.0 Create Variables Based on Command Usage. User activity must be divided
into sessions. Each session can be measured for consistency of activity based
upon the data dictionary and command popularity profiles.
• 6.0 Intelligent Subspace Modeling. If the variables that represent user or net-
work activity are many (which is usually the case, especially with network
data) and the models will be unsupervised, subspace modeling is preferred.
Intelligent subspace modeling could include a genetic algorithm which seeks
to optimize a fitness function serving as a metric for good subspaces or an
analytical solution based upon the behavior of the variables.
• 7.0 Prediction Modeling. AnalyzeTM serves as the primary software package
for multivariate statistical analysis and supervised prediction modeling [46],
and LIBSVM provides modeling with the one-class SVM [24]. These software
packages provide a soft decision value (R1) which represents the model’s degree
of confidence towards one class or the other.
• 8.0 Model Fusion. The Fuzzy ROC curve is the model fusion technique ex-
plained in this proposal, however many different fusion methods exist. The
fusion method simply must aggregate the subspace decision values and create
one decision value for ever observation.
• 9.0 Output Evaluation. The output evaluation for binary classification will
consist of ROC curve and AUC analysis. If it is not possible to create ROC
curves, the decision maker must select a threshold value for classification.
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Feedback of classified instances can serve as a tuning mechanism for the thresh-
old value.
APPENDIX B
COMBINING DATA MINING TECHNIQUES WITH
SCHONLAU’S DATA
B.1 Determining Optimal Variable Combinations for K-PLS
Prediction
The analysis of the text mining variables described in chapter 4 provides in-
sight into the relationship between the variables and the predictive power of these
variables. Exploring fundamental properties of the variables is an important first
step.
The AnalyzeTM software package is the primary vehicle for analysis from this
point forward for the text mining variables. Previous analysis and preprocessing
utilized Perl programs and some simple spreadsheet calculations, however now that
all of the variables have been produced and represented in the MetaNeural [46]
format required by AnalyzeTM , the predictive modeling power of AnalyzeTM can
be harnessed.
The choice of learning machines is often complicated and data dependent.
This analysis utilizes one learning machine for the sake of consistency - Rosipal’s
kernel partial least squares [124]. This learning machine provided good results and
remaining with one learning machine provides a consistent measure of comparison
between preprocessing techniques and combinations of variables.
Our original set of variables did not contain variable 1 (new) or variable 8
(user). Therefore, our original model contained seven variables. The most obvious
method for prediction modeling given the set of variables described is to simply
represent each tuple of data with a combination of these seven variables. Let us call
this the seven feature model. This is the initial approach. The file to be processed by
the learning machine contained 5000 tuples of data, each containing 7 variables, the
outcome (-1 for non intrusion, 1 for intrusion), and an identification number. The
identification number is a six digit number that uniquely identifies each tuple. The
184
185
first three digits represent the user, and these digits range from 101 to 150. We use
three digits to eliminate the confusion of any leading zeroes and create identification
numbers with same number of digits.
One final crucial step in data preprocessing consisted of the scaling of the data.
Previously in this discussion we indicated that the relationship between variables is
much more meaningful with scaled data. Learning machines also require scaled data
to extract meaning and accurately learn and predict. Each variable, to include the
response, was Mahalanobis scaled. After scaling the variables, the final step involved
splitting the data into a training and testing set (4000 tuples were used for training,
1000 tuples for testing), and then the learning machines processed the information.
Once the raw data is in MetaNeural format, AnalyzeTM operators perform and
provide the scaling, splitting, and predictive modeling, and all necessary analytical
results. This seven feature model achieved exceptional results, with an AUC of .907.
The technique tested next expands the details of the features in an attempt
to improve the prediction. Each of the first six variables in the seven feature model
is an average or percentage for the entire tuple of 100 commands considered. The
seventh variable, xu, represents the value which is a measure of the entire tuple.
Therefore, each command can be represented by six different values, each value
representing variables one through six. The result of this approach is a tuple of 601
features (the extra feature is Schonlau’s xu value). The results of this 601 feature
model were surprisingly not better than the seven feature model. The 601 feature
model was cumbersome because of its size, required much longer processing time,
and did not predict as well. The best AUC achieved with the 601 feature model was
.77.
The evaluation of several more preprocessing techniques further supported
the idea of poor performance with expanded variables that could be represented as
some type of average or summation for an entire tuple. Additional preprocessing
techniques evaluated eliminated Schonlau’s xu value in an effort to eliminate the
effect of this index-type feature. These additional preprocessing techniques are
described in the below table.
It is intentional that the predictive modeling with the text mining variables
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Table B.1: Preprocessing Techniques and Results
Preprocessing
Technique
Description of Variables σ AUC
no xu value Six variables without Schonlau’s xu value 1 .829
Enhanced Fea-
tures (a)
Includes six variables plus an indicator for com-




Same as (a) except user number (integer between




Each tuple of test data contains 100 commands.
This technique will examine only the center 32
commands of the tuple, and utilizing the six vari-




Examine center 32 commands as discussed above,
however produce aggregated six variables for every
tuple.
1 .79
Rank Order There are 635 distinct commands. Rank order
from 1-635 based upon frequency. Now the tuple
can be represented by a vector of 100 variables,
with each feature being the number that repre-
sents the rank order of the command. The num-
ber 636 will represent any commands not seen in
the training data.
1 .683
636feature Utilize a vector of 636 variables for each tuple of
data. Each position in the vector corresponds to
the tuple’s frequency of a distinct command, and
position 636 will correspond to the frequency of





shown in Table B.1 are not compared against Schonlau’s techniques. Schonlau builds
the statistics for his models from the first 5,000 authentic commands from each user;
this is an unsupervised approach. He tests his techniques with the subsequent 10,000
commands. The text mining techniques discussed in this paper focus solely on the
subsequent 10,000 commands for each user and generally utilize a supervised ap-
proach. The text mining techniques are not comparable with Schonlau’s techniques;
they are fundamentally different.
The absence of Schonlau’s xu value created degraded performance as expected.
Since the xu value is an overall indicator of whether or not an intruder is present,
it is a powerful predictor and hampers our clarity in determining the effectiveness
of other variables. The best performance of the aforementioned predictive modeling
occurred with Enhanced Features (b) with an AUC of .917 at σ = 1. The two
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variables added to this preprocessing technique, commands never seen from the
particular user (simply a 0 or 1 value) and the user number (integer between 1 and
50) provide an immense impact on the predictive power. It is likely that these two
variables provide a personalization of each tuple, effectively providing a signature of
each user that the learning machine identifies and uses to improve performance.
The other interesting thread of these results involves the continued poor per-
formance of expanded preprocessing techniques that provide the learning machine
with the raw data of each command as opposed to a summation or average. It is
difficult to ascertain exactly why this phenomena occurs. During the discussion of
the 601 feature model, we hypothesize that this degraded performance occurs be-
cause summations and averages are likely functions of sufficient statistics, and these
sufficient statistics provide as much information as possible regarding the variable.
The poor performance could also be an indicator that much noise and irrelevant
data is digested by the learning machine, creating convoluted results.
B.2 Results of Combining Data Mining Techniques
During this research project, another student at Rensselaer Polytechnic Insti-
tute also designed variables for predictive modeling of Schonlau’s data set. Yongqiang
Zhang developed a method named recursive data mining (RDM) that is based on
the simple but powerful model of cognition called a conceptor [135]. RDM recur-
sively mines a string of symbols by finding frequent patterns, encoding them with
unique symbols, and rewriting the string using this new coding. He used recursive
data mining to characterize the structure and high-level symbols in user signatures
and the monitored sessions.
In recursive data mining method, the input is encoded into symbols and then
mined for dominant patterns. Dominant patterns are then assigned new codes that
are then used to generate the data representation of a higher level. The input is
thus recursively mined until no new dominant pattern exists. During the recursive
mining, we generate several features that will be used to form the user’s signature
profile and will be compared to the features of monitored string. The result of this
RDM technique was sixteen variables that could be merged with the text mining
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variables.
In addition to the 9 text mining variables, we also utilized the first 16 variable
from the Communal Intrusion Detection Technique of RDM. Figure B.1 illustrates
the scaled values of these variables with respect to the output; this is the same
analysis that we performed with the text mining variables in Figure 4.2. The output
is again shown in the last column, and variables 1-25 are shown in th preceding
columns. The first 9 variables are the text mining variables, and the remaining 16
variables are the RDM variables.
Figure B.1: Matrix plot of combined variables
The first variable in particular demonstrates predictive power, illustrating a
clear direct correlation with the output. This is a text mining variable, “new”,
which is a 0 for any tuples that do not contain a new command never seen from
a particular user and 1 if a new command is seen. A more descriptive method
for representing this characteristic is to count the number of new commands. For
example, in a tuple of 100 commands, it is probably not unusual to see one or two
new commands, however some of the tuples contained 100 new commands! This
is obviously a function of how the dataset was created (by inserting another user’s
data and not attempting to mimic and intruder). Using this variable alone as a
prediction measure actually performs comparably with Schonlau’s xu value from
the uniqueness algorithm. The xu variable can be seen as the 9th column in Figure
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B.1.
It is also of value to analyze the correlation that exists between variables,
often identifying some of the “cousin” features that may be redundant. Within the
text mining variables there is almost a perfect correlation that exists between the
second and seventh variables; both of these variables involve the presence of unusual
commands. Variable 2, “%Unix”, captures the percentage of commands that are
Unix. Variable 7, “foreign”, captures the number of commands never seen before
from the entire population of users. These are often non-Unix commands, resulting
in the correlation.
Figure B.2: Correlation of combined variables
The most valuable analysis that is evident from Figure B.2 is the minimal cor-
relation between the text mining variables and the RDM variables. This minimal
correlation indicates that combining these two preprocessing techniques should re-
sult in a synergistic effect, essentially outperforming the ROC convex hull (ROCCH)
[56]. The ROCCH is the best operating point when considering the same False
Positive tolerance for two classification systems. The goal is to combine systems
somehow to exceed this ROCCH. Figure B.5 illustrates exactly this in a cartoon
diagram.
After analyzing the fundamental statistics of the combined set of variables,
we explored the predictive power of each variable set and the combined set. The
learning machine utilized was Rosipal’s Kernel Partial Least Squares (K-PLS) [124].
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Utilizing a gaussian kernel element, choosing an appropriate value for σ was neces-
sary. Through trial and error we found σ values of 1,2,or 3 typically worked best.
Similar to the text mining analysis discussed in section 4.5, the data was split
into 4000 training tuples and 1000 testing tuples. The nine text mining variables
(variables 1-9) achieve an area under the curve (AUC) of .944 utilizing the KPLS
method. The sixteen RDM variables achieved and AUC of .915 (variables 10-25).

























Vars 1-9, AUC =.944 Vars 10-25, AUC=.915 combined, AUC=.979
Figure B.3: ROC curve illustrating synergy from combination
The ROCCH of the subordinate curves would set almost directly on the curve
of the text mining variables. There is obvious information that the learning machine
gleans when combining these sets of variables that is not apparent from either of
the sets when considered independently.
Combining sets of variates is a field that has been explored for many years,
with much of the original work performed by Hotelling almost 75 years ago [78]. In
the advent of learning machines, combinations of multiple classifiers is a term often
mentioned. However, exploring the underlying statistics and illustrating the power
of the combination through synergistic ROC curves is a novel concept. Future work
in this field involves exploring the theoretical roots of what creates synergy when
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combining two sets of variables.
B.3 Defining and Striving for Synergy
These next sections involve developing techniques in creating synergistic com-
binations of variables from Schonlau’s dataset. It is the preprocessing of the data
that sets the stage for a good or bad prediction model. During initial work with this
data, our goal involved building combinations of classification systems that when
combined exceeded the capabilities of either system alone - creating synergy. The
measure of synergy comes from the analysis of each system’s Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve and the ROC curve of the combined system. Fawcett
and Provost explored combining multiple classification systems through the analysis
of the ROC curves. Their research emphasized achieving optimality by operating
on the convex hull produced by the ROC curves of the component systems, referred
to as the ROCCH [56]. This research proposes that there is an optimum beyond the
convex hull. By combining orthogonal sets of variables, synergy occurs.
A common yardstick to measure a binary classification system is the area un-
der the ROC curve. The ROCCH of several classification systems is simply the
curve representing the points of the greatest true positive ratings (from the compo-
nent systems) for every possible false positive rating. If a combined classification
system exceeds the ROCCH, it will inherently have a greater AUC and represent a
synergistic classification system.
The below illustration is a cartoon sketch of a superior ROC curve that gains
synergy from component systems.
One approach towards solving the optimal classification technique of the car-
toon in Figure 1 is to determine simply where on the convex hull of the component
systems there is an acceptable operating point. If cost prohibits multiple prepro-
cessing techniques, this could perhaps be the best solution. However, when multiple
preprocessing techniques are available, the prediction modeling discussed here apply.
The relevance of this work involves managing the selection of multiple pre-
processing techniques or multiple sets of variables. This discussion is not about
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Figure B.4: Cartoon example of synergistic ROC curve
significance of a set of variables. There could be an instance when an organiza-
tion must decide amongst several preprocessing systems or sets of variables. Cost,
often measured in memory space or processing speed, may constrain the number
of variable sets that an IDS can manage. These techniques provide quantitative
and graphical techniques to illustrate the value of a set of variables. Decision mak-
ers who utilize these techniques in analyzing variable sets will provide themselves
with improved opportunity for a successful IDS that operates as a superior binary
classification system.
B.4 Orthogonal Preprocessing
The first step in any prediction modeling effort is determining how to prepro-
cess the raw data. Since data preprocessing is often subjective and involves the data
mining creativity of the researchers, it is difficult to quantify how to capture two
or more orthogonal preprocessing techniques from the same set of data. From a se-
mantic point of view, orthogonal preprocessing techniques occur by mining the same
data set with different intentions. For example, there are two orthogonal prepro-
cessing techniques explained in this report: text mining and recursive data mining.
The underlying intentions behind the text mining involved describing a user’s be-
havior by collecting statistics based upon both individual user and group command
frequency, type, and popularity in many different manners and combinations. The
underlying intentions of the recursive data mining involved detecting patterns of
command usage for the purpose of identifying intruders and author identification
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from the same data set [135]. These two preprocessing techniques significantly differ
with regard to intended use, however they provide a measurement for common data.
These two preprocessing techniques also demonstrate orthogonality, which will be
shown later.
B.4.1 Analyzing The Text Mining Variables and RDM Variables
The text mining variables and RDM variables capture very different behavior
involving the same data. The text mining variables focus on command types and
the presence or absence of commands typically used by a particular user. The
RDM variables represent patterns that exist within the data, and these patterns are
relatively unique for each user, providing a measure of authenticity.
We observed good prediction modeling from both of these preprocessing tech-
niques utilizing Rosipal’s KPLS as a learning machine [124]. In an effort to maintain
consistency and a basis for comparison, we conducted all of our prediction model-
ing with this learning machine. Since both techniques performed well for the same
dataset, combining these variable sets seemed logical. Utilizing the area under the
ROC curve (AUC) as a measure of performance, the combination of these variable
sets achieved a noticeable improvement, shown in Figure B.5. The ROC curve of
the combined variables exceeds the ROCCH of the component systems, illustrating
synergy.
This synergy further encouraged the hypothesis that the two preprocessing
techniques utilized possessed orthogonality. However, finding a measure of orthog-
onality would be necessary. There are two techniques utilized to determine this
measure of orthogonality: the first technique involves analyzing the correlation that
exists between the associated principal components of each set (ie, calculate the
correlation of the text mining 1st principal component against the RDM 1st princi-
pal component, and the 2nd principal components, etc.) and the second technique
exercised canonical correlation analysis.
B.4.1.1 Principal Components Analysis for Orthogonality
Principal components are a linear combination of the variables such that the

























Vars 1-9, AUC =.944 Vars 10-25, AUC=.915 combined, AUC=.979
Figure B.5: Experimental results illustrating synergistic combination
of variance while remaining uncorrelated with the remaining principal components.
Principal components analysis involves the decomposition of the correlation matrix;
see [85] for a more detailed explanation.
Let ρi,j represent the correlation between the ith principal component of the
text mining variables and the jth principal component of the recursive data mining
variables. If the respective principal components of these variable sets presented
a low correlation (| ρi,j |< .5), especially for principal components that represent
greater that 10% of the variance, then we consider these variable sets orthogonal
and expect synergy from the combination of the variables. The color correlation
plot of the first three text mining principal components and the first three RDM
principal components is shown in Figure B.6.
In an effort to create a non-synergistic combination, we compared the principal
components of a subset of variables from the text mining variables against the
principal components from the entire set of text mining variables. As one could
expect based upon this experiment, the principal components demonstrated a high
correlation, where | ρi,j |> .8 in some cases. For this example, the ROC curve of
the combination sat almost directly on top of the ROCCH of the two component
systems.
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Figure B.6: Color correlation of first 3 principal components between text
mining variables and RDM variables
Although lower correlations between principal components of different variable
sets provided an indication for orthogonality, it is possible that high correlations
could result from two data sets that create synergy when combined. If there are
rogue variables that create a high degree of variance within a data set but provide
minimal predictive power, these variables will carry a strong weight in the principal
components. If both sets of variables have such a rogue variable, and these rogue
variables correlate for some reason, high correlation could result between principal
components of orthogonal variable sets. For this reason, it is important to always
Mahalanobis scale (normalize data, subtracting the sample mean and dividing by
the sample standard deviation) data first and compare the weights (coefficients)
that exist in the linear combinations that represent the scores for the principal com-
ponents. If these weights strongly favor these rogue type variables, further analysis
of the orthogonality is necessary. Another technique to examine orthogonality is
canonical correlation analysis.
B.4.1.2 Canonical Correlation Analysis for Orthogonality
Canonical correlation analysis is multivariate statistical technique designed for
comparing two sets of variables. The background for this technique is discussed in
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section 2.2.1.2.
Similar to principal components analysis, the first several canonical corre-
lations provide the most significant information. We observed the 1st canonical
correlation between the text mining variables and the RDM variables to be .699,
which would be high when considering two variables. However, we observed synergy
through this combination. Through our experimental results, we observed synergy
for when the absolute value of the first canonical correlations was generally lower
than .8.
B.5 Experimental Results for Orthogonal Analysis
There were three cases examined in the experiment performed with the prin-
cipal components. In regard to the numbering of the variables, recall that variables
1-9 are the text mining variables and variables 10-25 are the RDM variables. We
created three different cases: Case 1 compared variables 1,7,8,9 against variables
1-9. This is an instance where one of the variable sets is a subset of the other vari-
able set. High correlation between the principal components of each variable set is



























Figure B.7: ROC curves and correlation matrix from Case 1
The ROC curves in Figure B.7 illustrate the performance of Rosipal’s KPLS
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when the features are the principal components of the variables indicated in the
legend. For example, for the line representing variables 1,7,8,9, this ROC curve
is a result of using the first three principal components of these four variables as
features. For the ROC curve representing the combined model, this simply involved
concatenating the three principle components from each variable set to create a
prediction model with six features. The purpose of analyzing the combined model
is to determine if the combination creates synergy. The idea with Case 1 is to
show that if the principle components between two sets of variables show a high
correlation, the combination of these variable sets will not produce a synergistic
ROC curve. As a matter of fact, this combination produced an ROC curve that sat
almost directly on the ROCCH.
Case 2 compared variables 1,7,8,9 against variables 2-6. This case involved all
text mining variables, but the variable sets were mutually exclusive (ie, the same


























Figure B.8: ROC curves and correlation matrix from Case 2
Case 2 is beginning to show synergy. Notice that the correlation of the variables
is lower, and the ROC curve of the combined principle components lie noticeably
outside of the ROCCH.
Case 3 compared the text mining variables versus the RDM variables, or vari-
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Vars 1-9, AU =.881
Vars 10-25, AUC=.879
combined, AUC=.9209
Figure B.9: ROC curves and correlation matrix from Case 3
This case illustrates a noticeable increase in the ROC curve for the combined
principal components. The correlations between the principal components from each
set of variables is low; the highest correlation is .34.
The canonical correlation analysis also provided encouraging results. Since
the 1st canonical correlation always has the largest correlation value, a low value for
this 1st canonical correlation represents orthogonal sets of variables which should
produce a synergistic combination. Analyzing the canonical correlation for each
of the same three cases considered for principal components analysis provided the
following results:












Case 1 .6999 .5597 .4536
Case 2 1 1 1
Case 3 .3941 .2971 .1537
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Both case 1 and case 3 demonstrated synergy when combined. Case 2 did not
demonstrate synergy, as expected, because one set of variables was simply a subset
of the other set of variables. Given two sets of variables that predict reasonably
well (AUC ¿ .7), combining these sets of variables prior to prediction modeling will
create synergistic improvement given a low canonical correlation between the sets
of variables.
The analysis of synergy between sets of variables provides a method to evaluate
the contribution that a set of variables provides to a prediction machine. This
research directly relates to sensitivity analysis and provides a platform to summarize
results when multiple sets of variables exist.
Much of today’s research in intrusion detection systems involves examining
multiple intrusion detection systems, hybrid systems, and ensemble methods. When
collecting and considering a combination of agents that will provide intrusion de-
tection or prevention, analyzing the synergy of the variable sets provides a platform
for deciding which agents provide redundant performance. In addition to providing
a higher level of analysis for combinations of multiple classifiers involving intrusion
detection, the techniques previously discussed could extend to almost any classi-
fication problem involving multiple sets of variables. The ROC curve analysis is
particularly applicable to binary classifications problems. Security problems in gen-
eral can always be modeled as a binary classification problem, and the improvement
of our society’s security posture is an endeavor worthy of continued pursuit.
APPENDIX C
IMPLEMENTATION OF GENETIC ALGORITHM IN
PERL
#########################################
# Genetic Algorithm written by
# Paul F. Evangelista
# DEC 04
#
# This program utilizes a genetic algorithm
# to find uncorrelated subspaces by measuring
# their principal component correlation (across
# subspaces)
##########################################
sub shuffle #Randomly shuffle any given array
{




my $j = int rand ($i+1);




sub fitness { #Calculates fitness of each member utilizing Analyze
















@subset_1 = sort{$a<=>$b} @subset_1;
@subset_2 = sort{$a<=>$b} @subset_2;












#$call = "sh W_SVM.bashrc > details.txt";








sub sel_breed { #receives array of fitness values
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my @input = @_;
my $length = @input;
my ($i,@prob,$rn,$j,@sel_gen,$comp,@sort_input,@new_input);
my $cum_prob =0;
my $sum = 0;
my @new_input = sort{$a<=>$b} @input;
$new_input[$length] = $new_input[$length-1] + 1;
for ($i=0;$i<$length;$i++) {
#creates sort input which is an index array to original input in sorted order
$comp = 0;
for ($j=0;$j<$length;$j++) {





my $maxer = 0;
for ($i=0;$i<$length;$i++) { #find max fitness of current generation





for ($i=0;$i<$length;$i++) { #Create probabilities for selection
$sum = $sum + ($maxer - $new_input[$i]);
}
for ($i=0;$i<$length;$i++) { #Create probabilities for selection
$prob[$i] = ($maxer-$new_input[$i])/$sum;
#adjusts probability for minimization problem
$cum_prob = $cum_prob + $prob[$i];
$prob[$i] = $cum_prob;
print "$sort_input[$i] $new_input[$i] $prob[$i]\n";
}


















#print "rand#: $rn index: $sel_gen[$i]\n";
}
$sel_gen[$length-1] = $sort_input[0]; #elitist selection







for ($i=0;$i<50;$i++) { #create a random number of initial members
@array = @ordered_array;
shuffle(\@array);
$rand_chrom[$i] = join "\t",@array;
}
########################################################
our $no_gens = 30; #Experimental Control parameters
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#best fitness will range from 0 to 1, where 0 is best

















shuffle(\@array); #insert two immigrants for worst performers
$curr_chrom[$breeders[$gen_size-3]] = join "\t",@array;
shuffle(\@array);
$curr_chrom[$breeders[$gen_size-2]] = join "\t",@array;
























#print "creating offspring from parents $crossover[$i] and $crossover[$i+1]\n";
@parent_1 = split /\t/,$current_chrom[$crossover[$i]];




















#checks to see what integers went unused and assigns them to an "avail" array
if ($child_1[$l] == $j+1) {
$used_1 = 1;
}




























@check1 = sort{$a<=>$b} @child_1;
@check2 = sort{$a<=>$b} @child_2;
#print "child_1 sorted after check:\n @check1\n";
#print "child_2 sorted after check:\n @check2\n";
$new_chrom[$x_over_pu] = join "\t", @child_1;
$x_over_pu++;





print "size should be gen_size: $size\n";
for ($l=0;$l<$gen_size-1;$l++) { #MUTATION
for ($k=0;$k<$length;$k++) {
$rn = rand;
if ($rn < .01) {
#print "chrom before mutation:\n $new_chrom[$l]\n";





$new_chrom[$l] = join "\t", @array;








print "elitist at end of program: \n $current_chrom[$gen_size-1]\n";
}
print "Worst fitness is: $worst_fitness\n\n$worst\n\n";







@worst_sets = split /\t/,$worst;

















print GAout "Worst fitness is: $worst_fitness\n\n$worst\n\n";
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print GAout "Best fitness is : $best_fitness\n\nFittest chromosome:\n$fittest\n";
########## END OF MAIN LOOP ###################################
print "Worst fitness is: $worst_fitness\n\n$worst\n\n";
print "Best fitness is : $best_fitness\n\nFittest chromosome:\n$fittest\n";
@array = split /\t/,$fittest;







@subset_1 = sort{$a<=>$b} @subset_1;
@subset_2 = sort{$a<=>$b} @subset_2;
@subset_3 = sort{$a<=>$b} @subset_3;
open(set_1,">set_1.txt");
open(set_2,">set_2.txt");
open(set_3,">set_3.txt");
for ($i=0;$i<9;$i++) {
print set_1 "$subset_1[$i]\n";
print set_2 "$subset_2[$i]\n";
$subset_2[$i] = $array[$i+9];
if ($i<8) {
print set_3 "$subset_3[$i]\n";
}
}
